81. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
1047. Dept pass Cairo. Subj: Discussion With King Faisal re Support for BSO-Fatah. Ref: A. State 44811: B. State 42486: C. Jidda 0971.
Summary: Ambassador informed King Faisal we have additional convincing evidence close links BSO and Fatah. BSO conspiracy may well be aimed at setting back cause of endeavors to reach peaceful ME settlement. Terrorists are seizing initiative and damaging Palestinian cause. Amb urged cutting off of aid from Arab govts to Fatah as means reducing its resources and administering psychological blow. Otherwise terrorists will be emboldened to ask more and more of moderate Arab govts. We regard issue as one of great urgency and as of real significance for US-Saudi relations. King said Saudi Arabia much opposed to terrorism, though elements of Fatah infiltrated by Communists and Zionists were primarily responsible. SAG undertaking talk with Fatah leaders and has stopped aid until assurances received Fatah would cleanse itself of bad ideas and practices. King had clear reservations, however, about public or conclusive break with Fatah. Meanwhile, US should be putting pressure on Israel to withdraw from Arab territories. US can easily force Israel to do so by cutting off its support. Amb explained US views on need for negotiations and our willingness to assist. Amb urged again firm stand against BSO and Fatah as best long-range insurance prevent growth of terrorism. King urged withdrawal of US support for Israel. End summary.
1. Commenced my remarks at meeting with King March 14 by stating that US Ambassadors in number of Arab capitals instructed make representations at highest level host govts on what we regard as very serious implications recent tragic events in Khartoum.
2. I said we have been aware for some time of close connection between BSO and al-Fatah, and in fact in normal exchange of informa [Page 304] tion with Saudi Govt [less than 1 line not declassified] have brought those facts to attention of SAG. Recent statements of President Numeiry have underlined BSO-Fatah tifs. Khartoum events brought to light further unmistakable evidence of BSO-Fatah collaboration. Deputy Chief of Fatah office in Khartoum was leader of attack on Saudi Embassy. Vehicle used by attackers belonged to Fatah office there.
3. BSO and Fatah now linked together in vicious effort create chaos and uncertainty. One might wonder whether central objective BSO conspiracy was not to erase any slight progress toward Middle East peace, i.e., Khartoum assassinations may well have been aimed at dissipating hopeful reaction stimulated by recent talks in Washington with Hussein, Ismail and Mrs. Meir. Terrorists were seizing initiative, blackening Arab image throughout world, seriously damaging Palestinian cause.
4. USG was aware that some Arab govts were helping al-Fatah, voluntarily and involuntarily. Several are contributing money in sizable amounts. Cutting off this money would have two important favorable results: First, Fatah would be pinched in all its activities by reduced resources; secondly, and more important, it would suffer psychologically and in prestige from knowledge that it no longer enjoyed confidence and support of moderate Arab govts.
5. Finally, I told King that it seemed to me that if BSO continues its activities, trend toward radicalization of whole Palestinian movement will be accelerated and terrorists will be emboldened to ask more and more of moderate Arab govts, threatening to turn their increasingly violent tactics against these govts and their leaders. My govt wished His Majesty understand we regarded issue of support for Fatah as one of great urgency and as having real significance for relations between US and Saudi Arabia.
6. King replied he wanted me know that Saudi Arabia very much opposed to kind of violent excesses which had occurred at Khartoum. However, not entire Fatah organization favored this kind of deplorable tactic. Regrettably there had been elements in Fatah infiltrated by Communists and Zionists who undertook these things. Communists, for example, were ones who had forged Saudi passports and given them to BSO members. King reiterated firmly. “We disagree with and do not support at all terrorism and extremism.”
7. King continued that Saudi Arabia was undertaking talks with Fatah leaders. Saudi Arabia has stopped all aid to Fatah and would continue do so until assurances received that Fatah would cleanse itself of bad ideas and practices. But if Saudi Arabia were publicly to announce its intention stop all aid to Fatah, “our Palestinian brothers would attack us with much bitterness.” Moreover, Fatah itself would simply turn to other, Communist sources for support if Saudi help permanently withdrawn.
[Page 305]8. Our US friends, King went on, must begin to put real pressure on Israel to withdraw from Arab territories which it occupies. Once there is progress in that direction, then way will be opened to resolving all problems of area, including that of terrorism. On other hand, King said, Jews were, of course, delighted with White House spokesman statements made at end of Mrs. Meir’s visit to effect that, “US would never stop its support for Israel.” Declarations of this kind greatly limit Saudi capability for influencing Palestinians toward policies of moderation. As long as Israel remains so stubborn things are liable become steadily worse. If Israelis will withdraw from wrongfully occupied territories, then Arabs can work out details of reasonable method of living with Israel. US can easily force Israel to withdraw by cutting off its generous support to Israeli Govt.
9. Told King I knew he was aware from text of President’s recent letter to him that US continues regard Middle East question as one of most important issues affecting world peace. We were not at all satisfied with present no war, no peace situation. We did not believe, however, that outside powers could pressure either Egypt or Israel to accept an imposed solution. US was prepared help with negotiations once they were under way. But only then would it become apparent to US what it was it could usefully apply its pressure toward achieving.
10. Referring again to Arab govts’ support for Fatah and BSO, I wondered how moderate ones like Saudi Arabia could go on helping an organization if it had indeed been infiltrated by Zionists and Communists. Saudi Arabia in past had pursued policy of trying influence Fatah toward policies of moderation and compromise. Result has been further involvement of Fatah with terrorists. I was certain Fatah and BSO radicalism would continue to expand unless govts like Saudi Arabia took clear, determined public stand against them. Prestige of such highly respected, influential figure as King Faisal if brought to bear against terrorists could have great influence in deterring them. There was perhaps some risk against taking firm short-run stand against BSO and Fatah, but in long run moderate Arab states could in this manner best forestall possibility terrorism being turned against them. I reiterated that US regarded this issue as one of great seriousness in bilateral relations between our two govts.
11. King responded by declaring Saudi Arabia was not against Fatah carrying on “normal activities” aimed at Israel. Moreover, if Saudi Arabia were finally to announce intention never to assist Fatah again, it would simply drive Palestinians further into hands of Communists and other radicals. However, King would wish me to understand that Saudi Arabia’s assistance to Fatah would remain stopped until, “they come to a right line.”
12. I said my govt believed it extremely important that Saudi Arabia use every means to bring pressure on al-Fatah to abandon its support [Page 306] of terrorists. King replied that Saudi Arabia thought it very important US use all its influence to press Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.
13. Comment: King remained calm and relaxed throughout interview. He seemed almost to expect firmness and frankness of US viewpoint given to him. At same time he equally firm in holding to present Saudi policy of carefully limiting Saudi aid to Fatah but not closing off all contacts by emphatic or public disavowals. Saudis plainly worried about Communist (and Zionist) influence in Fatah and we have no doubt they detest and are fearful of terrorism. Nevertheless it also true that their convictions as to Israelis’ stubborness and US unwillingness pressure Israel are clearly identified in their minds as root causes of terrorism.
Summary: Thacher discussed with King Faisal the evidence linking Fatah and the Black September Organization and urged the King to reconsider funding Fatah.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Volume III, September 1, 1971–April 1973. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Tripoli, Tunis, Khartoum, Kuwait City, London, Moscow, Rabat, and Sana’a. Telegrams 44811 to Niamey, March 6; 42486 to Tel Aviv, March 11; and 971 from Jidda, March 9 are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. On the Khartoum incident, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 217. For the talks in Washington among Hussein, Ismail, and Meir, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Documents 26, 28–30, and 33–35.
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