Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

22. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, September 14, 1974.

SUBJECT

• The Cuba Problem

I. The following assumptions can be made about the Cuban problem as it stands at this stage.

1. We have a commitment to the Tripartite group (Costa Rica, Venezuela and Colombia) which has kept its side of the bargain to postpone consideration of the matter in the OAS until later in the year and to delay unilateral resumptions of relations until OAS action has been taken. The three governments are publicly committed to a scenario that includes an OAS meeting later this year. Other Latin American nations have also publicly staked out their position in the matter.

2. Castro has mixed feelings about any OAS action. On the one hand, a resolution lifting sanctions which does not point to changes in Cuban actions can be read to vindicate him. On the other hand, resumption of relations by most of the Latins which would occur in the absence of OAS action to lift the sanctions might be preferable to him as vindication at the expense of the OAS, which would be seriously damaged.

3. Any leverage which we might get from lifting OAS sanctions would be with the other Latin nations. It comes in part from support from the group opposing lifting of sanctions—Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, etc.—and in part from the group which does not wish to see the OAS weakened or seriously divided by the issue. Together this is a substantial number of the members of the OAS which might be put together to support a resolution in that body satisfactory to us.

4. An MFM in Buenos Aires next March is less certain than it had been. If there is an OAS meeting at the Foreign Ministers’ level this fall and an OAS Foreign Ministers’ meeting next spring in April, and if the augmented Andes group of chiefs-of-state meet in Peru in December, there will be a number inclined to question the utility of a Buenos Aires meeting. Its main purpose to Argentina will be the re-integration of Cuba. The continued deterioration of the internal domestic situation in Argentina adds to the uncertainty.

5. Establishing bilateral contacts with Cuba before OAS action would be difficult to do without telling the Brazilians and perhaps some others. It would be extremely difficult to keep secret.

II. These facts lead to four conclusions.

1. We appear to be too far down this road to back out of an OAS meeting on Cuba sanctions this year without real damage to the OAS and our leverage with the tripartite group and their supporters. They would be hard put to agree to postponement, but if they did, it seems likely that they would proceed with unilateral resumption before the end of the year.

2. It will be difficult to use the Buenos Aires MFM for our purposes and particularly for an OAS session. Vignes is most interested in Cuban presence in Buenos Aires. He would recognize the near impossibility of Cuban participation at a meeting which is in any way identified with the OAS.

3. Our leverage with Castro from lifting the OAS sanctions is not great compared to that we might get from lifting bilateral sanctions, which are very much more important to him.

4. Any publicity given to bilateral contacts with Castro before an OAS meeting on sanctions would further reduce our bargaining leverage with other nations of the hemisphere.

III. I therefore suggest that we:

1. Make clear to the tripartite group that our cooperation in working out an orderly OAS meeting on the resolution is dependent on a satisfactory resolution; work with them together with our supporters among the conservatives (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, etc.) to produce a resolution that places responsibility on Cuba for the imposition and removal of sanctions in return for our cooperation in passage of the resolution by a two-thirds majority and without any specific provision for “optional” sanctions.

2. After the OAS action

—maintain our bilateral sanctions, restricting trade and travel with Cuba, and

—indicate to the Latin nations and particularly Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, etc., that in recognition of their point of view towards the OAS and Cuba, we made a significant modification of our position. In return for this, we would expect that they would press Castro as they had earlier pressed us, to make concessions in terms of his relations with us.

3. After a while, make bilateral contact with the Castro government to negotiate these issues in return for relaxation of our bilateral sanctions.

This would seem to me to be the best way to apply the leverage we have with the other Latins and with the Cubans to getting something in return for lifting of the OAS sanctions, while at the same time strengthening the OAS mechanism and maintaining our good-faith relationship with the other nations of the hemisphere.

1. Summary: Low analyzed the prospects for OAS action to lift diplomatic sanctions against Cuba and proposed a U.S. strategy for handling the issue.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Cuba 1. Secret; Completely Out of the System. Kissinger wrote, “Good job,” on the memorandum. On an August 23 memorandum from Kubisch to Kissinger recommending U.S. acquiescence on Cuba as long as no substantive action occurred before November, Kissinger wrote, “We would like to delay through election.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850149–0196)