Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

468. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)¹

Washington, September 20, 1976.

Proposal to OAG to Counter Cuban Influence in the Caribbean

I have examined the proposal (Tab 1) on countering Cuban influence in the Caribbean. The main theme of the paper is that we should consider substantially increasing our economic assistance as the principal way to achieve increased U.S. stature and leverage in the area. I agree with that. The proposal for covert action is seen as secondary and only an appendage to the economic assistance. I am opposed to the proposal of covert action in the Caribbean because it would not work.

The following are some more specific comments which I would be pleased to discuss with you.

Comments on the “Background”:

I have some substantive differences with the statement of the problem in this paper:

—Fidel’s tutelage has made Burnham and Manley stridently anti-American. Fidel may have helped and taken advantage of Burnham and Manley’s proclivities, but the reasons these two leaders have turned on us are deeply rooted in their personal, psychological, racial, economic and national pasts. The task is primarily how to deal with the Jamaica and Guyana problems not how to deal with Fidel. If we approach a new policy toward the Caribbean as a strictly anti-Cuban effort, it will most certainly fail.

—We have not justified substantial economic assistance because these countries are poor risks (mismanaged and violent) and small unworkable economies.

The reasons for our policy toward the English-speaking Caribbean of not providing significant bilateral aid are far more complex than those given in the paper:

1) In the 1960s, when the Alliance for Progress began massive bilateral programs, we made a conscious decision, with the exception of Guyana where we were fighting Jagan and the Soviets: to leave the major bilateral role to the UK and the Commonwealth (Canada) and to concentrate on multilateral lending to reinforce federalist efforts. With hindsight, that was probably a mistake but we have kept the UK active and Canada has increased significantly its AID to the English-speaking Caribbean.

2) In the 1970s, as Congress and we have increasingly decided to concentrate bilateral assistance in the most seriously affected areas, we have found that only Haiti really qualifies as an “MSA.” We have phased down elsewhere in the Caribbean.

3) In the specific cases of Guyana and Jamaica, we have not moved our small bilateral programs because of the anti-U.S. voting pattern of Guyana (a decision taken by the Secretary against ARA’s recommendation) and because of the aluminium company negotiations with Jamaica (the strong position of Treasury on this issue is well known). We have been unable to get Treasury, OMB, and the President even to agree to a small ($2.5 million) P.L.–480 program for Jamaica. The prospects of developing support in the government for a substantial economic assistance program for Jamaica or others in the Caribbean seems bleak.

—Steady increase of Cuban activity and the mini-state problem. There has been more Cuban activity and the mini-states are a problem. We are naturally concerned about the Cuban activity. We are not, however, persuaded that the Cubans are being terribly effective thus far. The new Prime Minister of Barbados has already turned to debunking the charges of “destabilization.” As to the mini-state problem, it is also troublesome. We must try to improve our relations in the area and develop a strategy. But these small islands will be prey not only to the Cubans, but to virtually anyone or group prepared to pick up the bill over the short run.

Comments on Options for the U.S.

The paper concludes that the only real means of increasing our influence in the area is through the commitment of U.S. economic resources. We agree. We are prepared to propose a package to the Secretary and the President that would enable us to increase significantly our bilateral and multilateral efforts in the area:

—In Guyana, Burnham has recently expressed renewed interest. He is not taken by the Soviets and realizes we can help.

—It is clear that Barbados, and the mini-states would be greatly encouraged by increased U.S. attention and support.

—We would want to move cautiously in Jamaica so as not to propose a major new lending package to Manley on the eve of his elections (early 1977) thus interfering in the process—and in the immediate wake of the Agee affair.

Our proposal would be to:

—move on a few small loans for Guyana and Jamaica ready to be signed,

—move on new programs for Barbados and the mini-states, and

—prepare a larger more comprehensive package for early 1977 that we could put together with several donor nations, the three banks (IBRD, IDB and Caribbean Development Bank) and the IMF.

We do not minimize the opposition we would meet in Congress and other parts of the executive branch to such a plan, but we feel we must do it, and we have been planning it for some time.

Our rationale, by the way, would not be primarily to combat Cuban influence, but to assist in the more rapid economic development of the islands which are close to us, important to us, and already exporting hundreds of thousands of illegal and legal migrants to us every year, in part because of their underdevelopment. Indeed, the illegal migrant problem may be of greater long-term concern to us than the Cuban problem.

Comments on the “Proposal” for Covert Actions:

We would strongly oppose undertaking all the proposals under this section except those relating to propaganda against Cuban military activities and the proposal to support third country training of Jamaican security forces.

[2 lines not declassified] But we would strongly oppose any collaboration involving political covert action or developing agents of influence. These islands are small, open and suspicious. In virtually none of these are there clear, able long-term alternatives to the existing cast of characters. Even in Jamaica, it is not that obvious that Seaga would be able over the long run to do significantly better than Manley. In Guyana, the alternative to Burnham is Jagan. The benefits of political action are to say the least marginal—the costs of being caught would be absolutely disasterous. Covert action just would not work. We must stay completely out of the covert business in the Caribbean and make it very clear to all, including our liaison services, that we eschew all such political action.

The one thought that might have merit in the proposal is to encourage (and perhaps pay for) third country assistance for training Jamaican security forces. We note that the UK turned down a request from Jamaica. Should we not explore with the UK a U.S. supported UK program?

Political Action by Department of State:

To support a more forthcoming economic posture in the area, the Department can take several long range moves (if supported by the White House):

—First, assign career officers to Caribbean posts as Chiefs of Mission. One of our many problems with Manley stems from the enduring bitterness after de Roulet’s period. We have had only one Ambassador in the past two decades who could communicate with Eric Williams in Trinidad. In Barbados (which also covers the many mini-states) we have had a long string of political Ambassadors (except for the tenure of Eileen Donovan) who have come close to being PNG’d. The recent nomination of a U.S. labor leader with ties to AIFLD as Ambassador to Guyana has stirred up deep and unnecessary concerns in Burnham about CIA connections.

This policy of sending wealthy, generally patronizing and often bigotted political Ambassadors to the Black Caribbean because of the lush English-speaking setting has taken its toll over the years. If we want to take this area seriously, we should develop a cadre of Caribbeanists who understand and can function in the area professionally.

—Second, develop a career specialty of the Caribbean. Instead of using the area as a dumping ground for officers who are seeking out-of-area (EA or EUR) assignments, we should develop a professional group who can relate knowledge of the Caribbean with Latin American experience.

—Third, develop special training programs for our Caribbeanists including university training to prepare our people for dealing with the particular Black Caribbean environment.

1. Summary: Shlaudeman stated his opposition to a proposal for covert action in the Caribbean to counter rising Cuban influence. He recommended increased aid to the region and the development of a corps of knowledgeable Caribbeanists within the Department of State.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860055–1177. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Luers on September 20. Habib saw the document on October 4. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Attached as Tab 1, but not published, is a memorandum to the Operations Advisory Group proposing a program to counter Cuban influence in the Caribbean.