212. Telegram 8493 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
8493. Subject: Christian Democrats on the Offensive. Ref: A) Santiago 8347; B) Santiago 8385; C) Santiago 8386.
1. Summary: Christian Democratic (PDC) Secretary reports that party has prepared for distribution an analysis of Chilean situation and statement of position by ex-President Frei, which will attack government (hold this information until statement is released). PDC leaders are prepared for strong reaction; they even believe statement may catalyze change of GOC leadership. Embassy doubts government is in such straits, but believes publication will present government with unpleasant choice of ducking a hard-to-duck direct challenge, or taking counter-action which if characteristically insensitive could deepen its domestic and foreign isolation. End summary.
2. EmbOff Dec 15 had long talk with Rafael Moreno, Christian Democratic Party (PDC) Secretary (protect). Moreno had returned to Chile only a week earlier after two and one-half months abroad, principally in Brazil on private contract, but with two long sessions in Washington and New York, where he talked with wide variety of official, Congressional and private persons.
3. Moreno said that seen from abroad, he had had following principal impressions of Chile: (A) Economic situation is bad and shows little sign of improvement; (B) Relationship between church and state has become more difficult: Moreno was particularly impressed with [Page 581] US church’s strong support for Chilean colleagues and its criticism of GOC; (C) Swing of USG against Chile, as exemplified by favorable vote on UNGA resolution on Chilean human rights. Moreno said he had strong impression that USG would not backtrack from its new position.
4. In few intensive days since his return to Santiago, Moreno said he had talked with wide spectrum of opinion and arrived at following conclusions:
A) Economic situation is even worse than he had pictured while abroad. Lack of confidence has spread throughout middle-class, so that even formerly firm supporters of government now criticize economic program, although in general not yet criticizing government itself. Moreno said that lacking substantial increase in copper prices—and there is no sign of that—continuing present GOC economic policy will only drive Chilean economy further into the ground.
B) Church-State relationship is even more difficult than he had seen from abroad. Church will not challenge GOC openly, by for example mounting demonstrations in the streets. However, church hierarchy, clergymen and broad stratum of supporters are more and more decisively against government. He noted particularly that GOC (whatever the merits of the cases) had alienated important holy cross, Jesuit and Maryknoll orders as result of actions against MIR. He expected that current meeting of Episcopal conference in South of Chile would reject Bishop Camus’ resignation as Conference Secretary (it has), and that a supporter of Cardinal would be elected President of Episcopal committee (this did not happen). Both would be identified with Cardinal Silva, whose firm line vis-à-vis the GOC was strongly supported by Pope Paul during Cardinal’s recent visit to Rome. Moreno thought that Catholic laymen were increasingly sensitive to government’s hard line policy.
C) Pinochet’s position has become more individualized as he has emphasized his presidential authority. Appearance now is of a personal dictator who returned from what he saw as triumphal visit to Spain intending to impose a Francoist pattern on his country.
D) Partly as a result of Pinochet’s more assertive position, Chilean Air Force is thoroughly out of sorts with Pinochet and the army, and almost ready to try something else. Navy also is alienated from Pinochet. Latter himself was rebuffed by General Arellano, who got away with it.
5. In addition to this analysis, Moreno noted signs of opportunistic swing by leading pro-junta newspaper “El Mercurio.” Moreno said that PDC President Aylwin’s statement on CIA and PDC (ref A) had been published in “Mercurio” at express order of Director Rene Silva, and against advice of senior editor Arturo Fontaine, who supported govern [Page 582] ment position against publishing document. Moreno noted in addition “Mercurio’s” strong editorial against government’s new decree law on censorship and media suspension (ref B). Moreno described decree law as a “stupid” step intended to justify GOC closure of PDC magazine “Politica y Espiritu.” Moreno saw “Mercurio” disengagement from government as important bellwether.
6. Moreno continued that in context of this analysis and background, ex-President Frei in next few days will issue lengthy pamphlet analyzing present Chilean situation and giving his judgment on it. (He asked that word of impending publication be held tightly.) Moreno said the analysis had been in the works for considerable time, at least since October. Moreno continued that in party leadership’s judgment moment had now come for PDC to make its position clear. Party members were increasingly uneasy, and lack of public clarification of party’s position during period when GOC appeared so nervous would only tend to drive party members to the left, since increasingly they see little prospect of PDC’s moderate course affecting Chilean events.
7. He said that statement would be given very wide distribution. Party had handled reproduction “prudently,” but made no attempt at doing it clandestinely. It had not warned any of its armed forces friends what was afoot. Intention was to present a fait accompli to the armed forces, in the hope that military leaders would take whatever action they considered appropriate for Chile’s future.
8. Asked about possible worst case GOC reaction to Frei initiative, Moreno said government could only expel Frei, Party President Aylwin, and/or party leadership, and outlaw the PDC. He commented that such a worst case was no longer much of a deterrent. As for best case, publication could catalyze change in government leadership, which would bring with it change in policy. He said it made little difference who would take leadership, but he assumed the army would continue on top, and that all junta members would be replaced.
9. EmbOff wondered whether PDC might not be engaged in wishful thinking. Moreno admitted possibility but said time for action had come, and that party thought it could not delay longer making its position clear to public.
10. Comment: PDC searched its soul year ago and embraced moderate policy line aimed at eventual democratic cooperation with military government, only to find government rebuffing any thought of such cooperation with increasing vehemence. We agree with PDC that government is nervous but doubt any change in its leadership is imminent. Rather, it is PDC which, largely immobilized and slowly disintegrating, must feel that it can no longer remain passive. Recent release of Senate Committee report on CIA and Chile (ref C), according to Moreno, was body blow to Frei, and we imagine it may have led him to move before effects cut too deep.
[Page 583]11. EmbOff was careful to make clear to Moreno that he understood much of latter’s analysis but could not in any way be identified with it or advise Moreno on substance or timing.
12. Embassy just received advance copy of Frei pamphlet. It is under his name, 67 double-spaced pages long, and is entitled “The Mandate of History and the Requirements of the Future.” First page states: “I am often asked what I think about the situation in Chile. This is my answer.” Report on pamphlet follows.
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Summary: The Embassy reported that a critical pamphet by former President Frei would place the Chilean Government in a difficult position. The junta would have to decide between not responding to direct criticism or taking actions that would reinforce its isolation from Chilean civil society and the world community.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750439–0286. Confidential. Repeated to La Paz, Lima, and Buenos Aires. In the pamphlet, Frei envisioned a majority of Chileans coming together in a democratic Chilean Government to form consensus on policy. (Telegram 8549 from Santiago, December 18; ibid., D750441–0023) In telegram 686 from Santiago, January 27, 1976, the Embassy reported that although Frei’s pamphlet criticizing the junta would add to its difficulties, there was no apparent weakening of the junta’s control. (Ibid., D760031–0692)
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