125. Telegram 2699 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil1
2699. Subject: Bilateral Mechanism with Brazil.
1. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Silveira:
2. Begin text: Dear Antonio: I am pleased that we were able to meet in Paris for another personal exchange; it is always helpful to have your considered views and analysis of the challenges we face.
As I mentioned in Paris, I continue to place value on a new bilateral mechanism between the United States and Brazil. Your provocative and thoughtful letter of October 16 on this subject reached me, as you know, during my flight to China. Your detailed suggestions in that letter were very useful. I would like to refer back to them here, in order to move forward towards implementing the general understandings we reached during our New York and Paris meetings so that we have an agreed plan to announce during my visit.
First, I believe as do you, that we should address the question of a “special relationship” in all candor. I trust neither of us is under any illusions or holds misunderstandings of the benefits to be gained from [Page 346] whatever consultative mechanism we establish. My government fully recognizes that—to use your words—“an economically strong and prosperous Brazil, as a member of the community of developed countries, will be an important factor in the survival of the values of the Western world.” I am aware that the developed countries, and in particular the United States, are frequently suspected of seeking an exclusive predominance in global political and economic affairs. You have my full assurance that this is not our aim. It is neither possible nor desirable to freeze the status quo among nations. To harbor such a goal would be to blind oneself to the whole course of history despite much talk about polarization and “camps” in world affairs, I could never subscribe to the proposition that there is a fixed or inherent division between “developed” and “developing” countries. The sooner the gap is narrowed, if not eliminated, the fewer causes for friction there will be in the world. This has been one of the cardinal aims of our economic assistance programs over the years. And it lies at the heart of our search for new forms of cooperation.
The real difficulties arise not in broad philosophy but in questions of methodology and pace. In this context the thought you expressed in Paris that we can achieve the same goals using different techniques is an intriguing one; I am not certain this is always the case but certainly the concept warrants further exploration in the consultative process. It is natural and understandable that the developing countries should be in a hurry, while the encrustations of law and vested interests dampen a sense of urgency on the part of the developed countries. But all countries require orderly procedures as a prerequisite for progress. The outcome in the final analysis must be responsible compromise affording to the developing countries the necessary opportunities and means to make steady progress in development without simultaneously weakening the global economic and financial structure. My proposals to the Seventh Special Session of the UN constituted a serious effort to just this end.
Brazil, as the most advanced of the developing nations, is in a unique position to appreciate these tensions. And in the context of US-Brazil relations, it is this methodology and pace, particularly in the economic area, that should form an important part of the substance of whatever consultative mechanism we establish. By the nature of things neither of us can be completely responsive to the other, but I would look upon our mechanism as a means of achieving at least some of the goals of each side and offering opportunities for better mutual understanding.
As to questions of form, I find myself in substantial agreement with the ideas expressed in your letter. In essence I concur that the classic joint commission is not the most suitable procedure for our two [Page 347] countries. What we need is a process that will enable us to provide the political framework for technical consultations. As you suggest this could be accomplished by formal consultations once a year in each country on a rotating basis. We are also in substantial agreement on the composition of delegations. We might therefore consider drawing up a memorandum of understanding along the lines of the one you have signed with the United Kingdom. Having reached a general understanding of the outline for a consultative mechanism to be headed by the two of us, I suggest that if you have no objection we work out the details through routine diplomatic channels. I shall ask our Embassy in Brasília to be in touch with the appropriate members of your staff for this purpose.
With warm personal regards. Henry. End text.
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Summary: Kissinger informed Silveira that he agreed to setting up a consultative mechanism.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760004–0023. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Zimmermann; cleared by Fishlow, Ryan, Einaudi, and Rogers; approved by the Secretary. On February 3, Rogers sent a copy of a Memorandum of Understanding worked out between the Embassy and the Foreign Office which stipulated semi-annual meetings. Kissinger approved the Memorandum of Understanding on February 7. (Ibid., L/ARA Files, Country and General Files, 1965–1979: Lot 81D324, POL 1 BRAZIL, General Policy, 1975)
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