Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

213. Telegram 23858 From the Department of State to All ARA Diplomatic Posts¹ ²

Washington, February 17, 1970, 1640Z

SUBJECT:

• U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. Background. In recent months there has been continuing reference by some public and official circles of the Hemisphere to the question of Cuba, including the possibility of a reintegration of the present Cuban government into the inter-American system. A good deal of the discussion has originated in the Chilean Government but there has been input, often fuzzy and qualified, by Bolivian, Mexican, Peruvian, Panamanian and Venezuelan figures. Most recently Primin Williams of Trinidad-Tobago suggested at the just concluded IA–ECOSOC meeting in Caracas the possibility of incorporating Cuba into the economic mechanism of the inter-American system. While Williams carefully noted the problem created by Cuban Government interference in other countries internal affairs, his formal allusion to the question, and a subsequent limited and qualified echo by President Caldera have produced a flurry of renewed interest in the general question of relations with Cuba.

2. A rather consistent feature of the public and official speculation about possible changes in the present relationship with Cuba has been rumor-mongering about USG interest in altering its policy in favor of some sort of accommodation with the present Cuban Government. From time to time this kind of allegation has been cited as a justification for the consideration by some governments of initiatives aimed at “regularizing” the position of Cuba either in a bilateral or a multilateral (OAS) sense. As part of this process, there have been signs of an uneasiness that other members of the OAS might find themselves caught short by a shift in U.S. policy. Distorted accounts of statements by USG officials have added to this uneasiness (e.g. the gross wire-service distortion of remarks in Caracas by Assistant Secretary Meyer).

3. There is no basis in fact for such speculation about a change in USG policy toward Cuba. That policy remains unaltered. There are no rpt no conversations underway or contemplated between the USG and the Cuban Government concerning a modification of the present relationship. END BACKGROUND.

4. In order that there be no misunderstanding about present USG policy toward Cuba, you should seek early opportunity to reaffirm orally U.S. policy to FONMIN. (You may, at your discretion, inform selected Latin American diplomatic colleagues in a similar vein.) You should state to FONMIN that, in view of some speculation about present U.S. policy toward Cuba, your government has instructed you to review with him: (1) the basis of U.S. policy toward Cuba; (2) the present US estimate of the Cuban threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere; and (3) current U.S. policy toward Cuba. In so doing, you should draw upon the following as appropriate:

(a) U.S. policy toward Cuba is based upon and entirely consistent with the decisions and recommendations made collectively in the OAS which: (1) in 1962, excluded the Cuban government from participation in the OAS because of its incompatibility with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system. (2) in 1964, following Cuban-sponsored subversion in Venezuela, resolved that all OAS members not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba and suspend all trade and sea transportation with Cuba until Cuba ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere; (3) in 1968, following further Cuban acts of intervention in the internal affairs of the OAS states, condemned Cuba and called upon States not members of the OAS to restrict their trade and financial relations with Cuba until it ceased its policy of intervention and aggression. Convinced that Cuba presented a danger to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, the US has complied with these decisions and recommendations.

(b) For its part, US concern over Cuba has derived both from the present Cuban government’s avowed policies of interfering in the internal affairs of other American nations by attempting to subvert them, and from Cuba’s military ties with the Soviet Union which carry with them the risk to peace and security that would be posed by the military presence of a strong extra-continental power in the Hemisphere. Numerous examples of Cuba’s past efforts to subvert other American nations (dramatically illustrated by Che Guevara’s guerrilla activities in Bolivia), and the confrontation with the USSR over the emplacement of its offensive missiles in Cuba in October 1962 constitute ample evidence to support the prudence of our twin concerns.

(c) From the US standpoint, the objectives of the policy of economic restriction, including the suspension of trade, have been, not the overthrow of the present Cuban regime, but rather the reduction of Cuba’s capability for exporting armed revolution and the discouragement of Soviet adventures into this Hemisphere like its support of Cuba. As a result of the OAS policy of economic restriction: (1) Cuba is deprived of substantial sums of hard currency which would otherwise be available to promote Cuban goals of fostering armed revolution in Latin America, (2) Cuba is a financial burden for the Soviet Union (we estimate that it costs the USSR more than one million dollars a day to keep Cuba afloat.), (3) Some of the energy, ingenuity, money and manpower now required to keep the creaking Cuban economy going would otherwise be available for subversive activities. (4) Cuba today, (due also in part to Castro’s mismanagement) is not an attractive model likely to stimulate emulation elsewhere in the Hemisphere.

(d) Critical question in any examination of OAS policy toward Cuba is whether Cuban policies and actions with respect to subversion in the Hemisphere have altered in such a manner as no longer to constitute a danger to peace and security of hemisphere and therefore measures against Cuba adopted by OAS and its nonmembers are no longer warranted.

(e) Cuba’s efforts to export armed revolution have suffered a series of set-backs in Hemisphere which culminated in Che Guevara’s failure and death in Bolivia. Our impression has been that, for a number of months following Guevara’s death, the Cuban Government was reassessing its strategy and tactics because of its lack of success and because of pressing domestic concerns, principally economic. We have watched this situation carefully, and we have concluded, on the basis of all available evidence, that Cuban support of revolutionary groups in Latin America continues although at a reduced level compared to the period before 1968. Small groups of Latin Americans, including Brazilians, Bolivians, Argentines, and Uruguayans have received guerrilla training in Cuba during the past several months. In addition, Cuban funds probably have reached revolutionary groups in several countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala. Propaganda from Havana continues to highlight the activities of urban terrorists particularly in Brazil.

(f) This evidence is corroborated by the recent statement of a senior, well-placed Cuban Communist party official, made to a source which we consider to be highly reliable. In summary, the Cuban official said: Che Guevera’s death marked the end of an epoch and the beginning of a period of reappraisal. This does not mean that Cuba is any less interested in Latin American revolution than before, nor that Cuba is any less prepared to use her resources in support of Revolution in an appropriate situation. If Cuban activity is now on a lower level, this is simply because of the objective circumstances and Cuba is adjusting her approach—where Cuba used to support rural guerrillas, now Cuba is more interested in supporting urban guerrillas; there are promising elements in some of the armed forces of certain countries; the role of certain groups in the Catholic Church is of interest. (End of statement)

(g) Our over-all conclusion is, therefore, that the Cuban Government has not rpt not abandoned or renounced its policy of engaging in subversion in the hemisphere, although its activities currently are at a reduced level. Whether this level will remain relatively constant remains to be seen. We have no reason to believe that the Cuban Government would hesitate in trying to exploit any good opening for subversive activity should one arise.

(h) With reference to Cuba’s military ties to the Soviet Union, our concern is the dependent relationship of Cuba upon the USSR which makes it prudent to be alert to the possibility that Cuba could once again lend itself to Soviet military activities in this Hemisphere. There is no rpt no evidence that this relationship has altered. We currently estimate as low the chances of the Soviets embarking on any adventurist military course with respect to Cuba. We have taken careful note, however, of the Soviet naval visit in July 1969 (first of kind in the Hemisphere) and of Marshal Grechko’s visit in November (first visit of a Soviet Defense Minister to Cuba.) The full implications of these two developments are not yet known.

(i) To our knowledge, the Cuban Government has evinced no serious interest in returning to the inter-American system. In fact, Prime Minister Castro on repeated occasions has made statements in precisely the opposite sense.

(j) We continue to hope that Cuba will abandon its disruptive and destructive policies and actions in order that we, together with the other members of the OAS, could welcome the people of Cuba back into the family of American nations.

(k) In the absence of a basic change in the policies and actions of the Cuban government, which gave rise to the OAS counter-actions to safeguard the peace and security of the Hemisphere, the USG will continue to comply with the OAS actions and recommendations, thus maintaining its present policy toward Cuba. We believe that the OAS decisions and recommendations have provided the benefits of impairing Cuba’s capability for exporting revolution and have measurably increased the burden which Cuba represents for the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, therefore, we would consider efforts to modify the OAS decisions as imprudent and unwise.

5. Please report reactions to your approach. END

Richardson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CUBA–US. Secret. It was drafted by Crimmins, Hurwitch, and Funseth; cleared by Meyer, Bowden (EUR/SOV), Gardiner (INR/DDG), Jova, Feldman, and Vaky; and approved by Johnson. It was repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, USUN, and Warsaw. In intelligence brief INRB–26 from Cline to Rogers, February 5, INR analyzed increased pressure to reintegrate Cuba into the OAS. (Ibid., POL CUBA–LA)
2. Responding to ongoing public and official debate over the possibility of reintegrating Cuba into the Organization of American States and the hemispheric community, the Department of State ordered its diplomatic posts to reaffirm to the Foreign Ministers of each of the countries in the Western Hemisphere that no change in U.S. policy was contemplated.