42. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
1. You will have seen Cairo 5640 in response to Department instructions about US-Libyan relations. I thought it best to speak generally in that telegram, but you should know that Sadat feels very strongly on the issue. On Sadat’s express instructions, Fahmy asked that we postpone for six months repeat six months receiving Khalifa or increasing the two countries’ respective Embassies. By that time, Fahmy said we will have gotten rid of him, meaning Qadhaafi. In the meantime, he urged that American Embassy Tripoli be instructed “to be vigilant”, about developments and that we employ necessary sensitive means to monitor Libyan activities.
2. There is no question that Sadat is at the moment deeply concerned about Qadhaafi and any steps that seem to imply acceptance of Qadhaafi will be badly viewed here. Egyptians have hard evidence of a Qadhaafi-organized assassination plot against Sadat and relations between the two countries are at the moment worse than at any time in the past two years. I suspect they are likely to deteriorate even more. As a result, Egyptians have apparently made a policy decision to work actively to find ways of getting rid of Qadhaafi. In my judgment, unless the benefits accruing to US from a better dialogue with the Libyans are likely to be of a substantial nature, we will be well advised to postpone action on the Libyan initiative, especially at this sensitive time when we want Sadat’s understanding and cooperation in furthering the peace process.
3. Warm regards.
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Summary: Eilts informed Kissinger of Sadat’s request to postpone an increase in diplomatic ties with Libya for six months.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 25, Geopolitical File, Egyptian Chronological File, January 11, 1975–November 1, 1976. Top Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.
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