Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

259. Information Memorandum From Joseph B. Norbury of the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins)¹ ²

Washington, April 21, 1972

SUBJECT:

• Possible Scheduled Cuban Overflight of U.S. en route to Canada

1. Intelligence indicates that Cubana de Aviacion plans to change the technical stop in Canada of its flight #476 to Prague from Gander to Montreal, beginning Saturday April 22. This raises the possibility that the Cubans intend to overfly the U.S. en route to Montreal, although we have received no formal request for permission to do so.

2. We have asked our Embassy in Ottawa to inquire of the Canadian Government whether it has in fact authorized Cubana to make its regular technical stop at Montreal instead of Gander and we have also discussed this with the Canadian Embassy here. We have not yet received a reply to our inquiries.

3. As a signatory (with the U.S.) of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, Cuba has the right to overfly and make technical stops in the territory of signatory countries, including the U.S. Up to now we have always been able to persuade the Government of Canada not to authorize scheduled Cuban stops at locations which might require overflights of the U.S.

4. If Canada has authorized Cubana to make technical stops at Montreal, we see no alternative but to allow Cubana to exercise its treaty right to overfly the U.S. About 35 to 50 U.S. aircraft overfly Cuba every day, most of them scheduled flights of major U.S. air carriers. If we refuse to permit scheduled Cubana overflights of the U.S., Cuba would probably retaliate by forbidding U.S. overflights of Cuba, resulting in a considerable added expense for U.S. airlines—probably in the millions of dollars per year range.

5. One complication is that FAA regulations require scheduled overflyers of the U.S. to file an Operations Specification Sheet containing airflight safety information regarding routes, type of aircraft navigation equipment, etc., before permission for overflights is granted. Since it appears that the Cubans may be flying new Russian IL–62’s, aircraft which already overfly the U.S., FAA would not have difficulty approving the overflights. The Cubans have not filed such a document yet, however. Scheduled carriers who overfly the U.S. without FAA permission are subject to a fine, but of course in the case of Cuba, fines and other “normal” requirements do not always work.

6. Our plan (unless you instruct me otherwise), in the contingency that Cubana flight #476 does file a flight plan to overfly the U.S. on Saturday en route to Montreal is as follows:

a. We will allow the flight to proceed. We have consulted with E/AV, FAA and NORAD on this and there is agreement that this is the only realistic course to follow. Drastic measures to prevent a Cuban overflight would certainly result in Cuban retaliation against U.S. overflights of Cuba.

b. Next week we will advise the Cuban aviation authorities, via the Swiss Embassy in Havana of the requirement for the filing of an Operations Specification Sheet for scheduled overflights of the U.S. and that in the meantime, they are subject to the normal penalties required by FAA regulations for unapproved overflights of the U.S.

c. If Cubana de Aviacion files an Operations Specification Sheet, we recommend that the normal authorization be given for scheduled overflights in accordance with FAA procedures and requirements.

d. If the Cubans refuse to file the proper documents required by FAA, or otherwise violate air safety regulations, we will be forced to take additional measures, including diplomatic protests, perhaps circuitous routings en route to Montreal, or other appropriate measures.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 31–1 CUBA–US. Secret. Drafted by James S. Landberg (ARA/CCA). At the top of the first page, Crimmins wrote: “OK,” his initials, and the date, April 21. A note also initialed by Crimmins appears on the second page next to paragraph (6)(d), and reads: “To be decided at the time.” Attached to the memorandum is a copy of telegram 68905 to Ottawa, April 20, in which the Department alerted the Embassy to the possibility and instructed it to ask Canadian authorities about the flight (Ibid.)
2. Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins reported on the Department of State’s plans should a Cubana de Aviación flight overfly U.S. territory en route to Canada.