Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

219. Telegram 6960 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State¹

Guatemala City, December 10, 1975, 1700Z.

6960. Subject: Belize Dispute: Views of Vice President; Problems of the President.

1. In conversation with Ambassador December 8, President Laugerud confirmed press reports that Vice President Mario Sandoval had reported to a cabinet meeting December 5 on his wide-ranging travels and had proposed that Guatemala withdraw from the United Nations. Laugerud said that Sandoval had also suggested that Guatemala might cut off all trade with Britain and seize all property belonging to British nationals. To the Ambassador’s comment that this sounded like Idi Amin, Laugerud agreed, stating that Guatemala was a responsible nation and Sandoval’s ideas were preposterous. President noted that Israel had suffered far more than Guatemala at the hands of the UNGA but had not withdrawn; there was much less reason for Guatemala to do so.

2. Laugerud expressed discomfort at Sandoval’s return to Guatemala and intimated that by such measures as the leak of the cabinet discussions to the press Sandoval was already trying to capitalize on the Belize problem for domestic political purposes. President referred to “crazy” local newsman who had proposed a march on Belize (a la Spanish Sahara) on his radio talk show and to PR Party’s taking up of the idea in ringing speeches in Congress. None of these orators would ever get past the Belize bridge on the outskirts of Guatemala City, the President said, but “these people can all be used for political purposes and against me.” (Comment: La Nacion December 8 quoted Sandoval as saying, “If Shel doesn’t go (to address UN on Belize) I will go.” There is no danger of Sandoval’s going, but it’s an example of what the President had in mind.)

3. Ambassador said he thought recent statement from Presidential Press Office that anyone opposing Guatemala’s claim to Belize is a traitor had not helped calm climate or depoliticize issue. President said he had been forced to have that statement issued because a Guatemalan University student leader had said that if Belize became part of Guatemala it would only become a colony of American imperialism, like Guatemala. If it remained as it is, it would be colony of British imperialism. Therefore only chance for Belize was to become independent. Guatemala law, President said, defines statements of that kind as reason [treason] and there had been groups watching to see if Laugerud would point that out and if not to attack him publicly.

4. Ambassador said there were also groups in Guatemala that are prepared to accept a negotiated settlement of the dispute resulting in less than total recuperation of Belize and ready to support President’s efforts to that end. But public opinion must be educated and rallied in support of President’s policy. Laugerud repeated that GOG’s public statements had to take into account the extremists. At the time a settlement is reached, “I will be accused of selling out and dismembering the national territory, but I will have to face that when the time comes.”

Meloy

1. Summary: Ambassador Meloy and President Laugerud discussed the Belize issue and Vice President Sandoval’s suggestions that Guatemala withdraw from the United Nations, cut off trade with Britain, and seize all property belonging to British nationals.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Country Files, Box 4, Guatemala—State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE—NODIS. Confidential; Nodis; Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original except “[treason],” added for clarity. Defense Intelligence Notice DIADIN 3199–75, December 8, noted that under pressure following Guatemala’s defeat at the United Nations, President Laugerud had “authorized contingency planning and training for guerrilla operations in Belize to appease hardliners in his government,” but concluded that he would not authorize the execution of such operations unless all other avenues for a peaceful resolution had been exhausted. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 A 0058, B 1975)