132. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
2250. For Atherton from Akins. Subject: American Invasion Plans.
1. On March 25, shortly after the assassination of King Faisal, the rumor circulated in the eastern province (Dhahran) that the Embassy had put all American citizens on alert and had told them to prepare their passports for departure from the Kingdom. The Acting Consul General denied the reports but Prince Nayef (Deputy Minister of the Interior who had gone to the eastern province) asked that there be an official denial from me. I gave him one. I said we had not expected any disturbances and there were none. American citizens had not been alerted to be prepared to leave; we expected them to stay in the country as, indeed, they did. Nayef was gratified and said he would start an investigation to see who had started the rumors. (Upon receiving word of the assassination the Embassy passed reassurances to U.S. firms in Jidda and Riyadh, and had Dhahran do so also per Jidda 2120.)
2. [1½ lines not declassified] the Egyptians had told the Saudis the United States could be reporting disturbances in the country in order to justify military occupation of the eastern province. I saw [name not declassified]. He was with [name not declassified]. I asked them both about the reports. When [name not declassified] confirmed having heard them, I said they were absolute fabrications. I asked [name not declassified] how the Egyptians could have reached such a conclusion, much less could have told the Saudis. [name not declassified] said they had heard two suspicious press releases from the Pentagon. The first one was that the Seventh Fleet had been alerted; the second that it could be put on full alert soon. He had no further details.
3. I told [names not declassified] I thought this was irresponsible. I had heard no such report in connection with the Middle East—and I would have if it had been made. The Seventh Fleet possibly could have been put on alert due to the situation in Cambodia, but it certainly had nothing to do with Saudi Arabia and it was clearly wrong to tell the Saudis something so pernicious.
[Page 465]4. Vice President Rockefeller raised the matter with Prince Fahd, who said that the Saudis indeed had been disturbed by the talks of invasion and by the distortions of Secretary Kissinger’s remarks made by the American press and certain American writers. Fahd spoke of my press interview a few weeks ago which he said had a positive effect in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world and made the work of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger in the Middle East much easier. He was pleased the Secretary had confirmed what I said in his departure statement from Riyadh on March 19. But, he said, the rumors persist that the U.S. has evil intentions toward Saudi Arabia. The Vice President replied that the reports we intended to invade Saudi Arabia were absolutely wrong. He, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger worked closely on matters of policy and he could assure the Prince that the USG had no such intention.
5. Mohammad Mas’ud, Acting Minister of State for Foreign Affairs raised matter once again today. He said that the Saudis were gratified with the Secretary’s statement at Riyadh airport but the Secretary had promised King Faisal that he would also refer to the matter in his next press conference. Mas’ud said they had seen the account of the March 28 press conference but had read nothing on the subject. He said he hoped the Secretary could soon publicly condemn the invasion articles.
6. Comment: The invasion story will probably continue to poison our relations with Saudi Arabia (and the Arabs) until there is a detailed refutation of the invasion concept by a member of the administration.
7. Action requested:
A. That the Secretary at his next press conference refer to and refute the invasion articles;
B. That I be authorized to release the speech (or article) which I have given you—appropriately amended to include the Secretary’s Riyadh airport statement;
C. If release of speech is not approved, then request consultation in Washington the last two weeks of April. I have not been back in Washington at State Department expense since Fahd’s visit last June, and not at all in the last six months.
Akins
[1 line not declassified]
Summary: Ambassador Akins reported on Saudi fears of U.S. intervention in Saudi Arabia in the wake of King Faisal’s assassination.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750110–0724. Secret; Stadis. Telegram 2120 from Jidda, March 25, is ibid., D750103–1020. On the “anti-Saudi” campaign, see Document 130. At a March 19 press conference in Riyadh, Kissinger noted: “Our relation with Saudi Arabia is based on friendship and cooperation in which threats, military or otherwise, play no part.” See Document 141.
↩