Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

236. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 10, 1977.

PARTICIPANTS

• UK
• Robin Edmonds, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, FCO
• William Squires, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Joe Millington, First Secretary British Embassy
• U.S.
• William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
• Charles W. Bray III, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
• Marvin Weissman, ARA/CEN
• Mark Platt, ARA/CEN

SUBJECT

• Belize Dispute: Prospects for the Future

Summary—Rowlands and Molina had a “useful” meeting in New York yesterday, January 9. The British expect the negotiations to continue but are not optimistic about a successful outcome. In contrast to the sense of urgency with which Mr. Callaghan approached the subject last year, the British no longer appear to have such a pressing deadline for bringing Belize to independence. End Summary.

Edmonds was in Washington for a general round of U.S.–UK talks on the Caribbean. He informed us that Minister Ted Rowlands had asked Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina for a private meeting in New York on January 9 to discuss the Belize issue. Edmonds said it had been treated strictly as a personal meeting. He had had a short telegram from Rowlands characterizing the meeting as “useful” but giving no further details. Thus, Edmonds was unable to comment on whether or not a firm date had been set for the Belize negotiations to continue.

Speaking without reference to what may have happened in New York yesterday, Edmonds said the British thought it quite unlikely that the Guatemalans would be prepared to actually agree to a settlement anytime soon. He thought they would prefer to put the matter off until a new administration took office (Presidential elections in Guatemala are scheduled for March, 1978). Edmonds asked what we thought of this analysis. Weissman said that generally we agreed. Putting aside the “external” eventualities for the moment, one could not dismiss the possibility that developments in “internal” Guatemalan politics also could change the outlook. Some of the Presidential candidates are more militant than others. If the military splits over choosing a government candidate, Belize might become a rallying point for one or more of the factions, or an excuse to delay the elections.

Luers said that he had spoken with President Laugerud early last month. The Guatemalan president had gone out of his way to emphasize that U.S. policy on Belize had embittered senior Guatemalan military officers. The Guatemalans were also upset that the UK had brought the matter up again in the UN General Assembly. Luers had told the Guatemalans that he thought the British, the Belizeans and their Caribbean allies were being rather moderate by not pushing for an extreme resolution.

Edmonds asked if the Guatemalans really minded UN resolutions on Belize. Platt commented that yes, they did mind insofar as it reinforced their sense of isolation.

Weissman then said there was some movement in the IDB, particularly on the part of its president, Ortiz Mena, to get more interested in the Belize issue. Some informal discussions have apparently been held on the possibility of a large assistance package for joint development of Belize with the Peten region of Guatemala. This may be linked to Venezuelan President Perez’s recently expressed interest in trying to find some means of helping to resolve the matter. Weissman asked if the British had heard of IDB involvement. Edmonds said they had not. Weissman added that a proposal such as this, tied in with some sort of minor border “rectification,” might provide an “equally unacceptable” face-saving way out for all parties. Edmonds added that Price had seen Perez in Caracas a few months ago and was supposed to go back for a second meeting. He thought the Venezuelans could be very helpful. He termed not so helpful their interest in having Belize make a token territorial concession to Guatemala. This, of course, would be useful to Venezuela’s own interests in its dispute with Guayana. The “Torrijos plan,” Edmonds confirmed, is a non-starter.

Edmonds said that Price had refused to consider any kind of territorial concession. However, if the Guatemalans were smart and proposed some “reasonable” type of territorial arrangement, (undefined) there might still be some slight room for discussion.

Luers said it was his impression that the UK was the one primarily interested in a rapid settlement. The Belizeans seemed less interested. The Guatemalans might well prefer to drag the matter on indefinitely. Edmonds agreed with that summation. Platt then asked if Her Majesty’s Government had a time frame for bringing about Belizean independence. Edmonds said no, they did not. At one time Callaghan had spoken about independence in a year, but that had been over a year ago now. It was obviously going to take some time.

Bray asked what the internal pressures in England were for Belizean independence. Was there a strong sentiment for it in Parliament, or active pressure groups?

Edmonds responded that there was really no strong lobby for Belizean independence. A Guatemalan invasion would, of course, create one instantly, but save for that, it was not an issue in which the British public or Parliament was greately interested.

1. Summary: British and U.S. officials discussed future prospects for resolving the Belize issue and agreed that it was unlikely the Guatemalan Government would agree to a settlement anytime soon.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850183–2471. Confidential. Drafted on January 10 by Platt in ARA/CEN and cleared by Luers and Bray in ARA.