323. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
Cubana Crash Trial and Steps We Can Take To Restore Proper Focus
The Problem
The propaganda and political fallout from the Cubana crash is increasing. Castro may be planning to stage his CIA spectacular this weekend, presenting to the world perhaps several authentic agents. Carlos Andres Perez, who is increasingly nervous over what is coming out about his ties to Cuban exiles, would like to shift the load to us and could be getting ready to take up the destabilization theme. Escovar [Page 870] had just sent you a letter with that implication. We need to shift the focus to cooperative efforts to do something practical about the conspiracy that led to the Cubana bombing—and about terrorism in the Caribbean in general.
Discussion/Background
Trinidad has deported the two principal suspects in the bombing to Caracas where they will apparently be tried. Barbados is conducting a low-key technical investigation of the crash. Both countries are thus out from under, much to Burham’s displeasure.
Meanwhile, the Cubans have invited U.S. newsmen (and presumably others) to Havana for interviews with purported CIA agents in Cuba. The signals are mixed on the timing. It will be either this weekend or after November 2. What drives the Cubans is the calculation that they can:
—make more credible Castro’s allegations of CIA responsibility in the Cubana crash by giving “proof” of CIA’s continuing espionage activities in Cuba;
—stimulate pressure in the U.S. for congressional investigation of U.S. Government ties with Cuban exile groups; and,
—divert attention from the actual circumstances of the Cubana crash to allegations about the CIA and “destabilization.”
Meanwhile the Cubans are sending messages to Democrats not to worry. Cuban UN diplomats have been fanned out to contact members of Congress and staffers to convey the line that Castro’s denunciation of the hijacking agreement is not final and that Cuba wants to negotiate about it with whichever candidate is elected next week. Contacts the Cubans sought to make include: Kennedy, Hart, Stevenson, McGovern, and Abourezk. Similar pitches were made to our Chargé in Jamaica by the Cuban Ambassador and to academic and foundation figures interested in U.S.-Cuban relations.
At some point we shall have to rebut the Cuban charges. I believe it would not be prudent to do so before the upcoming show-and-tell exercise in Havana. We should be prepared to make a strong brief statement promptly thereafter which we shall prepare for you after we have learned precisely what the Cubans are revealing. One problem is that one or more of Fidel’s witnesses have, in fact, been employed by the CIA. We do not know what type of “proof” they will produce.
Immediate Diplomatic Steps
Foreign Minister Escovar has sent you a message (Tab 3) on the harm to U.S.-Venezuelan relations because of stories in the U.S. press about ties of Venezuelan officialdom, including President Perez, with the Cubana crash suspects.
[Page 871]Ambassador Vaky had a talk with President Perez last Saturday (Tab 2). Perez and his associates appear to be trying to protect their flanks from Castro and from anti-Castro elements around the Caribbean by shifting blame for the Cubana crash to the U.S.
We sent instructions to Vaky yesterday (Tab 5) to attempt to head-off any Venezuelan attempt to put the blame on us and to deal with Venezuelan sensitivities about U.S. press coverage.
At Tab 1 is a letter from you to Escovar—rejecting U.S. Government responsibility for press stories—rejecting implications of “destabilization”—and offering to send a team of State and Justice officers to exchange information on terrorist activities.
Trinidad and Tobago Foreign Minister Donaldson responded favorably to your October 14 letter (Tab 6) offering information about Cuban exile terrorist activities, subject to Prime Minister Williams’s approval, in deporting the two suspects it held to Venezuela. The GOTT announced that it is satisfied with assurances received from Caracas that the suspects will be fully prosecuted. Trinidad clearly is relieved to be free of this burden. However, to reassure Trinidad of U.S. cooperation in bringing the perpetrators of the Cubana crash to justice, I believe it would be desirable to send the State/Justice briefing team to Port of Spain. The attached message from you to Donaldson (Tab 2) offers to do so.
Barbados is continuing a technical investigation of the circumstances of the crash. Representatives of the U.S. National Transport Safety Board are on hand to assist. Foreign Minister Forde already has accepted the offer of assistance in your October 14 letter to him. A visit by the State/Justice team to Barbados would serve the same purpose as in Trinidad. A message from you to Forde making this offer also is in Tab 2.
Recommendations:
1. That you approve the attached message to Foreign Minister Escovar of Venezuela at Tab 1.
2. That you approve the attached messages from you to Foreign Ministers Donaldson of Trinidad and Tobago and Forde of Barbados at Tab 2.
-
Summary: Shlaudeman recommended steps to shift attention away from allegations of U.S. complicity in the Cubana bombing and to stimulate cooperative efforts against terrorism in the Caribbean.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840037–0747. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Luers and Gleysteen on October 29. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Cables approved with changes, 10/30.” Attached but not published are a draft message to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister (Tab 1), a draft message to the Foreign Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (Tab 2), a translation of an October 29 letter from Escovar to Kissinger (Tab 3), telegram 12610 of October 28 from Caracas on Vaky’s conversation with Pérez on the Cubana crash (Tab 4), telegram 266529 of October 28 to Caracas (Tab 5), and telegram 254013 of October 14 to Georgetown, Port of Spain, and USUN (Tab 6).
↩