Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

155. Memorandum From the Director of Operations Policy of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Gardner) to the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McAfee)¹

Washington, November 27, 1973.

SUBJECT

• ARA–CIA Weekly Meeting, 23 November 1973

PARTICIPANTS

• ARA—Messrs. Kubisch, Shlaudeman and Bowdler (for latter half of meeting); CIA—Mr. Flannery and INR/DDC—James R. Gardner

Chile

Most of the discussion centered around the CIA proposal for giving covert assistance to the Chilean PDC and private sector organizations. The sum proposed is [dollar amount not declassified], of which [dollar amount not declassified] would go to the PDC, [less than 1 line not declassified] and another [dollar amount not declassified] for contingencies. The purpose of the assistance, as explained in the CIA memorandum of proposal and by Mr. Flannery, is to help the PDC and elements in the private sector bridge the radical change in the situation brought about by the Junta’s overthrow of Allende.

Mr. Shlaudeman said that in his view the rationale for extending the assistance was a negative but real one. If we held off now we could be causing ourselves trouble, for it would look as if we had been interested simply in knocking off Allende. There was no question in his mind that a most important objective was for us to get out of political action in Chile once and for all. But the proposed program was a minimum one for a minimum time. He felt it should be extended with the clear understanding that after such and such a date the party would be over.

Mr. Flannery said that one problem was that reflected in the claim of the PDC that, if there were no PDC activity, the only ones that would benefit would be the Communists, since they would continue to operate and would continue to receive money.

Mr. Shlaudeman commented that this claim presumed a condition in Chile that was unlikely; that is, one in which the military would tolerate political activity by the Communists. Nonetheless, without the help of the PDC it was quite possible that the Junta would not be able to perform as an effective government, especially in the economic sphere. It needed the help of talented members of the PDC, although not necessarily that of the PDC itself. But a PDC break with the Junta, because of the effect it might have on individual dispositions to cooperate, could mean a breakdown in the effectiveness of the new government.

Mr. Kubisch said that, as we knew, he was in principle opposed to covert political operations:

(1) The political action possibilities available to us through CIA represented a means of influencing events and an instrument for action that should be used only if there were need.

(2) Given the evolution of events in the South American region in the last 25 years, and the increasing polarization in the region of contending political elements, and the history of our involvement in covert political and military action, we had to be extremely careful about using this instrument. In his view, we should employ it with the greatest reluctance and only when no other and better means were available. The damage to the US and to the USG were it to become known that we were engaged in covert operations could be very great, and across the board, in today’s world. We have been hurt by publicity about covert programs. Therefore his initial stance would be one of strong skepticism when proposals for covert political action were raised. His preference was for none whatever in the hemisphere. It would be good if we could go for years without resorting to them, if such restraint would do us no harm. Therefore he would recommend use of such programs only if there were no other way to accomplish a vitally important end.

(3) He nevertheless wished to consider the present proposal carefully. The importance of Chile and the views of important US officials who were concurring in the proposal commanded our most careful attention. But his first reaction was clearly negative.

Mr. Kubisch then referred to the help that we had given to anti-Allende elements in the 1970 election and said that whatever it was we had done, we had done it to oppose Allende and we had not achieved our objectives. Our interests in Chile as a result of the 1970 elections came under direct and material threat. We now have a different situation in Chile. While it was understandable that we felt it necessary to oppose Allende in 1970, and to help his opposition once he was in office, the question now was whether, given the abrupt change in Chile and in the security situation there, it was really essential to fine tune a political situation simply to be a moderating influence and to help the opposition stay alive. He found it difficult to see a persuasive case that we should do so. His feelings were sharpened by the problems that seemed to be emerging between the Junta and the PDC, and by the fact that the Secretary had made it clear that the change in regime in Chile was very much in our interest and that we should do all we could to help the Junta succeed. In view of the Secretary’s remarks, he would not be comfortable recommending assistance to any element in Chile that was not completely identified with the Junta. It was not essential to the success of the Junta that the PDC survive as an entity. He mentioned in this regard the situation in Mexico and Brazil.

Mr. Shlaudeman said that the case of the PDC in Chile was to be distinguished from Brazil and Mexico since the PDC was a real party with a real base, and it was the only real surviving element in the political system. What we were talking about in this proposal was help only in a transitional term. It was perhaps correct to say that the survival of the PDC as a party was not important—but what was important was that we not give the impression that we had no problems with a right wing dictatorship and that we had no interest in the survival of democracy in Chile after all that we had said over the years. He therefore still felt it would be best to tell the PDC that we would finance it for three to five months but that we were getting out of this kind of activity for good in very short order, that it was up to the PDC to put its house in order.

Mr. Shlaudeman said he was talking only about assistance to the PDC, he was against that part of the proposal that had to do with [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Shlaudeman said that in his view, based on what he knew of the operations in Chile, the security risk would be minimal. The reaction of the junta if it found out about our assistance to the PDC would not be great if our aid went to the more conservative wing of the party and not to that represented by Tomic. Six or seven months from now, he said, the reaction would probably be somewhat sharper.

Mr. Kubisch asked what would happen if in January or February the Junta found out that we had made money available to the PDC. They naturally would ask what the hell we were doing, were we still intervening in Chile; still meddling? If we could say that our program had ended with the overthrow of Allende, our position would be sound, but if, on the other hand, we had to say that we had given a little to help the PDC over a transitional period, wouldn’t the reaction be bad?

Mr. Shlaudeman said he really didn’t think it would be.

Mr. Kubisch said that when Allende had been president, it was possible to make a case that his opposition should be supported. Now, however, the situation was much different, the right wing was in control. Were we perhaps not saying simply that the situation had gone too far the other way for our taste? In gross terms, when a major threat to US interest was involved, we should use means to correct the condition, no matter how extreme they might be. This was not such a case. Just because we did not like a government was no reason to intervene in their countries. He himself didn’t like the Junta but he could not see it as a serious, extreme threat to our interests.

Mr. Shlaudeman said he agreed, but said that he was worried about the effects of a drastic, immediate cut off right now, especially since we had been saying every since 1962 that our primary interest in Chile was the survival of democracy.

Mr. Kubisch responded that Chilean democracy had taken the country close to disaster. He felt that, attractive as an orderly disengagement would have been, the present circumstances did not make this the preferable option. There were a lot of things that we favored abroad, that we thought were good things, but simply because we felt that way was no reason to use covert action to see them realized, unless, as he had said before, our interests were actually gravely threatened.

Mr. Kubisch concluded the discussion by saying that he wished to think about the matter a little more, even though he saw little prospect that his mind would change. It was agreed that Mr. Shlaudeman would speak to Ambassador Davis if the latter might advance any considerations that had not be given sufficient attention.

The meeting ended with brief discussions about Perón’s health, electoral prospects in Venezuela, and the stability of the government in Peru.

1. Summary: Department and CIA officials discussed the possible provision of secret assistance to the PDC and other private sector organizations in Chile.

   Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Congressional Liaison Files, 1959–1990: Lot 94D565, James Gardner Chronological File. Secret. The CIA’s memorandum of proposal has not been found. On December 7, Gardner outlined reasons for covert action in support of the PDC. By his estimation, such action would support centrists as opposed to right-wing groups, support democracy in Chile, and strengthen a group that could perhaps compel the junta to curtail human rights abuses. Gardner added that exposure of the assistance would not damage the reputation of the U.S. Government since the motive was to prevent the extinction of democracy, and that an abrupt cut-off of assistance might create resentment in the PDC. (Ibid.)