Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

205. Transcript of Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting¹

Washington, October 8, 1975, 8:08 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

[Mr. Rogers:] On Chile, I had a long meeting with the Pentagon yesterday. They want to get cracking on the sales program. They want to consult with the Congress beforehand. The question is that they—

Secretary Kissinger: That’s another six weeks, right?

Mr. Rogers: No. It shouldn’t be anything like that. There are just really three key people with respect to the issue who spoke to it on the floor during the debate on the Continuing Resolution—McClellan and Brooke, primarily—McClellan, who was for, having said the Continuing Resolution continued to furnish sales—and an erroneous statement. But the Pentagon feels, quite properly, they’ve got to consult with him.

Now, the packages that we have worked out—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know damn well that Brooke is going to say “No.”

Mr. Rogers: Not if the Pentagon press is right—and they will. What we want to say is to clear the books of previous sales committed—sales which we were committed to.

Secretary Kissinger: Why do I have the uneasy feeling that you guys are euchring me step-by-step into an arms embargo on Chile?

Mr. Rogers: Well, you shouldn’t. There’s nothing malevolent with what we’re proposing here.

Secretary Kissinger: No. But you’re going to propose the arms cutoff on the 502, right?

Mr. Rogers: No, not on the 502.

Secretary Kissinger: But that’s how it’s going to be leaked. Then you’re going to say you’re clearing the books on sales. After that, nothing will be done; then we have an embargo—right?

If the only reason you’re going to sell is on the ground that it’s already been committed, if you’re not going FMS on the ground—which I’m sure will get around—that it’s the first victory for 502(b), how are you going to resume? That’s what’s going to happen, you know.

Mr. Maw: You’re not cutting off sales entirely.

Secretary Kissinger: On the ground that these were things that were ordered before.

Mr. Maw: No. Sales generally.

Mr. Rogers: Sales generally.

Let me restate what I was saying. What is going forward is, (1), to clear the books of all the stuff that had been ordered beforehand and to propose an additional package. Clearing the books is 60 million dollars’ work. It’s a helluva lot of stuff. It’s reconfiguring the F–4s. It’s all the munitions for the—

Secretary Kissinger: What—so they don’t shoot?

Mr. Rogers: They don’t now. That’s the problem. And it’s also the—

Secretary Kissinger: I had the impression that Chile is being thrown to the wolves. I do not know why I do have that impression.

Mr. Rogers: If anybody was trying to play ducks on this measure, they would have leaked the issue long ago.

Secretary Kissinger: No, not as long as they’ve got it blocked in the bureaucracy—which seems to have happened for a month.

Mr. Maw: It’s still sitting—

Secretary Kissinger: That’s right.

Mr. Maw:—until you release it.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve been releasing it since July once a week. (Laughter.)

Mr. Rogers: The Pentagon is prepared to go. They want to talk to the Congress with respect to the past sales—

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think Brooke is going to say? I’ll tell you what Brooke is going to say. That’s a mental riot. What do you think Brooke is going to say? Do you think Brooke is going to say: “Good. That’s exactly the proposition I’ve been waiting for”—

Mr. Rogers: No.

Secretary Kissinger:—or he’ll rush out on the Senate floor? I’ll tell you what his constituency wants him to say: “That’s a great way to get campaign votes for nothing.”

Mr. Rogers: And the alternative is to go ahead with consultation on that, and the Pentagon is vigorously opposed to that.

Secretary Kissinger: But why didn’t they consult six weeks ago, two months ago? This issue is not new. Why did we wait for three months, only to conclude that now we’ve got to start the process of consultation?

Mr. Rogers: No. Part of the reason was—

Secretary Kissinger: I know it’s unfair of me to think there’s foot-dragging when things like that go on.

Mr. Rogers: Look, the bureaucratic decision of getting the foot-dragging settled has been settled. It’s part of the problem of getting that whole package through.

Secretary Kissinger: But part of the package was turned down. Who was in favor of the FMS thing?

Mr. Rogers: To give FMS credit?

Secretary Kissinger: What time did it take not to give them FMS? If I judge the bureaucracy correctly, two seconds.

Mr. Maw: It was not settled until your talks with the Chileans.

Secretary Kissinger: But it didn’t take time, for God Sakes. It wasn’t settled. I didn’t want it. I was sort of maneuvered into it. It’s totally against my policy and you know it.

Mr. Maw: Once you got maneuvered into it, then it came out of the papers—

Secretary Kissinger: You know it’s against my policy. I really resent Bureaus maneuvering me that way.

And if you may think it’s wrong, then state a different view. I do not believe it is proper to use our military—our military sales are either because they’re for our security or they are—if we once get into other criteria, we’re licked.

Mr. Maw: And they’re doing the same thing now on economic aid, and someone is approving that bill up there on human rights grounds.

Mr. Rogers: The issue is, very simply: Do you want to take the Congress on with respect to credits on farms or on Chile?

Secretary Kissinger: In fact, you could make an equally good case that if you let them win on FMS that they’ve got their pound of flesh. They’re going to get their pound of flesh.

Do you think that Chile will sneak through the Congress? There are only two ways. (1), we can say that we’ve dropped them from FMS because we find their human rights things are repugnant. “Therefore, you’ve got your pound of flesh. Therefore, don’t take any more”—that’s one way of doing it—or to say our position on FMS is given on the grounds of security. Therefore, let them link it to human rights as their responsibility and knock it out.

If we don’t, do you not think we’re going to have a human rights thing on Chile up on the Hill?

Mr. Rogers: Of course they are. My own assessment is as a matter of straight, raw politics: You have a better case of keeping the sales program alive if you don’t go for credits. That’s what it comes down to.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s an argument that’s perhaps possible, but not the way this thing is going to wind up being played.

Mr. Rogers: But we don’t play it that way. The only thing that we’re proposing to do now with respect to the credit issue is Chile. That’s going up in the next day or so.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s not going up with my approval.

Mr. Rogers: No.

Secretary Kissinger: There should be absolutely no misapprehension about it. And I am perfectly capable of sitting on it for six weeks.

Mr. Maw: It holds up the Mideast and everything. The Portuguese will be pulled out. We’re trying to send some papers through separately, and OMB is raising hell about it this morning. But we’ve got to release our Mideast package. We’ve got to release a lot of others. We’re getting a lot of flak, and the only unsettled question at the moment is Chile.

Secretary Kissinger: Which I never had a chance to focus on.

Mr. Maw: Well, last Monday we stopped it when it was going through with no FMS. You said you wanted another look at it.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But I ought to be in on these decisions much earlier.

Mr. Rogers: No decision was made. It hadn’t matured, really, until a couple of days before you and I talked about it in New York. Nobody was trying to do anything behind your back. No decision was made.

Secretary Kissinger: How did it mature? What’s the definition of “mature”?

Mr. Rogers: Well, it’s only by then that all the relevant Bureaus of the Department came together in a proposal to you, which was made available in a memorandum to you last week. You and I talked about it in New York.

Secretary Kissinger: The relevant Bureaus can just as well get together six weeks earlier, because all they do is weep around with each other so that they can finally make a compromise.

Mr. Maw: All Bureau work had been done on every one of these items, holding it up on Chile to make a decision.

Secretary Kissinger: But what inspiration were we looking for, and what was it that we gained by waiting six weeks on Chile? What fact was missing that we needed?

Mr. Maw: Because we couldn’t go with Chile until the Mideast package was settled, so everything was held up at once.

Secretary Kissinger: Why was everything held up at once?

Mr. Maw: You have to have a number that adds up to the total budget approval.

Secretary Kissinger: The fact that OMB can’t decide earlier doesn’t mean—

Mr. Maw: We’ve got money in various other corners, which we allocate to Chile—if that’s the decision. It would still add up to the total number, but we have to go forward this week with that package. We’re having trouble now getting the Portuguese cleared.

Mr. Rogers: My basic argument is you go and propose 20 million for credits and Chile and I think you’re really closing the door with respect to possibilities. I propose zero for Chile to go with the sales, and I think we have a fighting chance of getting it through.

I’m meeting with Carvajal this afternoon. I talked with Trucco; on Monday I went over the ground with him again. I said, “Look, we want to be sure what your opinion is. Do you want politically for us to take that fight on with respect to credits now, or do you feel that that’s a less attractive alternative to you than just sticking with the sales—the cash sales?” He said his judgment is—and I’m talking with Trucco and Carvajal again on the telephone—that he would just as soon avoid the fight with respect to the credits. I said, “O.K. I want you to understand this, and let’s talk about it again.”

Secretary Kissinger: Would we threaten to cut off PL–480 if they didn’t? (Laughter.)

Mr. Rogers: I will see him [at] 4 o’clock again this afternoon, and I will give you a report on that conversation.

Mr. Maw: As soon as you have that, let me know what the answer is so I can send it over to the White House.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven’t seen it.

Mr. Maw: Yes, you’ve seen it, except with respect to Chile.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

1. Summary: Kissinger, Maw, and Rogers discussed FMS credits for Chile. Rogers stated that in order to get congressional approval for the administration’s foreign assistance proposals, it should not propose FMS credits for Chile.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 8, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. In his October 8 conversation with Carvajal, Rogers stated that if the administration proposed FMS credits for Chile, Congress would deny the request. Carvajal and Rogers agreed that the U.S. Government should refrain from proposing FMS credits for Chile in order to prevent a fight that might prevent sales from going forward. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, P810150–1158) On October 8 Rogers sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him of his conversation with Carvajal. (Ibid., P830035–1082)