Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

160. Airgram A–108 From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, August 5, 1975.

SUBJECT

• The Coming Political Difficulties in El Salvador and the U.S. Response.

This airgram attempts to provide a synthesizing interpretation of our reporting of the past year on the declining strength of the National Conciliation Party (PCN) and of the government itself. It tries to place this development within the larger context of impending political difficulties in El Salvador which, if not satisfactorily resolved in the next several years, suggest an eventual prospect of revolutionary upheaval at some unpredictable point in time.

The PCN and the GOES Headed for Political Problems

As it presently is structured and functions, the Salvadoran government faces the unenviable and inherently contradictory task of meeting popular aspirations for improved living conditions while maintaining the order and stability expected by vested economic interests, many of whom equate the most modest change in the status quo with socialism or communism. Like their military-led predecessors back to 1932, the PCN governments of Col. Julio Adalberto Rivera (1962–67), Gen. Fidel Sanchez Hernandez (1967–72) and Col. Arturo Armando Molina (1972–) have promised to enact evolutionary social and economic reforms in order to avert a revolutionary upheaval. They have also tried to use the civilian-run PCN and its paramilitary arm, ORDEN, to mobilize, under the banner of reform and nationalism, sufficient campesino support to overcome the opposition’s electoral advantage among urban dwellers.

El Salvador’s small territory, burgeoning population, and grossly inequitable distribution of society’s benefits lend a special urgency to the need for basic, structural reform in the economic and social systems. This is especially true in the countryside, where 70 percent of the population lives. As Molina never tires of repeating: “There is still time, but not much.” These factors make El Salvador a special case, the frontier of the demographic crisis. The PCN system has not expanded the economic and social services pie rapidly enough, however, and population is winning the race against development. Since the early 1960s, real income has fallen for El Salvador’s poorest and the gap between rich and poor widened; there are fewer opportunities for employment and reduced access to land; and per capita caloric intake has fallen and malnutrition become endemic in the countryside. Thus, what President Oscar Osorio (1950–1956) promised—agrarian reform, social security, urban housing and industrialization—Molina is still trying to deliver a generation later (see A–82).

The natural tendency among government critics is to attribute the failures of the present administration to the personal shortcomings of Molina and his advisers, whom they accuse of timidity, incompetence, corruption and repression. There is at least an element of truth in all those charges. The Molina administration was, after all, conceived in fraud and nearly stillborn during the March, 1972, coup attempt. The chosen successor of a weak president, Molina was accepted not so much for his positive qualities but because he was considered neither an offensive, nor threatening alternative for important pro-government factions, both civilian and military. Handicapped by a lack of political finesse and charisma, he has failed to generate a popular following of his own. He and his fellow PCN leaders tend to be uncompromising with their political adversaries and are unwilling to carry on a dialog with their critics whom they consider to be demagogic to an extreme. For the foregoing and other reasons, these critics have concluded that the Molina administration is insincere about and/or incapable of undertaking basic structural reform. It would be fairer and from our point of view more helpful, to recognize that Molina’s failings have only accentuated the more fundamental difficulties of the system itself. He is but a product of the system and, in a sense, its latest victim.

We must understand that, in addition to the restraints imposed by the magnitude of the problems and the poor human and material resources available to solve them, the very inner contradictions of the political system have prevented PRUD and PCN governments since 1950 from satisfying the growing demands of El Salvador’s rapidly growing population. They have quite predictably failed to reconcile the unreconcilable. For example, the relatively few large landowners want to keep their land intact while a growing number of landless campesinos want to get land, even a small parcel, for themselves; and in the process of trying to please both, the reformist governments have satisfied neither. Moreover, there are signs that both the more traditional oligarchs and the campesinos are becoming impatient with the arrangement. The oligarchs tend to avoid direct participation in politics and government and have relied on their ability to coopt reform-minded military officers and government bureaucrats so that reforms, if they are unavoidable, are kept minimal and do not infringe on the oligarchy’s vital interests. Thus, they were able to dull the zeal of Osorio and Rivera—two of the more reformist presidents. Nevertheless, shaken by a number of economic measures taken by the Molina administration (wage increases, price controls, coffee sales policy, the “Agrarian Transformation” law, etc.) and a spate of unsolved robberies and kidnappings, some oligarchs are coming to doubt the ability or the willingness of the PCN leadership to protect their interests.

If the oligarchy is concerned because it believes the government wants them to relinquish too much to try to improve the lot of the poor, the campesino is disappointed because the GOES has done too little. In recent elections, he has begun to abandon the PCN, causing the government to resort to fraud to guarantee its majority. The future promises even greater fraud, since the campesino, informed of outside events by his transistor radio and the Church, is beginning to expect more from the government and to denounce openly the violent, arbitrary ways of the security forces, especially the National Guard. Moreover, the very promises of reform which the PCN governments have used to gain electoral support have stimulated greater expectations not only for better economic and social conditions but also for a greater voice in the political process, as witnesses the new attitude of the Union Comunal Salvadoreña (UCS).

Another basic contradiction plaguing the political system is the role of the military. (This paragraph owes an obvious debt to DATT’s IR–6–829–0014–74 of March 25, 1974, which deserves periodic re-reading.) Traditionally, the military has served as the guarantor of stability and its leaders regarded rapid change with caution and concern, much as the oligarchy would. This role has been reinforced by the habits of conformity produced by the military iron, unquestioning discipline and self-isolation. The military officer generally regards his society as a hostile environment and takes refuge among his brothers of the “military institution.” He shies away from contact with perceived enemies of the institution—campesinos, trade unionists, clergy, etc—and regards them as “Communists,” thereby contributing to his seige mentality. He views oligarchs with a mixture of envy and disdain. He regards civilian politicians, even those of the government party, with distaste.

Yet the present system requires that after 20 years of relative isolation and insulation from his society, a military officer undertake in five years to transform it. The military president is expected to become not only the chief administrator of the nation but also its political leader. Upon his nomination, he must suddenly begin to lead and reconcile the very groups he has spent a lifetime avoiding. This is changing, albeit slowly; Molina especially has made an effort to bring bright younger officers—most of whom have completed at least some university training in law, economics or business administration—into key positions in the public administration. Nevertheless, senior military education gives only the most superficial attention to the military’s emerging role as reformer and tends to reinforce traditional role perceptions. Thus, within the military officer corps there is considerable confusion and dissensus over this dilemma. Amateur navigators on the uncharted waters of economic and social reform, they are not sure how they got where they are or what to do next.

Thus, the government is plagued by a sort of Salvadoran “Catch-22.” On the one hand, it cannot win elections without resorting to ever greater fraud—and thereby running a greater risk of adverse popular reaction—unless it can produce basic changes in the economic and social systems. On the other hand, it cannot achieve such structural changes under the present rules of the game. Thus, it can neither win elections fairly nor govern effectively and is doomed to unpopularity and weakness. Whether the present governmental system is running out of energy and imagination (as some critics have charged) remains to be seen. However some observers have been prompted to recall that El Salvador has experienced a cyclical pattern of coups in approximately 15-year intervals since 1931 (i.e., 1944 and 1960).

What Comes Next?

In as violent and volatile a country as El Salvador, any prediction is apt to prove embarrassing in retrospect. Nevertheless, we should expect some kind of change—and perhaps of a dramatic nature—during the next 32 months, a period in which the country is faced with three national elections. The change would most likely, but not necessarily, be occasioned by a coup. A few observers would argue that President Molina has the unqualified backing of the military and is, therefore, immune to a coup. However, we detect signs of real unhappiness of some military officers with Molina, but as of yet the discontent has not become unbounded nor have discontented elements coalesced around an individual officer, group of officers or ideology. Economic conditions, especially as influenced by volatile international commodity markets, also have a direct impact on political stability. The recent frost in Brazil will probably convert El Salvador’s disastrous coffee policy of 1973–74, which produced large unsold stocks, into an unwitting stroke of genius. If so, one of Molina’s most influential and persistent group of critics—the coffee interests—may be temporarily assuaged and less eager to risk the potentially unsettling results of a coup to remove Molina.

A rather broad spectrum of scenarios is possible. It is conceivable, for example, that the PCN could somehow get through the 1976 legislative/municipal elections intact and find an attractive presidential candidate for 1977. (Agriculture Minister Lt. Col. Roberto Escobar Garcia seems to have the right mix of characteristics—a military background, experience in public administration, a basic understanding of agricultural problems, intelligence and an effective campaign style.) Or a coup might forestall elections and produce a new constitution, new symbols and a new official party without any basic revision of the rules of the game. Given favorable economic conditions, either outcome might provide a welcome transfusion of energy, imagination and good-will, but neither would necessarily resolve the basic contradictions of the present system. Another possibility is that a rightwing coup, financed by the oligarchy and designed to put an end to the reformist tradition, might occur. This would be a step backward and, while it might provide a few years’ stability through repression, it would also not resolve the basic contradictions of the system. At the other end of the spectrum, Molina—or a successor government resulting from an election or a coup—might succeed in incorporating the campesino in political system so that he participates meaningfully in determining his fate. This is essentially what the UCS hopes to achieve. With an organized campesino movement supporting the government as a countervailing power to the oligarchy, we could expect an effort to carry out more rapid and sweeping reform. Similarly, it is conceivable that the Christian Democrats may approach a leading military officer to offer him the PDC Presidential nomination—and therefore an excellent chance to win a majority of the votes cast—in 1977. At present, it does not seem likely that the PDC would even consider this nor that any opposition victory at the polls would be respected by the PCN-controlled election officials, but if the PCN chooses a more conservative Presidential candidate, a military candidate might become an attractive alternative for the opposition.

There is, therefore, the potential for modifying the political system so that it may become a more effective agent of economic and social change. But there is no guarantee that this potential will be realized.² In the event it is not, time may run out for El Salvador to find a non-violent solution to its problems. At this point, we do not foresee a revolutionary upheaval like that of 1932 within the next several years and are loathe to predict, as some do, that it is inevitable. However, the potential for such an upheaval does exist and is liable to increase if the impending political difficulties described above are not dealt with adequately. The fear of a 1932-like revolution, possibly of even bloodier and more far-reaching proportions given the increased deprived population today is increasingly invoked by government and opposition leaders alike as a justification for more rapid and broader reform. There are a number of danger signs which bear watching: there are some 100,000 families with no access to land, a sharp increase over just three or four years ago, attributable in part, though unintentionally, to the 1974 Land Rent Law; economic recession is aggravating the already staggering structural unemployment problem; the repressive measures of the security forces are breeding disrespect for authority; and Church and opposition leaders have heightened their criticism of the government, particularly in the countryside.

The U.S. Response

The U.S. has no vital strategic or economic interests in El Salvador. In global or even Latin American terms, it is a small, insignificant country. Our interest here is essentially preventive—we wish to see El Salvador and all of Central America remain quiet, peaceful and stable so that we can devote our attention to other, more vital areas of the world. In the Salvadoran context, our interest in stability implies support for basic, structural change going beyond the palliatives that PCN governments have been able to offer since 1962. We clearly wish to do what we can to avoid a violent upheaval and some of the unattractive policy options it would pose (basically, intervention vs. standing by and watching). Our interests in El Salvador do not justify the commitment of resources much above the present level. Moreover, there is little we could do to determine the course of events. Furthermore, the problems are Salvadoran problems, not U.S., and their solutions—if there are any—must be Salvadoran, too. Our primary concern at this point is to be aware of the potential for crisis and, by dealing with both “ins” and “outs”, to be able to detect where El Salvador might be headed. At the same time, we might consider a number of low-cost uses of our influence—which while not decisive, is consequential—to encourage the government to open up the political system and intensify the pace of reform.

A. The Mission (1) could continue to make it clear to the government, the military and the opposition that the USG does not oppose, and in fact welcomes, intensification of the government’s reform program. In so doing, we must be careful, however, to avoid identifying ourselves with the overtly political and demagogic variety of reform measures.

(2) could examine methods of effectively communicating to the GOES our view that electoral fraud is a self-defeating practice; and to the principal democratically-oriented opposition parties that alliances and identification with extremist political elements also is self-defeating.

(3) could seek more effectively to convey to Salvadoran officials the high importance the USG attaches to respect for human rights, recognizing that this is as delicate a matter as (2) above.

(4) should maintain and strengthen our dialog with opposition political groups, the clergy, the campesinos, the labor unions, and other groups who are pressing for change since the political system may be headed for a major modification. This does not necessarily imply that our present generally good relations with the government, the PCN and the military will suffer.

(5) should expand the dialog between all substantive officers of the Embassy and Salvadoran military officers, especially those below the rank of colonel. This is both feasible and potentially productive in a mutual sense. USIS should be able to use its existing programs to facilitate this kind of contact.

B. Washington Agencies: might consider devising programs to upgrade the administrative and technical skills of the military. We could provide a number of scholarships to train a few officers in public administration, economics or business administration, skills that would improve the officer’s chances to perform well in the public administration, positions that a good number will enter in any of the future scenarios. If, as we suspect, it is inevitable that this and future governments will use officers as cabinet ministers, subsecretaries and directors of autonomous agencies, would it not make sense for some of the USG training dollars to go to improve some of their technical and administrative skills rather than to improve their purely military capabilities?

In conclusion, the U.S. cannot serve as deus ex machina that could or should miraculously pluck El Salvador from its predicament. The USG does need to be aware of what is happening here and of what consequences it may have on overall U.S. interests in today’s interdependent world. We cannot pursue what Secretary Kissinger calls “just international arrangements for all mankind” without listening and appropriately responding to the elements fostering change in countries such as El Salvador.

Moskowitz

1. Summary: The Embassy analyzed signs the Salvadoran Government was weakening and noted the possibility of revolutionary upheaval in the coming years, adding that the ability of the U.S. Government to affect the course of events in El Salvador was limited.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P750130–1478. Confidential. Drafted by Political Officer Charles Blum on July 21; cleared in draft by Political Officers William Walker and Bruce Beardsley, Economic Officer Ruth Winstanley, and AID Director Edwin Anderson; and approved by Moskowitz. Forwarded to Guatemala City, Managua, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. Airgram 82 from San Salvador is dated June 12. (Ibid., P750101–0354)

2. Under foreseeable circumstances, even an honest vote count and possible opposition political victory would be no guarantee of peaceful transition and transformation since it appears improbable that the vested economic interests and traditional military leadership would long tolerate government by the political alliance of Christian Democrats and their more leftist partners (a likely combination). A reactionary coup would be almost inevitable. An alliance between the governing PCN and PDC does not appear in prospect at this juncture. [Footnote in the original.]