181. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Colonel Juan Contreras, Chief of the Chilean Intelligence Service
1. On 7 January 1975 I saw the Chief of the Chilean Intelligence Service, Colonel Juan Contreras, in my office. He came as a special envoy from President Pinochet with a message for you to be delivered through me.
2. I saw Contreras alone for forty-five minutes and then had him to lunch with two of my assistants. While we were alone he handed me the attached memorandum from President Pinochet.
3. Contreras told me:
a. The Chilean Government has completely dismantled the Armed Extremist Organization. They have infiltrated a member into the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party. He tells them that Communist instructions for the time being are to lie low and avoid violence.
b. President Pinochet is awaiting your visit with great pleasure and interest. He is willing, following your visit, to take a number of steps in the direction of human rights and let you have the credit for having persuaded him to do it. He wants to do everything he can to make your trip a success. They will take all necessary unostentatious security precautions.
c. In great confidence Contreras told me that President Pinochet has decided to replace Chilean Ambassador to U.S. Heitmann with a civilian [Page 489] politician who speaks good English. Several names are under consideration. A man by the name of Filippi is well up on the list.
d. Chileans do understand the current difficulties of both the U.S. Government and the Agency and realize that they must help us to help them.
e. They have released many prisoners including former Ambassador to the U.S. Letettier but cannot release Socialist Clodomiro Almeyda yet. He was Allende’s Vice President, and they fear that if they release him he will go to Mexico and set up a Chilean Government in Exile that, given the present mood of the UN, could easily obtain wide recognition. After Allende’s and Almeyda’s term runs out in 1976 they could do it then.
f. Chileans are still very concerned by Peruvian intentions and say Peruvians now have 137 tanks in Southern Peru but not nearly enough tank crews. There are, however, both Soviet and Cuban technicians there.
g. Private relations with President Peron and Argentines are excellent and the two Services are exchanging information on terrorists.
h. If there are any subjects other than those covered in the memorandum that you would like to take up with President Pinochet, he would appreciate any information you would care to transmit prior to your visit to Chile.
3. I told Contreras that in order to make it possible for us to help the Chilean Government they must help us to help them by steps in the field of human rights and now that they have dismantled armed subversion (as he told me) these should be easier. He understood and accepted this. He went away quite happy after reiterating President Pinochet’s invitation to me to visit Chile when I could. I promised Contreras to transmit President Pinochet’s memorandum to you.
Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director
Attachment as stated.
Memorandum from President delivered to Lt. General Vernon A. Walters by Colonel Juan Contreras
A. Economic
1. We need help from the U.S. to renegotiate the Chilean external debt with the European Nations.
2. Request EXIMBANK to be more forthcoming with credits for Chile, for the copper, phosphate and steel industries.
3. Use influence for favorable U.S. votes for Chile in the International Economic Organizations (IBD, IMF, World Bank, etc.).
4. Obtain that AID assist the Chilean Government.
[Page 490]B. Military
1. That the U.S. assist us in some form to purchase weapons (defensive) for the purpose of avoiding an armed conflict with Peru.
-250 tanks
-tank ammunition
-anti-tank missiles
-electronic surveillance of frontiers, air, sea and land
-logistic support for equipment delivered
-aircraft
-ships (submarines, mortar torpedo launchers, and landing craft)
2. Obtain a statement or pronouncement from the U.S. in the sense that if Peru attacks Chile using the Russian equipment they have that the U.S. will oppose this.
3. Obtain the support of the U.S. against a possible accusation against Chile if attacking Peru in the UN Security Council. This American veto would have to be previous to a veto by China on the same subject.
4. For the purchase of arms, if this is necessary, authorize the formation of a company in the state of Delaware that could make it possible to acquire and ship arms.
Santiago 3 January 1975
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Summary: Walters reported on a meeting with the Chief of the Chilean intelligence service, Colonel Juan Contreras. During the meeting, Contreras delivered a memorandum from Pinochet outlining the economic and military assistance desired by the Chilean Government.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 4, Chile. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy of the January 3 memorandum from Pinochet that was delivered by Contreras to Walters is attached and published. In a handwritten note attached to the memorandum, Scowcroft suggested to Kissinger that the U.S. Government respond to Pinochet’s message by having Walters indicate that “we want to do what we can,” and that Kissinger “would hope to discuss it if you are able to visit Chile”; Kissinger approved. In a memorandum to Scowcroft, December 31, 1974, Walters noted that he had declined a Chilean invitation to Santiago for private discussions with Pinochet, and that he had suggested, as an alternative, that Contreras travel to the United States to meet with him. He added that Contreras was scheduled to visit Washington during the week of January 6–10 and was expected to deliver an appeal for assistance from Pinochet. (Ibid., Box 3, CIA–Communications 16)
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