169. Telegram 4226 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
4226. Subject: New Defense Minister Complains Re US Arms Deliveries. Ref: State 150955.
1. Summary: Defense Minister Bonilla expresses hope for expanded military assistance from USG. Notes anomaly inherent in USG having reacted more responsively to Chilean arms requests when Allende in office than since, and deplores continuing arms imbalance vis-à-vis Peru. Especially concerned re TOW and M–60 tank deliveries. Ambassador explains problems presented for US, referring inter alia to Section 32 of Foreign Assistance Act. End summary.
[Page 456]2. Accompanied by Arma, I paid courtesy call on General Oscar Bonilla Bradavonic, who last week moved over to defense from post of interior minister in general cabinet reshuffle.
3. After amenities, Bonilla launched into a mild philippic with regard to US military aid to Chile. Burden of his complaint was that Peru had acquired some 200 Soviet tanks and other modern matériel, while Chile was finding it most difficult to obtain even fifteen M-60 tanks, and had been told TOW anti-tank device could not be made available because it was a sophisticated weapon. Chileans were deeply concerned, he said, over great imbalance between Peruvian and Chilean arms inventories.
4. Bonilla pointed out that under Marxist regime of ex-President Allende Soviets had been prepared to send to Chile the same type of tanks Peru finally obtained, on extremely advantageous terms. At that time, Chilean armed forces had evaded and delayed Allende’s efforts to move forward with a Soviet arms purchase. Today, the very weapons US had agreed to supply Chileans during the Allende period were apparently being withheld or deliveries postponed. Could it possibly be said that USG was more favorable to a Marxist than an anti-Marxist regime? And in these same ideological terms, was it fair to consider Chilean and Peruvian requests for US arms on a more or less even basis?
5. I took exception to Bonilla’s approach as being vastly oversimplified. Said Bonilla must remember two essential elements of present situation. First, it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain military assistance funds from US Congress and people, and what there was had to be spread among a large number of countries. Moreover, certain weapons such as M–60 tanks were in short supply in our own forces (for example, because of diversions during the Arab-Israeli war) and surely Chileans could not expect us to give lower priority to rebuilding our own inventories than to needs of other countries, friendly though they are.
6. Second point, I continued, was that while people of US of course prefer anti-Marxist to Marxist regimes, rightly or wrongly they look at problem in much broader terms. They prefer democratic governments and institutions to dictatorships or other authoritarian regimes, and this inevitably influences members of congress and organs of public opinion. Human rights problems are very real factor in Chile, and there is no doubt they increase our difficulties in meeting Chilean needs.
7. I took occasion at this point to carry out instruction re FAA Section 32 (political prisoners) contained in State 150955. Read out text of Section 32, explained that it was not a mandatory requirement, but enlarged upon its relevance to assistance programs for a large number of aid recipients.
8. Bonilla took response amicably. Asked if it would not be possible for Chileans to manufacture two in their own plants. (TOW seemed [Page 457] to be his principal immediate preoccupation.) Arma commented that it was a complex weapon, and even if this were technically possible there would be questions re patents and royalty rights of US manufacturers.
9. Comment: I have heard this rather truculent note regarding US military assistance from Chilean officials before, even from General Pinochet. It is a natural reaction of blunt military men who lack the political sensitivity and bureaucratic experience to understand the problem from our angle. Presentation is always good-natured. I think it is useful to reply with equal frankness.
10. Army Secretary Callaway will no doubt be hit with same story during his official meetings next week. We will give him updated briefing on his arrival in Santiago.
11. Other aspects of conversation reported septel.
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Summary: Popper reported that he had explained to Defense Minister Bonilla the factors that made it difficult for the U.S. Government to provide military equipment to Chile.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740192–0983. Confidential. Repeated to Lima. Telegram 150955 to multiple posts, July 12, stated that the Department was “reviewing entire area of Human Rights and authoritarianism in light of seriousness with which problems are viewed by Congress.” (Ibid., D740188–0199) In telegram 4247 from Santiago, July 18, Popper reported on other aspects of his conversation with Bonilla. (Ibid., D740194–0123) In a July 18 telephone conversation with Kubisch, Kissinger referred to Popper’s meeting with Bonilla and asked if “our Amb[assador] to Chile could be taught that he is not to reform the Chilean Government.” Kissinger expressed his preference for the new Chilean Government over that led by Allende, and he told Kubisch, “Let’s see what we can do on military equipment for them.” Kubisch expressed concern that making military equipment available to Chile could prompt Congress to pass legislation restricting the Department’s ability to provide foreign military assistance. Kubisch suggested informing the Chileans privately that military aid would be forthcoming. (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts)
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