214. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting1
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]
Mr. Rogers: On the Belize matter, we sent up two telegrams to your desk last night.
Secretary Kissinger: I saw one. I am in a dilemma. Callaghan is a good friend and he has been unusually supportive of us in every forum. I understand your point. Your point is also correct. Couldn’t we go to the Guatemalans and say, “Look, we have been asked to do this by our old friends the British. We know your views, but we feel honor-bound to express this concern.” And then give them the various alternatives that we have thought of. Then go back to the British and say, “We have done it. We don’t think it will do much good.”
I think it is a good cable—for all the reasons you have given. Rather than say because we know it won’t do any good, put it on the basis that we have done it again, having done it several times before, and then do the rest of the cable.
Mr. Rogers: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: And I don’t think that will smash any crockery in Guatemala. They will understand our transmitting an appeal by the British; I mean if it is done with some delicacy, so that we don’t get ourselves too much in the middle.
Mr. Rogers: Right. Obviously I am in no position to weigh the importance of another gesture in the direction of Callaghan. We can accommodate that. What I would like to do is try to do it in a way which avoids giving Guatemala the impression that we are surrogates for—
Secretary Kissinger: I completely agree with you. I think we should present it really as a post office.
Mr. Rogers: Okay. Let’s take a crack at—
Secretary Kissinger: Why not tell the Guatemalans, “We are dealing here with two close friends, and we have a very [Page 597] difficult problem.” And then give them these various possibilities—except you, of course, think they are going to move.
Mr. Rogers: I do.
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t understand what got into Callaghan on this. How many troops did he send there—200?
Mr. Rogers: Five hundred.
Secretary Kissinger: Does that make any difference?
Mr. Rogers: It doubles the capacity.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The problem was that the Guatemalans have moved into a position where the British will now lack warning, and the Guatemalans could move across the border at will.
Secretary Kissinger: That means they have 700 troops there now?
Mr. Rogers: Almost a thousand.
Secretary Kissinger: And the Guatemalans have how many troops?
Mr. Rogers: We don’t know exactly. In the region, they have more than that. But man for man, the British troops are obviously more efficient. The British also put in some six Hawk Hunters—and in that microscopic geopolitical strategic equation it is a considerable force. And it means that, of course, if the Guatemalans push over the border, they are close to some serious fire power. So it does alter the equation considerably.
Secretary Kissinger: It is lousy for us either way. I don’t want to back the British, because if the Guatemalans are right, I am not eager to see Belize become a Cuban outpost there. But are they right?
Mr. Rogers: About the possibility of the Cubans?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Not intervention—
Mr. Rogers: Or involvement—no. I think that is much less serious than they make it out.
Secretary Kissinger: But why are the British so bullheaded about this?
Mr. Rogers: They want out.
Secretary Kissinger: If they want out, why not turn over a part of the country to Guatemala? What do they care?
Mr. Hartman: This is Callaghan. It is this feeling that their honor is at stake, that they have commitments to the people in the area. And he likes to move troops around. It is a little bit like the Spanish in the Sahara.
Secretary Kissinger: But Callaghan called me and said the reason they have got to do something about this, participation at the ministerial, is that if they don’t assert British nationalism, the Scots are going to [Page 598] assert their nationalism with respect to the oil, and that that is not a trivial matter.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]
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Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Rogers discussed the escalation of forces in Belize and Guatemala and the implications for resolving the dispute over Belize.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets appear in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The draft telegram to Callaghan was sent to Kissinger’s office on November 3. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0079) According to a routing slip, the telegram was revised and approved by Kissinger on November 4. (Ibid., P830114–0644) It was sent as telegram 262111, November 5, which is Document 215.
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