228. Telegram From the Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic to the Departments of State and Defense1
1371. Subject: Results of Prince Sultan Visit.
1. Begin summary. Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff, LTC Ahmad al-Ghashmi advised Ambassador and DATT 21 April that visit of Saudi MinDef Prince Sultan had gone extremely well, had resulted in cancellation of “agreements” with USSR, and had opened new page in YAR relations with Saudi Arabia and by extension with the US. End summary.
[Page 714]2. During week that followed departure of Prince Sultan rumors began to proliferate in Sana that discussions had bogged down and visit had yielded no tangible results in military assistance field. Additional reports circulated to effect that large number of YAR military personnel including paratroopers had begun new training cycle in USSR and that local Soviet mission had been very active following Sultan visit. Usually well informed civilian and military officials at mid to upper levels expressed pessimism in talks with US Ambassador and DATT and one highly placed YARG source predicted that Soviet-YAR ties would continue on expanded basis.
3. In contest of these rumors Ambassador and DATT visited YAR Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff LTC Ahmad al-Ghashmi on 21 April and asked for his assessment of Sultan visit. Latter responded immediately and positively that full agreement had been reached on all major questions of military assistance. He went on to say that the Saudis had reconfirmed their intention to finance Western military equipment largely of US manufacture though in some cases from France. The Ambassador mentioned that we had sent letters of offer for military equipment by special courier to Riyadh for Saudi review prior to Sultan’s visit to YAR and asked if these had been presented to Yemenis. Ghashmi answered that he himself would travel to Riyadh within the next month to sign these letters.
4. In the meantime, Ghashmi said, Saudis and Yemenis had agreed on formation of joint military committee—headed by Ghashmi himself on YAR side and on Saudi side by Colonel Falih al-Dhahiri, G–3 Action Officer for Saudi programs in YAR. Ghashmi noted that Dhahiri had arrived on previous day April 20 at head of Saudi follow-up team which would begin process of implementing reorganization plans previously developed by Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation.
5. Ambassador explained that we had heard rumors in Sana of difficulties or misunderstandings during the Sultan talks together with stories of large-scale Soviet offers of equipment and training. Ghashmi dismissed these rumors as lies and attributed them to “party factionalists” (hazibiyiin) seeking to sow doubt and discord. He confirmed that the Soviet Ambassador had been to see him on three successive days with offers of military hardware including T–55 tanks and 1,300 training spaces in the Soviet Union but assured his listeners that he had refused these proposals. He went on to say that YARG had cancelled “agreements” with USSR and was hoping to terminate the entire relationship.
6. By way of further clarification, Ghashmi explained that the preceding information was extremely closely held. Agreements and decisions during the Sultan visit had been reached behind closed doors at meetings restricted to President Hamdi and himself on the YAR side. [Page 715] He assured the Ambassador that Hamdi would reiterate the above information during the Ambassador’s next call on the YAR President.
7. In closing, Ghashmi agreed with the Ambassador that this was truly the dawn of a new era in Yemeni international relations. He did say, however, that the next four months would be crucial. He considered it vitally important that some major and eyecatching items of military equipment arrive in Yemen before the end of the summer. He concluded by saying he now believed that the Saudis were sincere in their desire to move forward with a military assistance program for Yemen.
Comment: 1. Ghashmi’s comments had ring of truth throughout. Reasons for the nose-hold which he and President have placed on military agreements allegedly reached with Saudis are obscure. Possibility exists that despite his remark concerning cancellation of “agreements” with USSR he is not ready to burn bridges openly with Moscow until he has significant quantities of Western equipment in hand. Additional possibility exists that Saudis for reasons of their own have imposed black-out on military assistance decisions until appropriate later date, perhaps when Ghashmi visits Riyadh to sign letters of offer. Would appreciate any light which Embassy Jidda may be able to shed on this matter.
2. Ghashmi’s allusion to “agreements” with the USSR implies that some type of written understanding was reached between the two countries at an earlier date. It was not clear, however, whether he was referring to a specific undertaking (such as the alleged agreement signed, initialed, or negotiated by Abdul Alim last November) or whether he was using the word as a generic term to denote the historic military relationship between the USSR and YAR. On balance latter seems more likely in context of his hopes (so often expressed before) that the Soviet connection would come to an early end.
Summary: Ambassador Scotes and DATT Prados reported on their meeting with Ahmad al-Ghashmi to discuss the results of Saudi Prince Sultan’s visit to Yemen.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760152–0498. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, CINCEUR, and DIA. This report was meant to clarify contradictory information reported by the Embassy in telegram 1313 from Sana’a April 19, and telegram 1366 from Sana’a, April 20. (National Archives, RG 84, Sana’a Embassy Files: Lot 79F206, POL 7, Visits, Prince Sultan)
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