Leaders of the Social Christian Party (PSC) met with the Ambassador at a
luncheon held at the residence on December 14, 1971. PSC leaders had
expressed interest in such a meeting during their frequent contacts with
officers of the Political Section. They were particularly eager that the
luncheon take place prior to the December 21 deadline for a decision
from the Supreme Electoral Court regarding the PSC petition for
recognition as a legal party with a right to participate in the February
1972 elections.
As the luncheon progressed, it became apparent that the PSC leaders had
requested this opportunity to express the party’s views to the American
Ambassador in an attempt to elicit his support for its campaign for
legal recognition. By the end of the afternoon they mentioned the
subject several times and bluntly requested that the Ambassador see
President Somoza to present the PSC point of view with a USG endorsement. The Ambassador’s response
was noncommittal. The full memorandum of conversation is attached.
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation
Managua,
December 14,
1971
Participants:
- Ambassador Shelton, Amembassy Managua
- Cesar Delgadillo, President, Partido Social Christiano
(PSC)
- Eduardo Rivas, Ex-Senator PSC
- Ignacio Zelaya Paiz, Ex-President PSC
- Manuel J. Morales Peralta, Fiscal PSC
- Roger Miranda, Secretary for International Relations
PSC
- James R. Cheek,
Political Officer, Amembassy Managua
- Dan E. Turnquist, Political Officer, Amembassy Managua
After the usual amenities the PSC leadership got directly to the
point and began discussing the party’s petition campaign and the
possible repercussions if the Petition was not accepted by the
Supreme Electoral Court. Although the conversation touched on many
other matters, this was the central theme, the topic which the PSC
leadership always returned to and the note that closed the
conversation.
Party President Delgadillo reviewed the internal struggle in the
party which had led to the petition campaign. (Managua A–116) He
emphasized that once the Petition was decided upon all party
elements combined in collecting signatures. The party was both
surprised and pleased by the “outpouring of support” received and it
collected the necessary signatures in considerably less time than
originally thought necessary. Now everything depended on the
decision of the Supreme Electoral Court.
Senator Rivas stated that if the Court turned down the PSC petition
that he and other more conservative elements would be incapable of
restraining the youth who wanted to opt for violence. He observed
that he was an old man and would not become involved in a violent
revolution, but he would have no choice but to advise those younger
and fitter than he that this was the only road to ending the “Somoza
dictatorship” if constitutional methods were foreclosed by rejecting
the party petition.
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Morales agreed with Rivas commenting somewhat truthfully that he was
too fat to be a revolutionary but that he would no longer, in good
faith, be able to advise the youth of the party that violence was
wrong if peaceful means failed.
Zelaya suggested that the ultimate decision would be a political one
made by President Somoza and asked if the Ambassador had any notion
what it would be. The Ambassador answered that Somoza had assured
him the law would be observed but had gone no further than that.
Zelaya then suggested that acceptance of the petition was in the
best interest of the USG and party leaders would be grateful if the
Ambassador would discuss the matter with Somoza and present the PSC
position, hopefully with a U.S. endorsement.
The Ambassador protested that the PSC leadership was ascribing much
more influence to him than he actually possessed and jokingly
observed that if his influence was indeed as great as they thought,
he would be greatly surprised. The PSC leaders laughed politely, but
clearly were unconvinced.
The Ambassador inquired about what changes the PSC had in mind if and
when it became a majority party in Nicaragua. The party plans
expressed were rather vague, concentrating on such areas as
eliminating nepotism and corruption from government and orienting
the government away from the “oligarcy” and toward the “people.” It
was made emphatically clear that the PSC believes in private
property. However, several suggestions were made that it might be
necessary to divest the Succession Somoza of some of its properties
which, according to the PSC, have been acquired at the expense of
the people during thirty-five years of “dictatorial rule.” They
failed to explain how this belief in the sanctity of private
property could be reconciled with their statement that there should
be a more equitable distribution of property presently owned by this
“oligarchy.”
The Ambassador asked about the PSC’s view of the U.S. role in
Nicaragua. Zelaya attacked the AID
program stating that Nicaraguan contractors had profiteered on the
Rama Road project and that many roads built with U.S. aid were built
for the specific purpose of serving lands owned by the Somoza family
rather than the nation of Nicaragua. The Ambassador defended the
performance of the AID mission in properly monitoring the
contractors. He discussed with the participants the wealth of
documentation which had to be furnished on each contract and stated
that the AID auditing procedures were too tight to allow such
“fraud” as they alleged. He further pointed out the
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difficulty in locating
a road in Nicaragua which did NOT pass near a Somoza farm since they
are the largest property owners in the country. He closed by
observing that while he was in no position to defend GON contracting procedures in general or
the Somoza family since that was not his function he could and would
vouch for those projects supervised by AID.
On the international scene, the PSC leadership was even less precise
than when discussing domestic politics. Miranda’s observation that
the party would recognize the Peoples Republic of China was greeted
with general laughter, but when an inquiry was made about Cuba,
there was talk about being clearly identified with the Western world
and a commitment to the interamerican system.
Throughout these remarks on the party’s aspirations for Nicaragua
both domestically and internationally, all of the PSC participants
made it clear that their first and primary concern was the petition
campaign and legal recognition for the party. They stated quite
frankly that if an honest and open election were held tomorrow they
would probably obtain no more than 100,000 votes. They admitted that
the Partido Liberal Nacional (PLN) led
by Somoza has an excellent nation-wide organization. They also
volunteered that Somoza was personally popular. It can bring
pressure to bear on nearly every member of the population through a
relative who is a government employee or through some needed favor
from the government or the national guard. As an example of this
kind of pressure they cited the telegrams which were flooding the
Supreme Electoral Court requesting that names be removed from the
PSC petition. Most of these have been produced through PLN pressure
brought on PSC petition signers.
Legal recognition is simply a step in a long campaign to gain
political power in Nicaragua in the opinion of PSC leaders.
The conversation closed with one last plea to the Ambassador to use
his influence with Somoza to affect the outcome of the Court
decision. The Ambassador thanked the PSC leaders for an interesting
afternoon, expressed a desire to see them more frequently.
Comment:
When analyzing the dire predictions made by PSC leaders regarding the
aftermath of rejection of their petition, it must be remembered that
they were trying to convince the Ambassador of the necessity of U.S.
intervention. The petition was rejected by the Supreme Electoral
Court on December 21 (Managua 2935).
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The luncheon participants subsequently have taken a much less radical
public line and promised to keep working within the system with the
hopes of participating in 1974. They have however noted that some
dissident elements in Nicaragua may take the Court decision as proof
that violence is the only way.
Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of the whole afternoon
was that a group that is frequently publicly critical of U.S.
“intervention” in Nicaragua was willing to ask for just the kind of
intervention they denounce when it was convenient for their
purposes.
