175. Telegram 6180 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
6180. Subject: Chilean Requests for Arms Assistance. Refs: (A) State 220331; (B) Santiago 5805.
1. Summary: DefMin Bonilla conveys appreciation for our expression of hope for a favorable USG response to Chilean requests for M–48 tanks and TOWs within next two months. Emphasizing decrease in number of internal security detainees, he defends need for stringent methods in coping with violent extremists, but displays understanding for our Congressional and media problem in months ahead. End summary.
[Page 469]2. Since Dept’s instruction, for which we are grateful, stopped short of specific commitments, I decided appropriate level for démarche authorized therein would be Defense Minister Gen. Oscar Bonilla. Accordingly, I saw him on Oct 9, with Chief of US MILGP (Capt Davis) present.
3. I carefully communicated substance of paras 2 to 5 of instruction to Bonilla. He expressed great satisfaction with regard to indications that within near future way would be open for purchase of tanks and TOWs. He took our point that our willingness to strengthen Chilean army in this way, at a time of shortages in our own forces and other difficulties, is based on our sense of responsibility to help preserve hemisphere stability. He asserted that Chileans had no military aims against Peru, and no reason whatever to attack any of Chile’s neighbors. He understood that in entertaining the Chilean arms request, our purpose was deterrence.
4. Bonilla said he would communicate our message directly to the junta. He had no doubt that it would be fully appreciated. Time-frames mentioned would be helpful for Chilean planning purposes.
5. Turning next to what I had said in regard to the human rights issue, Bonilla offered both a justification and a plea for understanding. He pointed out that there had been vast changes in internal security procedures in Chile since the early days of the junta. The number of detainees on security grounds was being steadily reduced. Immediately, those being released were people who had been held without specific charges, but releases of those charged and perhaps even those sentenced would eventually take place. Detention centers such as the National Stadium, Pisagua and Chacabuco had been or were being closed. The number of those newly detained for security reasons had now fallen to only one or two a day. Because of complaints about torture, it was now a practice of the Chilean security authorities to have a doctor examine all those entering or leaving detention centers, to determine whether they had been physically abused.
6. Continuing, Bonilla said the whole business of security detention was distasteful to the junta. It was expensive, it absorbed the energies of too many people, and it provoked sharp and unjustified reactions. Unfortunately, as a result of leftist propaganda, the outside world had a vision of rivers of blood running in Chile—an obvious absurdity. He, Bonilla, would like personally to invite any US Senators concerned to come to Chile and confirm for themselves what the situation was like here today. If they, or any one else, would give him concrete cases of abuse or of disregard for human rights, he would have the matter investigated immediately. At the outset of the coup, it had been necessary to use the emergency provisions of the Chilean constitution to supplant normal legal safeguards for detainees, but this situation had changed and was changing very significantly.
[Page 470]7. At the same time, Bonilla pointed out, a serious internal security threat still existed in Chile. This was proved by the Oct 5 raid on a hideout of the violent leftist MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) organization. In the house where the MIR leader Miguel Enriquez had been killed, the authorities had found an arsenal of automatic weapons. They were constantly finding other clandestine arms stocks. The world had to understand that it was not possible to deal with terrorist opponents as if a situation of normalcy prevailed. The MIR and their likes had no concern for human rights. They used the human rights issue to gain support from others. For example, they and other leftists had flooded the courts with habeas corpus (Amparo) requests on behalf of non-existent individuals to create the impression that thousands were being unlawfully detained.
8. In response to Bonilla’s remarks I agreed that Chile’s internal security problems were often ignored or misunderstood outside the country. What seemed to me important was to continue the trend toward more normal practices. I applauded the large-scale release of detainees now taking place. Every move in this direction was helpful in coping with the Congressional difficulties I had cited in my presentation. Bonilla said he understood.
9. In noting the desirability of discretion in connection with arms purchases, I discussed with Bonilla international news reports of the Chilean purchase of F–5s and A–37s. He realizes the potential problem which could arise if there were premature publicity for the purchases now contemplated, particularly during the next sixty days.
10. Comment: I believe our message will help to assuage Chilean fears and suspicions and to produce a more relaxed approach to the problem of security vis-à-vis Peru. It will be still more effective if we can give Chileans go-ahead signals for acquisition of meaningful quantities of M–48s and TOWs even before periods mentioned in reftel A expire.
11. On the human rights discussion, Bonilla’s remarks must be viewed in the perspective of Chilean legalisms. Junta has made a case that all its internal security measures are justified under long-standing provisions of Chilean constitution, which allow a government to suspend virtually all human rights guarantees in time of war or emergency. It is a case which many Chilean lawyers challenge, but it is junta orthodoxy, and it is the basis for Bonilla’s protestations. At the same time, it is clear to me that he grasps the relationship between critical news reports and Congressional action. Bonilla is known as a relative moderate in Chilean government circles, and I believe he will exert his influence in favor of restraint.
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Summary: Popper reported that he had informed Defense Minister Bonilla of the U.S. Government’s intention to act soon on Chilean arms requests. Bonilla expressed great satisfaction and responded to Popper’s comments on human rights issues by offering a justification and a plea for understanding of the Chilean Government’s handling of internal security threats.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile–State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE–EXDIS. Secret; Exdis. The instruction for this démarche is in telegram 220331 to Santiago, October 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740283–0919) Telegram 5805 from Santiago is discussed in the source note to Document 174. On December 2, Rogers assured Heitmann that the U.S. administration’s intention to sell weapons to Chile remained unchanged, but he noted the serious problem posed by strong congressional opposition to any military assistance. (Telegram 264721 to Santiago, December 3; ibid., D740349–0725)
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