113. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- President Nixon
- King Faisal bin Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia
- Isa K. Sabbagh, Special Assistant to American Ambassador, Jidda (Interpreter and notetaker)
A—The President underscored the significance of this visit to Saudi Arabia by the President of the United States, the first U.S. President to do so:
1. Emphasis on U.S.-Saudi friendly, cordial relations.
2. Emphasis on King Faisal’s own tremendous standing and prestige in area.
3. Underscoring the new U.S. direction in its policy towards the Middle East.
4. Underscoring the seriousness of our new joint “active partnership” with Saudi Arabia so that this could be heeded by others as a beneficial relation to have with the United States.
President Nixon listened to King Faisal expound on the wicked designs on the area, and the Arabian peninsula in particular, hatched by the Communists (Chinese, Soviet, etc.) and their Arab helpers. The King stressed the dangers to Saudi Arabia (and therefore to U.S. interests also) coming from the pincer movement around the Peninsula and the Gulf formed by Iraqi designs in the North and PDRY in the South.
The King warned of these designs which seem to have alliance with Zionist plans against the area.
B—In response, the President agreed with King Faisal’s analysis of the Communist aims and assured him that the United States was ever watchful because it agreed that this leopard was not going to change its spots readily. The President further explained the strategies of U.S. policy towards the P.R.C. and the USSR. In essence, this policy was purely pragmatic based on interests, indeed on the interest of the world in not having confrontation between giant powers (China: mini-nuclear, yes, but with ¼ of the world’s population, and the USSR). China did not love the U.S., rather it feared the USSR.
[Page 411]U.S.–USSR relations were based on accommodation in certain fields of mutual interest so that the Soviets cannot readily extricate themselves from such relationship with us and proceed to do harm to others. We would not stand, anyway, for the Soviets or any others taking advantage of détente at the expense of our friends such as Saudi Arabia.
C—The United States emphasis on supporting the moderate, responsible governments and elements in the area was also manifest by our “journey for peace.” The point was obvious in Egypt, now in Saudi Arabia, then Syria. We hope all other Arab countries will follow suit.
D—The President asked the King to use influence with Syria so it (and the other Arabs) would not rush things at the Geneva Conference by putting all issues and topics on the same tray for instant solution. This is not only not possible, but it is not wise. Give this your understanding and patience with our tactics and timing.
E—The President intimated to the King that Iraq had sent us a message saying it was not, as supposed, totally in the pocket of the Soviets. What did the King think our reply should be? Should we respond formally to such an Iraqi approach?
King Faisal was in favor of doing anything which would, hopefully, wean Iraq and any other country away from the accursed Communists. Yes, give Iraq if only one eye with which to see the light. “One eye is better than blindness.”
F—Arms: King Faisal explained the need of certain Arab and Muslim states for arms.
President explained Congressional limitations on arms to Pakistan. There are also limits as to what we can supply Egypt and how much. However, if Saudi Arabia found it useful and feasible it could help its friends with any extra amounts it orders. This did not mean to imply that Saudi Arabia should pay for all this, however. In any case this whole subject should be held in strictest confidence.
The United States was keenly interested in Saudi Arabia playing the role of “watch man” vis-à-vis the small states of the Gulf: to help strengthen them, to support them and to have consultations between Saudi Arabia and the United States on that area and its stability.
King Faisal informed the President that “only two days ago I received two messages: one from King Hassan II of Morocco, the other from President Bhuto of Pakistan asking me to intercede with the President for arms needed by them.”
The President thought Morocco was an easier case. Pakistan was subject to the Congressional ban, but something could be worked out given Saudi Arabia and U.S. cooperation.
G—The President informed King Faisal that we would be announcing (Sunday 6/16/74) the restoration of diplomatic relations with Syria.
[Page 412]The King was delighted, praised Asad.
H—King Faisal repeatedly expressed the wish that our American friends could stand solidly by their President and the new policy for a just peace in the Middle East worked on so tirelessly by brilliant Dr. Kissinger. It is painful to see all these intrigues against the President and his Secretary of State just at this juncture. It cannot be coincidental.
The King promised to continue his talk with (and hopefully influence over) his Arab brethren to see the wisdom of going along with the United States on the new path of friendship and cooperation, given the continuation of the United States’s new direction and its efforts for a just and lasting peace.
I—The King asked that, if possible, President Nixon not hold official meetings in Jerusalem but in Tel Aviv, lest agitators spread wrong rumors about “U.S. recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.”
The President said, frankly, talks were scheduled in Jerusalem but he had repeatedly refused to go to the old (Arab) city.
J—The President, as a final point, asked King Faisal for the favor of influencing the oil producing countries to reduce the price of oil so it can be manageable and would fit in with development of new sources of energy.
The King said, of course, any result “would depend on whether the other oil producing countries would heed our counsel,” but he promised to continue trying.
Summary: President Nixon met with King Faisal to discuss bilateral relations, the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, and the price of oil.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 208, Geopolitical File, Saudi Arabia, June 6–August 9, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in King Faisal’s private office at the Royal Palace. Nixon visited the Middle East June 12–18, staying in Saudi Arabia for part of June 15.
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