Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

84. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, April 2, 1975.

SUBJECT:

• Luncheon for the Secretary General of CENTO

PARTICIPANTS:

• His Excellency Umit Haluk Bayulken, Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization
• The Honorable Aziz Khan, Deputy Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization
• His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Ambassador of Pakistan
• Mr. Aydin Yegen, Charge d’Affaires ad interim of the Republic of Turkey
• The Honorable Nasser Majd, Charge d’Affairs ad interim of Iran
• The Honorable Richard A. Sykes, C.M.G., M.C., Minister, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• The Honorable Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development
• General David C. Jones, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Honorable Robert Ellsworth., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
• Mr. James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
• The Honorable Joseph J. SISCO, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• The Honorable Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Mr. Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

KISSINGER: If I had been in Ankara another 24 hours on my last visit, I could have been the new Prime Minister. No one wanted to take a position on Cyprus. I held discussions with the heads of all five parties trying to discover a Turkish position the US might support. Two of the five, Ecevit and Feyzioglu are former students of mine. That doesn’t mean they listen to what I say. Is Feyzioglu’s position (as Deputy Prime Minister) a job or just a title?

BAYULKEN: It could be a job.

KISSINGER: Ecevit would settle if he were Prime Minister. Whether he’ll want a settlement now is another question. He wanted me to delay my efforts. Your domestic situation certainly complicates the matter.

BAYULKEN: How about the domestic situation here?

KISSINGER: No, the United States is one of the few countries in the world where domestic politics play no role in foreign policy.

SYKES: That’s what we’ve been reporting to London.

BAYULKEN: What is the attitude of Congress toward treaty obligations? Although they are questioning some of your executive agreements, they seem to support strict adherence to the letter of formal treaties.

KISSINGER: You mean like your treaty obligations on Cyprus?

BAYULKEN: Yes. My impression was that the United States at first supported our intervention against those who overthrew Makarios. Later on, there was a shift in opinion against us. What will Congress accept on Cyprus?

KISSINGER: It’s a very complicated situation. There were a number of factors involved at the time of your intervention. First, it was during the transition between President Nixon and President Ford. It was not a period of executive strength. Secondly, the Greeks here organized themselves as a domestic political pressure group very quickly. Our original assessment at the White House was that a settlement could be reached before a Congressional reaction developed. And, finally, there was the Turkish Government crisis. Then, during the pressures of a Congressional election year, a small group of Congressmen were able to sway their colleagues. Most Congressmen know nothing about Cyprus and could care less about details. I believe if the initial vote on the arms embargo were taken now there would be no problem for us. But Congressmen who are on public record as voting for the arms embargo need some tangible evidence of movement toward a settlement to justify revising their vote.

BAYULKEN: But the Administration is following the same line on Cyprus?

KISSINGER: Everyone knows our position. We are working to reverse the Congressional decision on military assistance and we need definite signs of movement toward a settlement. The Government of Turkey must determine its position. It must realize it cannot take full advantage of Turkey’s intervention. There must be some gesture we can use with Congress. If a second vote were taken now, I am sure the arms embargo would be rescinded.

BAYULKEN: But now you are expecting a favorable vote in the Senate?

KISSINGER: (Referring to comments made about him by President Makarios during an interview) Why the hell do I have an Assistant Secretary for European Affairs if he can’t keep his clients in line.

SISCO: I’ve seen the article. It’s not really so bad.

Hartman: It appears that Makarios is looking for someone he can hang an unpopular settlement on.

KISSINGER: That’s why you’re going out there.

KISSINGER: Mr. Secretary General, on one of my trips to Damascus, the Syrians asked me why I always take Joe Sisco with me when I’m traveling. I told them that whenever I leave him behind he takes advantage of my absence to measure my office for size.

SISCO: And the Syrians believed him.

KISSINGER: I think the only way to deal with the Arabs is to develop what we would consider an irrational position. An Arab once told me he thought I had lied to him in a letter. I asked him how he had come to that conclusion. He replied that he had read copies of letters I had sent to other Arab leaders at the same time. The letters all said the same thing; therefore, he knew I was lying.

BAYULKEN: My experience with the Syrians as Foreign Minister was the same.

KISSINGER: Did you ever stay at the official guest house in Damascus? It’s right next to a minaret. It goes off every morning at 4:30 a.m. for half an hour. I need my sleep. Now I arrange things so I do not stay in Damascus overnight.

KISSINGER: What do you think of Asad?

BAYULKEN: It’s difficult to convince him that you wish to be friendly. But once you do so he is good to deal with—an honorable man.

KISSINGER: My impression is the same.

BAYULKEN: We have difficulties with our Arab neighbor from time to time. But we find that they appreciate public gestures of support, even small gestures which do not involve real action. When Iraq nationalized its oil, a reporter in London asked me for my reaction. I replied that we had done the same in Turkey in compliance with international law on full compensation and that I anticipated Iraq would do the same. Two years later, I visited Baghdad. They recalled my remarks and said it proved I was a friend of Iraq. It was a small thing, cost Turkey nothing, but it had great effect on our relations with Iraq.

KISSINGER: Mr. Secretary General, do we have any CENTO problems?

BAYULKEN: I have just completed my initial discussions with the three regional governments. All three are firmly attached to the principles of CENTO. You have a problem with the Turks on arms supply. It does not affect CENTO now, but it could in the future.

KISSINGER: If we can get the Cyprus talks restarted within an agreed framework for a settlement, this will be enough to allow Congress to move on arms.

BAYULKEN: That would be very beneficial. The leaders of Turkey have kept cool, but they are subject to public pressure…

KISSINGER: Turkey has shown great restraint.

BAYULKEN: Except for some leftist elements, the regional leaders are all reasonable about CENTO. In Iran, the Shah has analyzed the situation and will continue his firm attachment to CENTO.

KISSINGER: I wonder if he knows where his ambassador is. He’s rarely in Washington, We enjoy his presence when he is here, of course. What is he doing in Mexico?

SOBER: He is preparing for the Shah’s visit there.

BAYULKEN: The Shah is worried about the situation in Baluchistan.

KISSINGER: I had the impression that was under control.

YAQUB KHAN: The situation has slipped recently.

BAYULKEN: The Shah thinks in long-range terms. He is concerned about Soviet intentions. In the economic field, in spite of many meetings and much paperwork, in terms of substance CENTO is inactive.

KISSINGER: I know what you mean about discussion and paperwork. Happily, I don’t see much here. That’s because my staff keeps everything from me. About the only things I get for decision are those in which they anticipate failure. Then I get the blame.

BAYULKEN: I recognize CENTO must work within a restricted framework. It must be a peacekeeping organization, not aggressive. It must not impose on detente. And it must not alarm other regional powers. But still we must be active. We must do more for Pakistan. The Moslem members, for instance, could do something to persuade Afghanistan to be more friendly toward Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am reluctant to negotiate anything with Prime Minister Bhutto. I always lose my shirt.

YAQUB KHAN: Yes, he enjoys negotiating with you. But we regard CENTO as important to our security.

BAYULKEN: After my discussion with Prime Minister Bhutto and Minister of State Aziz Ahmed, I am convinced that Pakistan is in CENTO to stay.

YAQUB KHAN: Absolutely.

BAYULKEN: But they think something more should be done within CENTO.

KISSINGER: What do you have in mind?

BAYULKEN: I have nothing specific to recommend, but as you know, the regional members have for some years been concerned with Soviet-inspired threats from their neighbors—that is, threat by proxy. Iran may perhaps be less concerned since its agreement with Iraq. But Pakistan is most concerned with the imbalance which exists in regard to Indian military power—both in numbers and in war industry. Pakistani intelligence agencies have proof of Soviet involvement in Baluchistan. At the next Ministerial meeting, an effort must be made to deal with matters like subversion by proxy.

KISSINGER: We would be pleased to explore specific proposals.

SISCO: Mr. Secretary, maybe it would perhaps be helpful to refresh your memory on this subject. It has a long history within CENTO.

KISSINGER: I hope you gentlemen will all take note of the delicacy with which the Under Secretary has entered the conversation.

SISCO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The crux of the matter is that the CENTO treaty is directed at threats from communist-dominated countries. It does not get into threats by proxy from non-communist countries.

BAYULKEN: Everyone recognizes that CENTO was created to deter communist threats. But in the CENTO region there has always been something like jealousy in comparing NATO and CENTO. Unlike NATO, CENTO has no teeth, no unified command, no earmarked forces. The dismemberment of Pakistan created real questions in Pakistan regarding the value of the pact. The atmosphere has improved since the arms embargo was lifted. Compared to India, Pakistan now has great ethnic cohesion. But the numerical imbalance remains. If we cannot sort out some new initiatives in the next Ministerial meeting…

SISCO: Of course, the greatest thing we did to show our concern for Pakistan was to lift our arms embargo.

KISSINGER: Yes, and we are still catching hell from the Hill about that decision.

BAYULKEN: But while lifting the arms embargo from one CENTO ally, you applied an embargo on another.

KISSINGER: It is a basic tenet of United States foreign policy that one ally must always be embargoed.

BAYULKEN: And we must have some modest economic projects for the Ministerial. I recognize your financial problems. But I wonder if you could make some modest increase in project funds and also in technical assistance. I believe Iran is prepared to make a significant increase in its contribution, but it does not wish to act alone. We are great at discussing things in CENTO, but slow on actions.

KISSINGER: I support that. Can’t we do something with Defense and AID funds?

ELLSWORTH: We will look into it.

Parker: We have been discussing the Secretary General’s ideas at the technical level.

ATHERTON: We will follow up on this.

KISSINGER: Dan (Administrator Parker), see if there is a way to work something out in time for the Ministerial meeting that I can announce there. Mr. Secretary General, I’m looking forward to heading the United States delegation to the Ministerial and seeing you again in Ankara next month. I also want to spend some time in Istanbul after the meeting.

The lunch concluded with an exchange of toasts and general conversation.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. It was drafted by Terrence Grant (NEA/RA); cleared by Sober; and approved in S on May 3. The conversation took place at a luncheon for Secretary General Bayulken.
2. Secretary of State Kissinger and CENTO Secretary General Haluk Bayulken discussed the state of the alliance and its future organization. They also discussed Pakistani intentions vis-à-vis CENTO. Specifically, Bayulken broached the topic of transforming CENTO into a regional security pact by raising the issue of “Soviet threats by proxy.”