Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

309. Telegram 61342 From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts.¹

Washington, March 13, 1976, 0414Z.

61342. Inform Consuls, Embassy distribute to State officers only. Subject: Cuban Troops in Angola.

1. Following is text of INR Report No. 352 titled “Cuban Troops in Angola: How Much Longer?” dated March 9, 1976:

2. Begin summary. Cuban military intervention in Angola probably did not result from any single decision or event, but rather from a series of decisions in response to the evolving situation there.

3. Castro has claimed that no Cubans were fighting in Angola until South African forces began their push north on October 23, but some Cuban troops probably were involved to a limited degree in MPLA combat operations during October and possibly earlier. South African actions apparently had little effect on the Cuban troop buildup of perhaps 2,000 men during September and October; direct Zairian and indirect Chinese involvement probably influenced Cuba’s decisions strongly.

4. The big Cuban influx beginning in November may well have been caused largely by the South African-led offensive and the loss by the MPLA of strategic areas of south-central Angola. November also saw a change in the nature of the Cuban involvement as Cuban units began conducting their own combat operations separately and in conjunction with MPLA forces.

5. For the next several months, Cuba probably will maintain a large, but gradually diminishing, military force in Angola. The nature of the Cuban role and the size of its troop contingent will depend largely on the MPLA’s ability to resolve conflicts with domestic rivals and hostile neighboring countries. Accommodations with UNITA and South Africa probably would hasten Cuban troop withdrawals, but Cuban influence is likely to be felt strongly in Angola for a long time to come. End summary.

6. Background: To mid-1975.

7. For at least a decade, Cuba provided trainers and advisers to the MPLA, along with a limited amount of material assistance. Until 1975, the total number of Cubans working with the MPLA probably did not exceed 100 at any given time. Most of these apparently were based in the Congo (Brazzaville), though a few may have been infiltrated into Angola.

8. As a result of developments in Portugal during 1974, Cuban (and other foreign) attention to Angola increased, while all three Angolan independence movements began jockeying for position and seeking foreign assistance.

(A)—In November 1974 the FNLA, which had been receiving Chinese and Zairian support, began moving troops into Luanda and northern Angola. The MPLA also brought troops into the Luanda area.

(B)—In late 1974, and more seriously during March and April 1975, fighting broke out between the FNLA and the MPLA. The Cubans have admitted to sending about 230 advisers to Angola in late spring 1975, probably to assist MPLA efforts to oust the FNLA from the Luanda area and Cabinda.

(C)—In late June 1975, the Cuban Communist Party official responsible for military relations with the MPLA met in Mozambique with Agostinho Neto, presumably to coordinate future operations.

(D)—Some time during July, 42 Cuban military personnel reportedly arrived in the Congo to assist in reassembling Soviet weapons being supplied to the MPLA.

(E)—Also in mid-July, Zaire sent a commando company and an armored car squadron into Angola in support of the FNLA, which had been all but eliminated from Luanda.

(F)—During the second week of August, two Zairian paratroop companies were also sent to Angola, and South African forces occupied the Cunene Dam complex in Southern Angola.

9. In this context, according to a reliable clandestine source, MPLA representatives in late July-early August asked for Soviet troop support, were turned down, and were told to approach the Cubans instead. Senior Cuban officials in Luanda allegedly were receptive to the idea of supplying Cuban combat forces and pressed the issue in Havana, using both practical and ideological arguments to convince Castro, who reportedly was reluctant at first. The decision to send combat forces reportedly was made in mid-August. At the time, neither the Cubans nor the MPLA apparently were concerned about the entry of South Africa into the conflict, which they considered improbable. Rather, they reportedly feared a Zairian intervention and considerably overestimated Zaire’s military capabilities.

10. The initial buildup: September–October, 1975.

11. In early September the first Cuban ship, carrying about 120 troops, left Havana, arriving in Pointe Noire (Congo) on September 24. Four other ships carrying men and military matériel left Cuba in mid- and late September, arriving in Congo and Angola in early and mid-October. These may have carried as many as 1,500 men.

12. On September 30, the Cubans also began sending troops by air. The flights continued at the rate of one flight per week through the end of October. These five flights probably carried about 400 men to Brazzaville and/or Luanda by October 28.

13. The Cuban troops were assigned a variety of tasks. Many were detailed either as individuals or in small groups to MPLA units throughout the country as trainers and advisers. Others were given support roles in communications, logistics, medical services, anti-aircraft defenses, and defensive positions around Luanda. The Cubans also reportedly set up infantry training camps near Benguela and Luso to give crash infantry training to MPLA forces.

14. Evidence concerning Cuban participation in combat operations during this period (September–October) is inconclusive. Some Cuban troops probably went into combat against the FNLA and Zairians in the north with the MPLA units to which they were attached. Cubans assigned to defensive positions near Lobito and other towns on the Benguela railroad also engaged in combat when the UNITA/South African offensive began during the last week of October. There is no evidence, however, that Cubans were conducting autonomous combat operations during this period.

15. During September and October, the Zairian and South African presence in Angola also increased:

(A)—In mid- and late September two understrength Zairian battalions were sent to Ambriz, and in late October or early November another battalion entered.

(B)—In September, South African shipments of military matériel to the FNLA and UNITA began, and South African military advisers established a small training base for the FNLA in southeastern Angola.

(C)—In the last half of October, a South African strike force entered Angola and captured the major southern cities and Lobito-Benguela.

16. The massive buildup: November 1975-January 1976.

17. It is not clear whether there was a causal relation, but after the events of late October, Cuban troop movements to Angola increased.

(A)—During November and early December the airlift stepped up markedly and averaged five flights per week.

(B)—During December, the sealift also increased, with 10 Cuban vessels arriving in the Congo-Angola area. The number of troops they carried is unknown, but they could have accommodated perhaps 3,000.

(C)—Both airlift and sealift continued through late January, until the total number of Cuban troops in the area reached 10,000–12,000, at which point it apparently leveled off.

18. The nature of Cuban involvement also changed, as Cuban combat units began to engage opposing forces in central and northern Angola—sometimes, but not always, in conjunction with MPLA forces. By mid-December and January, the Cuban forces were clearly in control and bearing the brunt of combat operations.

19. What next?

20. The MPLA’s military victory presents Havana with several options:

(A)—Withdrawal of all or a substantial part of its military forces;

(B)—Maintenance of a large, but gradually diminishing, force to assist counterinsurgency efforts and to help secure the country until the MPLA achieves a political consolidation;

(C)—Extension of the war into South African-held Namibia;

(D)—Maintenance of a relatively small guerrilla-training cadre to improve the capabilities of insurgent groups in Namibia;

(E)—A shift in focus of Cuban activities to assist Rhodesian insurgents, but from bases in Mozambique rather than Angola.

21. Withdrawal appears unlikely in the near term. Both the MPLA and the Cubans remain suspicious of Zairian and South African intentions, and Castro has refused to withdraw his troops in response to the Zairian pullout. The continued presence of South African forces in extreme Southern Angola also would probably weigh against withdrawal. During his February 28 meeting with Zairian President Mobutu, Agostinho Neto reportedly said that he could not give up the assistance of Cuban troops as long as foreign troops remained on Angolan soil.

22. UNITA-organized guerrilla operations will also encourage the MPLA to maintain a large Cuban military presence in Angola. The Cuban forces have been well-trained in counterinsurgency at home, and they probably would assist MPLA forces in conducting such operations. If the MPLA’s political consolidation proceeds reasonably smoothly, Havana may begin reducing its forces in Angola gradually, probably replacing some combat troops with smaller numbers of technical and political advisers.

23. Extension of Cuban military operations into Namibia is a possibility, but the Cubans have shown some reluctance to engage South African forces directly in Angola and would have to expect an all-out response from Pretoria if they crossed into South African-held territory. A military defeat at the hands of the South Africans would remove much of the luster from Cuban victories to date. Moreover, direct Cuban operations in Namibia would lack the quasi-legal justifications that Havana has given for its Angolan involvement. The Cubans, however, are likely to provide training and other forms of support to SWAPO guerrillas from bases in Angola.

24. Cuba may well give similar assistance to Rhodesian insurgents, but Mozambique would be a much more convenient base for such activities. Various reports suggest that Cuban military personnel have recently conferred with the Mozambican Government about providing advisers and arms to Zimbabwe guerrillas. Samora Machel’s decision to sever all links with Rhodesia and aid the insurgent forces has increased the likelihood that some Cuban military personnel will be permitted to operate in Mozambique. The use of Cuban combat units against the Smith regime’s military forces does not appear imminent, but it is a distinct possibility at some later date.

25. Political developments in Angola itself will strongly influence Cuba’s decision. Castro has suggested that he would remove Cuban military forces if the MPLA government so requested.

(A)—An agreement between the MPLA and South Africa over the Cunene hydroelectric complex and a subsequent pullout of South African forces would increase the likelihood of a Cuban withdrawal.

(B)—Recognition of the MPLA government by Zaire, Zambia, and other previously hostile African and Western nations, including the U.S., probably would do much to assuage MPLA and Cuban fears about future foreign interventions.

26. Even if Cuban military forces are phased down, however, the presence of large numbers of political and technical advisers will assure a strong Cuban influence in Angola for a long time to come, and Cuban assistance to other liberation movements in southern Africa would enable the Castro government to play a major role in the region’s affairs.

Kissinger

1. Summary: The Department transmitted an analysis of Cuban involvement in Angola that had been prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760096–0470. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Eyes Only. Sent to all European diplomatic posts, all American Republic diplomatic posts, the Liaison Office in China, and the Embassies in Japan, Egypt, Guinea, South Africa, Tanzania, Zaire, Nigeria, Mozambique, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Gabon. Drafted by David Smith; cleared by Godfrey Summ in INR/RAR, Gary Chafin in ARA, Raymond Ewing in EUR, Jeffrey Cunningham in EA, Ann Griffin in NEA, and Theodore Ford in AF; and approved by Kirk. An earlier chronology of the Cuban buildup in Angola is in telegram 43033 to Stockholm, Addis Ababa, Copenhagen, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Helsinki, Kinshasa, Maputo, Lusaka, Moscow, Oslo, Pretoria, Reykjavik, the Mission to NATO, and the Mission to the UN, February 23. (Ibid., D760070–0874)