Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

321. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, October 22, 1976.

Cubana Airlines Crash: Strategy Paper

The Problem

The Cubana crash poses problems for us in hemispheric relations and counterterrorism. Cuban exile terrorism threatens mounting difficulties for us in our relations with Caribbean and Central American countries. Action against the gang responsible for the Cubana crash can significantly reduce that threat. Our strategy should be designed to bring the current case to trial, effectively counter the false allegations against us, and minimize the potentially negative impact on our relations with several nations involved.

Discussion/ Strategy

Legal. A primary objective is to assure that one of the nations (Barbados, Trinidad or Venezuela) takes jurisdiction in the Cubana case. We won’t know which, if any, has agreed to do so until the current meetings in Port of Spain conclude. There is some possibility that Barbados may take jurisdiction; if so, we should offer them our support since the GOB is seriously concerned about retribution from Cuban exiles.

Should Cuba take jurisdiction by default the trial would be a propaganda feast for Fidel. On the other hand, ultimate Cuban taking of jurisdiction would not be inconsistent with international practice and treaties. The U.S. might be able to take jurisdiction, depending upon whether we could establish that any elements of the crime took place in U.S. territory; the maximum penalty we could probably give would be three years (due to our failure to enact legislation implementing the international convention on sabotage. We ratified the convention in 1972, but the implementing legislation, twice submitted by Justice, has lain before Congress for three years without action).

In any case, this is a precedent-setting case, the outcome of which could be very important for the future handling of international terrorism. The Government of Barbados has invited U.S. participation in a crash enquiry. We should respond positively as soon as possible and urge field FBI cooperation. The Cubans will probably be there as well. But we should go anyway.

Criminal Investigation. A small group of anti-Castro Cuban exiles are the central actors in this and many of the other recent terrorist acts in this hemisphere. The FBI and CIA probably have more information on these groups than all of the other interested governments, except Cuba itself. Rather than permit Cuba to take the lead in providing information, we should be prepared to give thorough briefings and offer to exchange information (to the extent possible without compromising sources) with the Governments of Barbados, Trinidad and Venezuela. An offer to exchange information combined with an offer to provide technical assistance and clear indications that we are undertaking thorough investigations of this and past Cuban exile acts would help. The most effective deterrent to further expansion of this terrorist activity would be the conviction and punishment of some of these organizers.

Other investigative aspects relate to the broader questions of Cuban exile activity in the U.S. and abroad, to connections between the Cuban exiles and DINA, and to investigations into earlier terrorist activities such as the Letelier killing. We understand that the NSC has already authorized the CIA to expand its efforts regarding Cuban exiles abroad. It is probably time to urge that the FBI expand its attention to these matters within the U.S. It seems very likely that when Congress returns early next year, hearings will be held on the question of Executive Branch attention to the terrorist and political activities of non-Communist foreign intelligence agencies in this country. The DINA/Cuban exile tie will be an obvious focus of attention.

Public. We should rebut openly and clearly the false charges made by Castro and others on U.S. Government involvement in the crash. The press is already piecing together aspects of alleged U.S. official ties with suspects in the Cubana crash. The public and Congress are also interested in our replies to the charges made by Castro. We have pulled together information on Fidel’s charges. I think that we should make our forceful rebuttal available to the public and Congress soon.

Diplomatic. The problems we face in the Caribbean are manageable. We should probably await further formal exchanges with the governments in the area until we learn the full results of the meeting in Port of Spain:

—We should, depending on that outcome, consider further direct messages from you to the Foreign Ministers of Trinidad/Tobago and Barbados. Such messages would include the offer of detailed briefings on Cuban exiles, FBI technical assistance, and willingness to discuss technical and financial assistance on airport security.

—We want to be certain that we keep the Venezuelans engaged in talking with us. The Venezuelan Government ties to this gang of Cubans are far more recent and direct than ours. The Venezuelans may well try to play up past CIA connections. We will be proposing that Ambassador Vaky have another talk with Perez on the entire case, once the jurisdiction matter becomes clear.

—With Guyana, we should let Burnham stew.

—With Cuba we should send a reply to which we attach our public statement.

In the OAS we are considering initiatives we might take, particularly on the question of airport security in the hemisphere.

Recommendations:

I recommend:

1. Legal. That you approve the cable at Tab 1 which instructs our Ambassador in Bridgetown to respond positively to the Barbadian request for U.S. participation in the enquiry and supports the Barbadian inclination to take jurisdiction.

2. Investigation. That you sign the letter at Tab 2 to the Attorney General expressing our concern over the expanded Cuban exile terrorist activity, asking that greater FBI attention be given to this matter, and suggesting that we offer FBI technical assistance and briefings to the Governments of Barbados and Trinidad/Tobago.

3. Public. That you approve the use of the statement at Tab 3 for use in press and congressional briefings replying to Castro’s charges (it has been cleared with CIA).

4. Diplomatic Note. That you approve transmittal of the diplomatic note to Castro at Tab 4.

1. Summary: Shlaudeman outlined a strategy designed to counter false allegations against the United States in connection with the Cubana bombing and to minimize the potentially negative impact of the incident on U.S. relations with the countries involved.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–1516. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Luers on October 22 and cleared by Willis and in substance by Karkashian in S/CCT. Kissinger initialed approval of recommendation 1 on October 26, and a handwritten note next to it reads, “Cable sent 10/26.” Kissinger initialed approval of recommendation 2 on October 26. Kissinger initialed disapproval of recommendation 3 the same day and added the notation, “Too defensive.” A separate notation in a different hand reads, “Bob Funseth [of S/PRS] is not satisfied with the proposed statement—too long and some things we shouldn’t be volunteering, especially in the present political climate.” Kissinger did not initial approval or disapproval of recommendation 4 and wrote, “Let’s 1st do 3.” Attached but not printed are: a draft telegram to Bridgetown (Tab 1), an October 26 letter from Kissinger to Levi (Tab 2), a draft press release on Castro’s October 15 denunciation of the 1973 hijacking agreement (Tab 3), and a draft reply to the October 15 Cuban note denouncing the hijacking agreement, the final version of which is published as Document 325. For the agreement, see Document 271.