Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

222. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 9, 1976.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
• Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
• Marvin Weissman, Director, Office of Central American Affairs
• George A. Gowen, Desk Officer for Belize
• Great Britain
• P.D. McEntee, Governor General-designate for Belize
• Richard Samuels, Counselor, British Embassy
• Joe Millington, Staff Member, British Embassy

SUBJECT

• Negotiation of Belize Dispute and Effects of Guatemalan Earthquake

Mr. McEntee indicated that he was on route back to London after having visited in Belize prior to the announcement of his appointment as the new Governor General. He had planned to visit Guatemala City and then go on to New Orleans to attend the Guatemalan/UK talks. However, the earthquake on February 4th had caused a postponement, probably an indefinite postponement, of those talks and he had decided to return to London instead. He requested this interview with Ambassador Ryan and Mr. Weissman in order to share his impressions of present sentiments in Belize and also to obtain our views of Guatemalan intentions regarding negotiation of the dispute.

McEntee indicated that the Belizeans, prior to the earthquake, had been growing somewhat upset over the growing size of the meeting planned for New Orleans. Dean Lindo, head of the Opposition Party, had indicated he felt this would turn into a political conference rather than a useful negotiating session. McEntee understood that the talks would now be postponed, possibly for several months. Mr. Weissman agreed with this evaluation. Mr. Weissman then asked if the British forces in Belize had much need to continue their military alert in view of the disruption caused by the recent earthquake. Mr. McEntee did not respond directly to that. He did, however, refer to three recent instances in which Harrier aircraft had intercepted Aviateca flights over Belizean territory enroute to Puerto Barrios prior to the earthquake. He asked if we had any idea of what Guatemalan intentions had been in scheduling these flights over Belizean territory. Mr. Weissman responded that we did not.

Mr. McEntee then asked Ambassador Ryan what Guatemalan intentions were with respect to negotiations. Ambassador Ryan replied that during a recent visit to Guatemala City he had gotten mixed readings on this point. Foreign Minister Molina, however, had said that the Guatemalan Government was quite serious in seeking a settlement and that some movement had occurred in its negotiation position. Molina, however, had been quite insistent on showing Ambassador Ryan and Assistant Secretary Rogers an 1856 map of the area prepared by the U.S. Senate which showed Belize as a much smaller territory north of the Sarstun River. Mr. Weissman added that it was his speculative view that the Guatemalans had not had any serious expectation of achieving much immediate progress in the talks. Instead, he judged they intended to use the talks as a means of erasing the effects of the UN resolution passed last December, as well as continuing the good feeling established by the recent visit to Guatemala City of Undersecretary Rowlands. McEntee replied to this by saying that Premier Price of Belize continues to insist that any talks will have to be a continuation of the UN process and must be based implicitly on the terms of the UN resolution. Mr. Weissman said he had gained the same impression from his visit to Belize in January. He added, however, that Lindberg Rogers, the Minister of Home Affairs in Belize, had indicated to him that he now felt that some common ground had become visible between the Belizean and the Guatemalan positions; that is, he felt that there was now some room for talks to begin on issues other than territorial concessions.

Mr. McEntee replied by outlining his impression that the issue of the Belize dispute will persist for some time. During his stay in Belize, he talked with a great number of local people and had the impression that security was their first concern; independence was a distant second. This was despite the emphasis which Premier Price continually places on the independence issue. In reply to a question from Mr. Weissman, Mr. McEntee indicated that he felt that Assad Shoman, who served as the Belizean representative at the UN for some time last fall, was rather young, not a very good lawyer, and somewhat “warm-headed.” He may, however, be open to influence and somewhat malleable in his opinions. Lindberg Rogers seems to pull a great deal more weight politically in the Price cabinet, although he may not be as wise as some other members of that group. Mr. McEntee then observed that he felt Belize to be economically viable as an independent state. He felt this was true even with respect to the Government of Belize’s ability to balance its own budget. Of course, they will need external assistance, but this is true of most presently independent less developed countries. More importantly, Belize has a great deal of empty land which could be put into production. He cited the example of the Mennonites, who have established some extremely productive farms in northern Belize. In this connection, Mr. Weissman observed that he would expect some rather striking demographic shifts with independence. He had been told during his own recent visit to Belize that most of the Creole population along the coast could not be persuaded to engage in agriculture. Mr. McEntee agreed with this observation. Mr. Weissman said that many of the Creoles could be expected to leave Belize following independence. They might be replaced by immigration from other parts of Central America, particularly El Salvador. Mr. McEntee then agreed that the situation in Belize might be extremely volatile after independence. The Belizeans, after all, do not trust the Guatemalans and many fear that the Government of Guatemala might move in even if a treaty were reached with Great Britain.

Mr. Weissman asked Mr. McEntee what would follow if no deal were reached in the round of talks this year. Mr. McEntee replied that it would then be necessary to rethink the British position. He added that it was his personal view that the earthquake in Guatemala had two effects on the situation. First, he did not feel that Guatemala was now in a position to discuss the issue seriously with Great Britain and Belize. Second, he felt the Guatemalans posed no military threat given the distractions caused by the disaster. These developments had suggested some ideas to him which he was going to raise with the Foreign Office on his return to London. He did not discuss these in detail, except to say that they did not include the idea of a unilateral British withdrawal from Belize.

Finally, Mr. McEntee added the personal observation that he was now returning, in a sense, to the colonial service after having served for 12 years in the Foreign Service. Previous to that he had served for 20 years as a colonial officer, primarily in Kenya.

1. Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Hewson A. Ryan and Governor General-designate for Belize P.D. McEntee discussed the Belize issue and the impact that the earthquake in Guatemala City would have on reaching a negotiated settlement.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850183–2460. Secret. Drafted by George A. Gowen in ARA/CEN on February 13, and cleared by Marvin Weissman, Director of ARA/CEN. In telegram 1334 from Guatemala City, February 18, the Embassy reported that Laugerud had advised Meloy that he planned to raise the Belize issue with Kissinger during his scheduled February 24 visit to Guatemala. Laugerud complained that the British had yet to reduce their military forces in Belize, which was “not helping the cause of peaceful settlement.” (Ibid., D760060–1101) In telegram Tosec 40130, February 20, the Department reported that the British had agreed to withdraw one company of troops from Belize in mid-March, “solely as a gesture of good faith,” noted that “the Guatemalans were informed of this decision on February 2,” and added that the British hoped the Secretary would encourage the Guatemalan Government to take the negotiations “most seriously.” (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Trip Briefing Books, Cables to HAK, 2/16–25/76, Latin America (4) TOSEC)