11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1 2
SUBJECT:
- Latin American Views on US Policy
The attached memo of conversation relates the views of Rodrigo Botero, Personal Assistant to Colombian President Lleras Restrepo, on what Latin America now feels about the US and what we should do. You may remember Botero as the person who accompanied President Lleras in his private conversations with you and translated for him. He is bright—MIT-trained—and is a good source for how the Latins feel about things. His views are of particular interest now, given our review of Latin American policy, and you may wish to skim the attached.
Botero said in effect that the Latins had two concerns: the bread and butter items, and the attitudinal posture of the US.
The bread and butter items we know about—the need for more trade and access to development capital. Mr. Botero listed the following specifics as things that he did think were essential to achieve any success in revitalizing the community:
- —Untieing of US loans—at least for hemisphere procurement;
- —Some move on trade preferences;
- —A gesture such as the US championing Latin American nations’ cause for more trade with the Europeans;
- —Some increase in capital flows for development.
The attitudinal aspect was extremely important to understand. He described the hemisphere and the system as virtually at a spiritual/organizational crisis, and he placed it in a historical context:
- —He quite frankly blamed the Johnson administration for allowing the feeling of momentum established in the early years of the Alliance to decline.
- —The 1967 summit meeting was a failure; by the end of the Johnson administration the hemisphere felt the Alliance was in pieces and the situation was bad.
- —They awaited the new administration’s policies and felt that the change offered an opportunity for starting new momentum.
- —They could not wait much longer.
- —What they need basically is a new spirit, a new feeling of movement.
- —To do this they needed to a) revitalize the inter-American System which is in crisis; to make the organizations effective; to give them greater voices in making decisions and doing things; and b) they wanted a mature relationship with the US—not to be told, but to cooperate, discuss, consult and work in harness.
He said that the attitudinal factors would get the US a lot of mileage and compensate for not being able to give much bread and butter. The Latins were realistic and understand that there is not much more bread and butter, i.e. that there is domestic resistance to trade liberalization and that aid levels will not rise very much. But they would like to see the Administration try. For example, stating that the Executive will ask Congress for x, y, and z, would be very effective even if Congress turned it down. How willing the administration will be to try for things the Latins think are essential is what they are watching for.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC File, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, volume 2, September–October 1969. Confidential. Sent for information. In the margin next to the section beginning with “What they need basically,” Nixon underlined most of the sentence and wrote, “agree—this Oct 31 speech must not be a dud stylistically.” Nixon also underlined most of the next statement and the penultimate sentence, and wrote, “do it” in the margin. Nixon’s comment was dated October 20. The attached memorandum of conversation has not been found.↩
- President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on the views of the personal assistant to Colombian PresidentLleras, Rodrigo Botero, on the U.S.-Latin American economic relations.↩