457. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
SUBJECT
- Bahamas Military Facility Negotiations
The negotiations over the three U.S. military facilities in The Bahamas are entering a crucial stage. There is considerable difference between State and Defense on how to handle these, but enough agreement has been reached for them to proceed. There is a possibility, however, of a more serious breakdown with the Bahamians. The following is an outline of the issues.
[Page 1173]There are three facilities in The Bahamas. AUTEC on Andros Island is an Atlantic undersea test facility where almost 1,000 Americans and Bahamians provide facilities for weapons (torpedoes), acoustic and calibration testing which virtually every ship in our Navy undergoes. We have an investment of about $85 million under conditions which would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere because of the unusual depth of the ocean in an area free of commercial shipping and close to U.S. ports.
The second facility is NAVFAC, considerably smaller and less elaborate, which is a SOSUS site (sound surveillance system) engaged in monitoring Soviet and other west Atlantic Ocean naval activity. While important, the base could be relocated in CONUS. Neither the number of men nor the financial investment is great.
The third facility is the Air Force Eastern Test Range on Grand Bahamas Island involving a large area but very few people and a $10 million investment. It could be relocated in Florida if necessary, given a lead time of two to three years.
These three are facilities rather than bases. AUTEC is by far the most important of them. The Navy describes it as critical, but not irreplaceable. Sy Weiss (the Ambassador) understands from DOD that this is an economic negotiation, i.e., that there is a certain price (a relatively low one) beyond which we would prefer relocating the facilities. He wants to carry on the negotiations in these terms with the Bahamians. He is concerned, however, that he may not have the whole picture and that if we give them a top figure which they refuse, DOD will want to go back with a new offer which would confirm in the Bahamians’ minds the “irreplaceable” nature of the facilities and cause them to hold us up for an unreasonable amount. Their initial proposal received earlier this year was for $5 million annual rent and $500 million in aid. We have made clear to them that this is out of the question. With a per capita GNP of $2,600, bilateral development assistance to The Bahamas is not supportable. Weiss has now been authorized to make a firm proposal. He will offer a $5 million annual rent for 15 years with a fallback to $6.15 million. Under consideration is the further possibility of a $30 million lump sum prepayment of rent with a $4 million annual rent for the rest of the period.
The present concern is that the difference between our offer and their demand is so great, and their naiveté and inexperience so considerable, that they will simply reject our offer and tell us to remove the facilities. Thus, Sy wants to go with a high initial offer while Defense wants to go in lower and be prepared to offer more later. I will keep you informed if any serious problems arise on this.
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Summary: Low briefed Scowcroft on military facility negotiations with The Bahamas, noting that Weiss had been authorized to offer $5 million in rent per year for a 15-year period.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Papers, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Box 1, Country Files, Bahamas. Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote ‘Thanks’ on the memorandum. In telegram 301837 to Nassau, December 23, the Embassy transmitted the revised text of the U.S. reply, which offered $5 million in annual rent for 15 years and pointed out the additional benefits that would accrue to The Bahamas through spending on salaries, training, and infrastructure. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750445–1053)
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