217. Letter From British Foreign Secretary Callaghan to Secretary of State Kissinger1
I much appreciated the helpful suggestions you made about solving the Belize problems. Sending reinforcements seems to have had a sobering effect on some of the Guatemalans, although they are still [Page 602] jumpy. To offset this, I intend to make an approach to the Guatemalans before the vote in the Fourth Committee.
In order to convince the Guatemalans of our genuine wish to engage in meaningful negotiations after the UNGA, I plan to send Ted Rowlands, my Minister with special responsibility for the dependent territories, to Guatemala City to see President Laugerud. Rowlands is attending the Surinam independence celebrations on 24/25 November and would go on to Belize and Guatemala. The purpose of this visit would be to convince the Guatemalans of our serious intentions. The negotiations would be broad-based and Ted Rowlands would give them some idea of their scope. The security and economic guarantees listed in part B of your message could certainly form the basis of a possible agreement, and Ted Rowlands will say so when he sees them. You may not be aware that similar ideas formed part of our negotiating position for the abortive talks with the Guatemalans last July.
Your suggestion of a joint public announcement before the vote is not possible for us, since it would cut across action at the UN and would get us into trouble not only with the Belizeans but also a large number of other cosponsors. I am, however, instructing my permanent representative to the UN to make a statement immediately after the vote to the effect that we are ready to resume negotiations with the least possible delay and that a Minister would be visiting Guatemala City to discuss with President Laugerud a wide variety of ideas including trade and economic cooperation. I am also sending a personal message to Molina to tell him what I propose. I shall send you a copy on a personal basis through Peter Ramsbotham.
We would hope to get a favourable response from the Guatemalans to the proposed visit. Laugerud’s statement that he would not consider military action while there was any hope of negotiations is encouraging and the action I am planning to take should, I hope, reassure him about our serious intention to resume negotiations as soon as possible and make it easier for him to agree.
I am most grateful for the action Ambassador Meloy has several times taken in Guatemala City, and for the invaluable reports we have had from the State Department of President Laugerud’s thinking and state of mind. If you think it would help perhaps Ambassador Meloy might again see the President as soon as my message to Molina has been delivered.
Frankly, I do not think that the ICJ idea offers any real chance of progress. As you know, I wish to bring Belize to secure independence as soon as possible and I am under mounting pressure from the Belizeans, the Commonwealth and the non-aligned group. A reference to the ICJ would be regarded by these groups as a transparent attempt to deprive Belize of its independence by putting the whole issue in cold [Page 603] storage for several years. It would appease one of our customers, but would stir up the rest of them.
Warmest regards,
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Summary: Foreign Secretary Callaghan responded to Secretary Kissinger’s suggestions on how to peacefully resolve the dispute over Belize.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810038–1718. Secret. Sent as an enclosure to a November 13 forwarding letter from Ramsbotham to Kissinger, and Callaghan’s message to Molina, not published. Kissinger’s initials appear on Rathsbottom’s covering letter. In telegram 6703 from Guatemala City, November 28, the Embassy reported that the Laugerud “welcomed Rowlands visit as a positive gesture,” and despite “pressure from many quarters for intemperate action,” reiterated his assurances that his government would not initiate any aggression. (Ibid., D750414–0588)
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