Attached for your information is a report of Amb. Stewart’s meeting with
President Figueres yesterday. State and CIA are requesting a further assessment from Ambassador
Ploeser and Stewart of
Figueres’ reaction and possible next steps.
The impression I get from the report is that Figueres was shaken, but
took the line we expected—denying receipt of the Soviet money and
claiming that he really is in control of the situation and that he is
really trying to help us end the cold war.
The key issue now is whether Figueres will simply keep silent, taking
into account that we know of his financial ties with the Soviets, or try
to counterattack by charging blackmail. That will depend to a large
extent on whether he believes we have solid and usable evidence which
even his great liberal reputation would not offset. Stewart apparently
tried to convey the idea that the evidence was so convincing to him—an
old friend of Figueres—that he had come to Costa Rica for this mission.
However, we know that Figueres must have passed the story on to another
Costa Rican (CIA thinks the Vice President) even while Stewart was in
the house, because the Costa Rican told it to our AID Mission Director—who is very friendly toward
Figueres—who immediately called Washington to complain about this
“ludicrous” tale. (He was told not to discuss the matter any further and
is now back in the U.S.)
I will be in touch with the agencies and will let you know if there is
any further indication that this will become a public blow-up. If it
does, you noted that you would want to check with the President on
possibly briefing a U.S. political figure not connected with the
Administration, such as Hubert Humphrey, to bolster the credibility of
our case.
Attachment
Report of Meeting
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEYER AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HURWITCH FROM AMBASSADOR
PLOESER
Ambassador Stewart’s statement follows:
“I saw Figueres alone at La Lucha establishment on January 8.
Conversation lasted three hours. When initial representation was
made including mention reception Soviet money President visibly
shaken and he denied having done so. He was then presented with
prepared paper which he read carefully and stated most of other
facts true.
“Regarding taking of money Figueres said it was story planted by
Echandistas [text not declassified] I replied
that I would not have come on mission if I hadn’t been convinced
there was some basis of fact for the occurrence. President asked me
source of our information and I stated it was impossible to provide
him with our sources but that I could assure him that it did not
emanate from Echandistas.
“Then there ensued a description of grievances which the President
laid to lack of U.S. appreciation of his pro-American efforts and
our suspicion of his motives. I said we may have been guilty of
being unappreciative but that we had helped him when he was in
trouble and we hoped he would be statesman enough to overlook our
faults and remain a true friend of the U.S. Figueres stated that he
continued to be a firm supporter of the U.S. and the West and we
could count on his entire cooperation.
“Figueres then explained the motivation for his dealings with Manuel
Mora, whom he described as an old-line Communist who could obtain
advantages through the CP of Russia for sale of
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coffee. He described Mora as
intelligent, devoid of ideas for good of common people, and
manageable. To this I replied that perhaps Mora thought he was
managing Figueres and called attention to the fact that some of the
information included in the Hard Fact sheet was based on Mora
statements. He said Mora might be trying to ‘destroy’ him but he did
not have any qualms about this as he was completely in control of
the situation in Costa Rica.
“I told the President that the U.S. was greatly concerned about the
establishment of a Soviet Embassy, and the possibility of its use as
a center of subversion in Central America. Costa Rica would be an
ideal center for a base of Russian operations, given its long
democratic history. Figueres stated that in a long conversation with
Dmitriy Zhukov, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had laid down
the ground rules for Soviet conduct when an Embassy was installed.
He said in reply to my query about permitting Embassy personnel to
engage in subverting students, labor leaders and intellectuals that
Zhukov had been warned that such activities would not be permitted.
As for activities outside Costa Rica, I said the U.S. would require
Costa Rican assistance in watching activities of indicated Soviet
persons. The president said the U.S. could count [text not declassified] Costa Rica in this field. I replied
that we consider this cooperation vital and were glad that we could
count on Costa Rica. Figueres, however, again repeated his annoyance
at burning of literature at our behest.
“Anyone who has talked with Figueres will understand that he can
ramble and this occurred during our conversation. According to
Embassy most of his complaints and observations have been heard
before.
“However, in making observations about the Hard Fact paper, Figueres
took exception of paragraph on Dr. Luis Burstin, the President
describing him as brilliant scholar who embraced Marxism in Mexico
but who has been veering away from this
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doctrine under Figueres’ tutelage. He also
gave Max Blanco a clean bill of health, although he is not mentioned
in the paper. As for nomination of Gutierrez as Director of ITCO,
Pepe admitted he was supported by Mora but claimed that numerous
conservative Costa Ricans also supported his nomination. He said he
would watch Gutierrez’ performance closely.
“Referring to use of Mora to make a deal with Castro, Figueres declared that he
has given up hope of Fidel’s overthrow and believes if rapprochement
can be made with Cuba something may be done to change Castro’s
policies. He admitted he wants release of Matos and Sanchez Arango
but said any deal with Castro must be on a much broader scale, i.e.,
general amnesty for prisoners and a promise from Fidel to
discontinue subversive activities directed at other countries.
“During conversation, Figueres returned again and again to the matter
of taking Russian money. He said it was simply impossible for him as
a leader among Latin American liberals to sell out this way, but I
replied each time that to me the evidence appeared so convincing
that I was in Costa Rica to talk with him.
“While I was at La Lucha Figueres received a telephone call from an
unidentified person who reported on the ships which were supposed to
be landing arms near the Panamanian border. He identified them as
the Waltham and Guayaquil, black in color, about 70 foot long and
fast. He said his informant identified them as belonging to the
Department of State. I said this couldn’t he true and Pepe amended
his statement to state that they might be CIA craft. Toward the end
of the conversation we returned to the subject of the ships and the
President said they might be smuggling contraband ashore. This was
partially confirmed, he said, by the presence of an accomplice of
Frank Marshall near where ships sighted. As a matter of fact,
Figueres continued, he was now convinced CIA was not involved in any
plot to overthrow him but that he was stationing agents on the
Panamanian frontier to intercept any contraband being smuggled into
this country. I asked him
[Page 5]
about Frank Marshall and he described him as whisky smuggler and
a potential troublemaker but there was no inference Marshall had the
slightest chance of staging uprising against him.
“Figueres retained the Hard Fact paper I gave him.
“The entire meeting was conducted in a friendly vein and Figueres
expressed his satisfaction that I had been sent to discuss these
delicate subjects with him. I am not too happy about the result of
the meeting as I believe the President was crawfishing. His offers
of cooperation were too glib and must be proved by actual
performance. He is wedded to the idea of ending the Cold War by
rapprochement with the USSR and I do not think I impressed him about
the dangers of Russian subversion. In fact, referring to [text not declassified] he said he was a relic
of the Cold War who saw a Communist under every bed and he should
retire. This attitude may allow Soviet to use him. It can only be
hoped that he will reflect on the U.S. concern and realize that he
cannot have it both ways.
END
