Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

152. Telegram 209707 From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, October 24, 1973, 1613Z.

209707. Subject: Meeting Between Alfredo Ortiz Mancia and Deputy Assistant Secretary Bowdler.

1. Mr. Ortiz opened the meeting by explaining that he had travelled to Washington at President Molina’s request to check out the Salvadorean impression that there was a coolness within the Department toward El Salvador perhaps arising out of the 1969 war with Honduras. In support of this impression he mentioned the leak of the Israeli arms deal which persons in El Salvador think came from the State Department. He also indicated that the GOES was not receiving the same type of military assistance, both in matériel and training, as other neighboring countries. Ortiz described Honduras’s hardening position in the Mexico City negotiations and strongly suggested that these talks would end in no agreement. What worries the Salvadorans, he added, was that if these negotiations fail, there will be a temptation on the part of revanchist elements in Honduras to put the blame on El Salvador and even take some military action in retaliation for the Salvadoran invasion in 1969. Ortiz claimed that because of the lack of military assistance from the United States, Salvador would be hard pressed to defend itself, particularly from aerial attack, because of the weakness of its air force.

2. Ambassador Bowdler, after expressing his great appreciation for the personal gesture of confidence on the part of President Molina in sending Ortiz to Washington, emphasized that there was no coolness within the State Department towards El Salvador. Quite the contrary, he said that our relations with and feelings toward El Salvador were as close and cooperative as they had ever been.

3. Ambassador Bowdler explained that the leak on the Israeli arms deal was totally unauthorized and had not come from the Department of State. A reading of the news story suggests that the person who furnished the information seemed to have Israeli arms deals primarily in mind. He pointed out that the mention of El Salvador seemed to be incidental to the principal point of the story as were similar references to Mexico and Nicaragua. Mr. Ortiz stated that he was very glad to receive the explanation because of the impression that the story had come out of the State Department.

4. Ambassador Bowdler then explained at some length our policy of evenhandedness with respect to El Salvador and Honduras on supplying military equipment and training. He emphasized that we had been scrupulous in offering to each country, on identical terms, whatever had been offered to the other. Ambassador Bowdler and CEN Director Lazar explained in some detail the background of the A–37 offer. Here, again, we found Ortiz surprisingly uninformed for a Presidential emissary. For example, he was under the impression that the Hondurans had already received their A–37s. We assured him this was not the case and advised him of the difficulties that had been overcome here in order to attempt to tailor the Salvadoran A–37 package to the expressed wishes of the Salvadorans. We told him that we thought one problem the Salvadorans might have had was our inability to promise them that credit would be available to cover the aircraft sale. We explained to Ortiz that we could only have offered credit pursuant to congressional authorization and that there was no such authorization when the negotiation was being discussed. We told him that the offer of the A–37s had probably expired but that we would look into the possibility of reviving it if the GOES was still interested.

5. Ortiz expressed the personal opinion that direct personal contact between President Molina and General Lopez promoted by General Arana would be much more likely to lead to a solution than meetings such as those going on in Mexico. He felt that direct interpersonal relations away from the glare of publicity had advantages over formal negotiating sessions which needed to end with a joint press release acceptable to public opinion on both sides. He stated that the frontier issue would require mutual concessions and harkened back to the Antigua meetings which apparently had almost reached agreement based in part on Honduras’s willingness to exchange some territory on its side of the border for some of the disputed areas. Ortiz ended with a request that the U.S. take a hand in facilitating settlement in some way. Ambassador Bowdler pointed out that the Mexican negotiations could be very useful in defining areas of agreement and disagreement. Perhaps at the Presidential level the points at issue could be resolved, thereby achieving the type of settlement that would benefit everyone.

Kissinger

1. Summary: During a meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Bowdler, Salvadoran emissary Alfredo Ortíz Mancía said that an impression existed within the Government of El Salvador that relations with the United States had cooled. Bowdler assured him that this was not the case and that the U.S. Government maintained a policy of evenhandedness in its relations with El Salvador and Honduras.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lazar and approved by Bowdler. In an October 23 briefing memorandum, Lazar assured Bowdler that the U.S. Government had not leaked news of Israeli aircraft sales to El Salvador in an effort to influence negotiations between El Salvador and Honduras and had “deliberately refrained from taking sides,” scrupulously following a policy of “evenhandedness” in the provision of military equipment to both countries. (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files: Lot 75D469, El Salvador—Political 1973) According to telegram 233087 to San Salvador and Tegucigalpa, November 28, during a November 27 meeting with Bowdler, Ortíz Mancía asked the U.S. Government to help bring about a settlement of the border dispute. Bowdler replied that “any solution, to be effective, will have to be arrived at by agreement between the two countries and cannot be imposed upon them by any third party.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])