Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

189. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, February 5, 1975, 2:30–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT:

• The Secretary’s Meetings with Prime Minister Bhutto

PARTICIPANTS:

• Pakistan: Prime Minister Bhutto
• Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed
• Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi
• Ambassador Sahabzada Yaqub Khan
• Mr. Yusuf Buch
• Mrs. Khurshid Haider (notetaker)
• The Secretary
• Mr. Joseph J. Cisco, P
• Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, NEA
• Ambassador Henry A. Byroade
• Mr. Peter D. Constable, NEA/PAB (notetaker)

THE PRIME MINISTER: I want to thank you for your support. I deeply appreciate it.

THE SECRETARY: The way you worked on Mrs. Kissinger I couldn’t do anything else.

PRIME MINISTER: We should have done it earlier.

THE SECRETARY: Since she was there with me during my last trip to South Asia she has developed an enormous affection for Pakistan. It was the highlight of the trip for her.

MR. SISCO: The highlight for me when I last visited Pakistan with you, Mr. Secretary, was what the Prime Minister said, when he told his Chief of Protocol to give you the royal treatment. He said so many heads of state who are boobs are treated so well, Secretary Kissinger needed more. Were you married the last time you went, Mr. Secretary?

THE SECRETARY: What was the significance of whether I was married or not?

MR. SISCO: Well, they were working on Nancy…

THE SECRETARY: Don’t explain. You make it worse. When I travel with Nancy in communist countries, when we go into the bedroom, I say so all the bugs can hear, “Shouldn’t we get married now that we are traveling together?”

PRIME MINISTER: Marriage is in their eyes a bourgeois institution.

THE SECRETARY: They are more puritanical than we are.

PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am very happy to see you, to have this opportunity to strengthen my personal relations with you. I am always pleased to hear from you about the world situation. I don’t believe the American people trust your intelligence. You are more European.

THE SECRETARY: I have no trouble with the people. My problem is with the press.

PRIME MINISTER: This decision affects my country but I am sure objectively history will endorse it.

THE SECRETARY: I am sure of it, too. Otherwise I would not recommend doing it. Let’s agree on the public position. We will announce it after my return, about the 20th of February. We’ll tell the Indians and the Congress, beginning at the end of next week. We’ll suggest a date to you. No technical or formal decision has been taken. However, it is my firm judgment that we will do this. This is a commitment. But we must be in a position to say we have this under final review after your discussions with the President, but no final decision has been taken. I know you understand this.

PRIME MINISTER: We’ve done this very carefully up to now. Your White House spokesman used the phrase, “under active consideration”. We’ll use that phrase, too.

THE SECRETARY: You have been very good. The problem is within my own department. It’s better now, though. They only leak the facts. They’re not working against me. Morale must be better!

PRIME MINISTER: Apart from the pleasure of seeing you, I always appreciate the constructive discussions we have on world issues. I believe your next trip will be beneficial in terms of results.

THE SECRETARY: That depends on the Israelis. Also we need something from the Egyptians, a quid pro quo so the Israelis can save face. Sadat is wise enough to understand that. If you have a chance with the Syrians you can repeat what I have said. They will take it seriously coming from you. [To Aziz Ahmed] Will I run into you on this trip in the area?

AZIZ AHMED: No danger of it this time.

PRIME MINISTER: But do let us know if we can do anything.

THE SECRETARY: There will be no final settlement, but hopefully we will be successful in the next step.

PRIME MINISTER: As you have outlined the step-by-step approach, there is really no difference between that and a meeting of the Geneva Conference.

THE SECRETARY: Anything you can do in public to make that point would be most helpful, only the American press does not seem to understand that there is no difference. A Geneva Conference would soon deadlock and dissolve into a step-by-step approach. There would not be an overall settlement. Sisco wouldn’t permit it. He has been working on the Middle East since 1959. He spends 90 percent of his time on it. What would he do if we had a settlement?

MR. SISCO: South Asia would keep me busy.

PRIME MINISTER: We won’t give you any problems with South Asia.

MR. SISCO: It is remarkable what you have done in South Asia to reconcile your differences on your own.

THE SECRETARY: What are your views on China?

PRIME MINISTER: The press often asks me this. I tell them that if they think after Mao there will be a reversion to war lords and struggles of the old China, they are wrong. Yes, there may be dislocations and some fall-out when the great giant disappears, but I don’t see any big changes. Now, Sino-Soviet relations might change.

THE SECRETARY: Chou En-Lai is really remarkable hiding out in the hospital for a year. I would like to do that and place all my people in key positions and manipulate them from the hospital bed.

PRIME MINISTER: Of course the struggle in China with the extremists will continue.

THE SECRETARY: The so-called victory of Chou En-Lai is overdrawn. The whole leadership is over 70. They will all go at the same time.

PRIME MINISTER: There the tangible factor is of Sino-Soviet relations and the changes that might occur after Mao.

THE SECRETARY: It would be a grave mistake for the Chinese to move irrevocably toward the Soviets. In the first place the Soviets won’t trust the Chinese and secondly the Chinese would be at the Soviets’ mercy. I don’t think they will do it.

PRIME MINISTER: And of course the territorial dispute is still there and it is a very long border.

THE SECRETARY: Has the Chinese attitude toward the U.S. cooled?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, I think they feel that there has been a lack of progress on the Shanghai communique. [To Aziz Ahmed] You were there recently. Do they talk to you about this?

AZIZ AHMED: Yes. I talked to the Foreign Minister. He was very understanding about this. They didn’t seem in any great hurry.

THE SECRETARY: Our impression is the same. The Chinese do not seem particularly anxious about our relationship. You are going to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes.

THE SECRETARY: We’ll see if Senator Sparkman knows who you are. Last week when Prime Minister Wilson went up there Sparkman tried to seat Callaghan in the Prime Minister’s seat and Wilson in Callaghan’s chair. Someone pointed out to him that he had made a mistake so he tried to put Ambassador Ramsbotham in the Prime Minister’s chair. He never did get Wilson into the Prime Minister’s seat.

PRIME MINISTER: Well, if the Tories win again he won’t have any trouble understanding who the Prime Minister is. Has she won it? I believe she won the second ballot.

AZIZ AHMED: It’s not final yet but there is no contest.

PRIME MINISTER: Mr. Shahi is our only fissionable material. Shahi, what can you say on the subject the Secretary raised this morning?

MR. SHAHI: We have agreed to safeguards on the facilities that we have. There is no way of carrying out a clandestine program of trying to go nuclear. We have only a 130 megawatt reactor which is under safeguards. We are a long way from having the capability.

THE SECRETARY: Could we say that you have assured us that you intend to observe safeguards, that there will be no nuclear development outside of safeguards? Yesterday when I was before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in closed session, I briefed the Committee on the arms problem and on some of the things we were thinking of. Lee Hamilton asked me, “What do you get out of this?” I answered that for me it was a matter of principle. Lee Hamilton, whose reaction on the arms problem will be a key factor, asked if Pakistan could not do something in the nuclear field. I have tried to prepare the way in my statements. I have said in India that we would not fuel an arms race but I have left the door open. If the Indians have read my statements carefully they should have the message. We will draft some things we think you should say after the President makes the decision final; a draft that says Pakistan intends to observe safeguards and will not undertake any experiments outside the scope of the safeguards.

PRIME MINISTER: I will be asked about the non-proliferation treaty. Our objections to that are on a moral basis. India has not signed. Of course we will sign if India signs.

THE SECRETARY: Of course under safeguards you couldn’t divert your efforts to a nuclear explosion.

MR. SHAHI: The Soviets now appear to be making a distinction on peaceful nuclear explosions and we understand the United States is prepared to study it.

THE SECRETARY: Absolutely not. We agreed with the Soviets to study the threshold on peaceful explosions but we are not proceeding on this. We have found there is no way to distinguish between a peaceful explosion and weapons technology. I always tell the Indians when they talk about their peaceful explosion that it is nonsense. There is no way to make this distinction. Perhaps there is a theoretical distinction for the United States and the Soviet Union with their highly sophisticated technology, but there is no distinction for emerging nuclear powers. Our position on safeguards is clear. It does not permit diversions.

AMBASSADOR BYROADE: Is the Prime Minister to say something here?

THE SECRETARY: It would be better if you say it is something you have raised with us and you have it under active consideration. The Indians have the bomb and there is concern for proliferation. You understand the concerns of President Ford and the Secretary over proliferation questions and these are under active consideration. We can marry the two “active considerations”. Two weeks from now it makes it more interesting when we make our announcement and you indicate that you are committed to place your nuclear installations under safeguards.

MR. SISCO: The South Asia Nuclear Free Zone will come up again.

MR. SHAHI: The Prime Minister’s position is that we need a political solution to India’s nuclear threat. We need security assurances by the nuclear powers for non-nuclear states. Perhaps there could be a restrictive formula that covered only countries outside of alliances.

THE SECRETARY: One of the problems with that is the Soviets would use it against us.

MR. SHAHI: China also wants it.

THE SECRETARY: We have a problem with the concept of nonuse of nuclear weapons. We can’t defend Europe. We have to be free, we have to have the flexibility to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It is only in Europe that we would use them. For example, in the event of a European war we might have to use them in Czechoslovakia.

PRIME MINISTER: This is a matter for the United Nations. We can leave this aside and talk about bilateral matters.

THE SECRETARY: If the Indians used a nuclear weapon against Pakistan we would view it with the utmost gravity and the world would view it with the utmost gravity.

PRIME MINISTER: I have said many times that I am committed to the Simla process. We agreed at Simla on a formula for Kashmir, that it would be a subject for bilateral negotiations with India. We don’t intend to heat up the situation over Kashmir but now Mrs. Gandhi has worked out a settlement with Sheikh Abdullah and we understand it will be announced soon. Maybe even while I am here. There will be some re action in Pakistan, but it will be controlled. The Indians shouldn’t say that we are heating it up. They do these things and then say we’re heating it up.

THE SECRETARY: It would help us on the arms question if you could make some motion on the Simla process. I don’t know what moves may be possible but maybe there is something that you could do.

PRIME MINISTER: We have done many things. We have signed the trade agreement. I do not know what is left that we can do.

AMBASSADOR BYROADE: The Pakistanis are ready to resume diplomatic relations.

THE SECRETARY: I have a message to give you from the Bangladesh Government. They are prepared for discussions without preconditions. They wanted me to convey it to you.

PRIME MINISTER: Thank you. We are happy to cooperate.

THE SECRETARY: Were you surprised by the changes in Bangladesh?

PRIME MINISTER: No.

THE SECRETARY: My estimate is that Mujib’s talents lie in oratory rather than government. In 1971 I predicted that Bangladesh would be an international basket case.

PRIME MINISTER: Bangladesh is poverty and poetry. Mujib gives the poetry and the people have the poverty. But this has been no surprise.

THE SECRETARY: Can Mujib last?

PRIME MINISTER: I doubt it.

THE SECRETARY: What happens then? The Army?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, and they will turn increasingly anti-Indian.

THE SECRETARY: After my trip to South Asia last October, the head of my policy planning staff said after he had seen India we should give nuclear weapons to both Pakistan and Bangladesh. [Laughter]

MR. SISCO: I told Ambassador Ali [the Bangladesh Ambassador] here the other day that Pakistan and Bangladesh are natural allies.

PRIME MINISTER: It would have been so much better if we had been a confederation from the start.

Aziz Ahmed: And if they had had more autonomy.

THE SECRETARY: Will the Bengalees turn against India?

PRIME MINISTER: There are anti-Indian sentiments now. There are problems over smuggling. Bangladesh produces jute and tea, the same things India exports. They are competing in international markets. The Chinese have not recognized Bangladesh yet.

THE SECRETARY: They will do so.

PRIME MINISTER: They asked us about it and we requested that they hold back. It was during the period while Daoud’s brother Naim was going to Peking and I was off to Moscow. It did not seem a good time and they held up on that score, but they will do it.

THE SECRETARY: You have to go to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sparkman will probably call you Prime Minister Wilson. Our Chairman is a little advanced in years and he is out of focus at the end of the day. In some ways Fulbright was better for us than Sparkman. He was very intelligent. Sparkman will sign any harassing letter to me that his staff prepares.

PRIME MINISTER: Has Fulbright gone to London?

THE SECRETARY: No, Fulbright turned it down. Eliot Richardson is going to London. It has already been announced in the press that it is a training ground for my job. But he’ll have to deal with Sisco to get it. I always tell the Syrians that I bring Sisco with me on my Middle East trips so that he won’t plan a coup while I am gone. The Syrians know it is a joke, but at the same time in their own context it is still plausible. You didn’t bring my favorite child here with you.

PRIME MINISTER: No, she is in London studying at Oxford.

[The Secretary then said his farewells and the meeting ended at approximately 3:30.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable and approved on May 11 in S. The meeting took place in Blair House. On February 6, Kissinger hosted a lunch for Bhutto and Senator Charles Percy attended. The memorandum of conversation of the meeting is ibid.
2. Secretary of State Kissinger met with Prime Minister Bhutto during his official visit to Washington to discuss Pakistan-U.S. relations and nuclear issues, including the South Asia Nuclear Free Zone proposal and Pakistan’s relations with India and Bangladesh.