Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

166. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, June 3, 1974.

SUBJECT:

• Military Supply for Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS:

• Pakistan:

  • Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs
  • Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Pakistani Ambassador
  • S.I. Riza, Counselor, Pakistan Embassy (notetaker)

• U.S.:

  • The Secretary Sidney Sober,
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter D. Constable, NEA/PAB (notetaker)

Ahmed: I have a letter for you from the Prime Minister [the Minister gave the Secretary the letter]. I want to congratulate you…

The Secretary: I’m glad you could stay to see me. Anyone who calls me Excellency is always welcome. Every problem in the Middle East is more difficult. The admission price for the next step is higher. It gets no easier.

Ahmed: You have achieved a significant break-through. You have created a new atmosphere.

The Secretary: To get the Syrians to agree to anything is a break-through. The Israelis and Syrians should have a common state. They negotiate with the same methods. I knew exactly what the reactions of each would be.

Ahmed: Well, that helped. It is a wonderful thing. You know our problem. I don’t need to say much. The Soviet Union is more restive about the fact that we are taking a negative stand on the Asian Collective Security proposal. In March the soviet Ambassador said we were reactivating CENTO. He suggested we should join the Asian Collective Security system instead and make a public statement.

The Secretary: That would be disastrous for your relations with China. We wouldn’t care as much as the Chinese, although we wouldn’t like it either.

Ahmed: We’re feeling the beginning of their pressure. I have a message on their line of attack [referring to a paper in his hand]. The soviet diplomats are beginning to tell our chaps and opposition leaders: “You sign bilateral agreements with the Chinese (they are referring to the communiqué when our Prime Minister visited Peking) and with the U.S.; you participate in CENTO, but what do your friends do for you when you are in trouble? The Soviets support their friends at all costs. You sign the Collective Security Treaty and you will have our support. “After the signing of the Peking communiqué, the Soviet Ambassador called me the next day. He expressed his displeasure and postponed the Prime Minister’s visit to July.

The Secretary: Did you tell the Chinese about this?

Ahmed: They must have done that [in Islamabad]. It’s an obsession with the Soviets to extend their influence against China. I can understand that. One way to advance their political interests in the area is to promote the Asian Collective Security system. They have no illusions about building a ring around China, but they believe they can extend their influence.

The Secretary: Wouldn’t India join the Asian Collective security system?

Ahmed: The Indians said at the time of the Brezhnev visit that they support it in principle. The Defense Minister or Deputy Defense Minister said in Parliament that the Soviets would supply SAM 6s or 7s to India. Afghanistan continues to receive military equipment from the Soviets. And the Soviets are arming India. India’s defense budget is over $2.5 billion a year.

The Secretary: That would worry you if they weren’t dedicated pacifists.

Ahmed: [Laughter] It’s our only hope. Swaran Singh visited Kabul and a military mission followed. I had written to him before asking him to say nothing in Kabul to interfere with normalization in the Subcontinent. He sent a nice letter to me in response saying he had had a good talk with the Afghans and told them to take it easy in their relations with us. But then the military mission followed his visit. On top of that, when the Chinese announce at a banquet for our Prime Minister that they are ready to have friendly relations with all the nations of the Subcontinent, then four days later the Indians explode their nuclear device. Chou told us Mrs. Gandhi has written several letters suggesting they take a first step to raise the level of their representation.

The Secretary: Didn’t they raise the level to Counselor?

Ahmed: No, they still have a Charge there [sic]. After our talks with the Chinese, we thought the Indians would be pleased. Then four days later—bang! It’s an intriguing question. Was there Russian involvement in this? The date could have been shifted under Soviet influence. This has had a disturbing effect in Pakistan. It seems to us it is time for the U.S. to resume military aid to Pakistan. It is a good point in time. There is strong feeling against India. No one believes their peaceful intention. Even Radha Krishna of the Gandhi Peace Foundation disputes this. Therefore, we’re in a tight squeeze. We think we have to have military aid. We propose defensive equipment at the beginning. We would define defensive as anti-aircraft SAMs, anti-tank missiles, radar coverage of our borders and submarines.

The Secretary: Submarines? Why are they a priority item?

Ahmed: India has the capacity to land a division of troops an the Baluchistan coast. They have received seagoing troop carriers from the Soviets. The Prime Minister has asked me to press for immediate action and for an immediate announcement.

The Secretary: That is totally out of the question.

Ahmed We would also like a reiteration of the President’s statement to the Prime Minister last September that the independence and integrity of Pakistan is a cornerstone of American policy.

The Secretary: That is no problem. You want it publicly? Perhaps I can have a question planted at my next press conference.

Ahmed: I have discussed the question of military aid with many Congressmen and Senators with Hamilton and Buchanan, with Humphrey, Church, Symington, Javits, Griffin and Aiken. Humphrey, Javits and Griffin all made the point strongly that they agree our position is difficult. But they said Congress doesn’t make policy, the Executive Branch does. Hamilton said that only one thing would save us—if you would make a forceful statement for military aid for Pakistan.

The Secretary: They want to destroy me. But I’ll test that I will talk with them. I’m not the obstacle. I’ve always believed in military supply for Pakistan. It’s absurd that the Soviets can arm India while our hands are tied. It’s a massive problem, but I don’t believe the Congress would let us do it. I’m going to talk to Javits. His intentions are honorable. Humphrey tells others what they want to hear. It’s technically true that it’s up to the Executive Branch, but they would raise unholy hell Have you heard of any change in attitude up there [to Sober]’?

Sober: No. Did Church say this to you [to Ahmed]?

Ahmed: No, but he was upset about the Indian test.

The Secretary: Church will violently oppose arms. How about Senator Percy?

Sober: He might not oppose. If Hamilton has changed his view, that’s very significant; he has been dead-set against.

The Secretary: Military aid may come up tomorrow in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and I can test their reaction.

Ahmed: Something has to be done. we have waited patiently for two years. The manner is for you to decide. You don’t want us to surrender to the Soviets.

The Secretary: Not to the Soviets nor to the Indians.

Ahmed: But there are pressures on us.

The Secretary: To join the Asian Collective Security system. That would ruin your relations with China. It would be a very risky thing for you to do—to join the same pact with India and the Soviets and give up your relations with China. What were Prime Minister Bhutto’s impressions during his visit to China?

Ahmed: In spite of speculations that Chou was not well, he was present during the talks with Mao and presided on the Chinese side the next day. We were told his doctors had said he could only attend for one hour but the talks went on for two.

The Secretary: Did you deal with Teng?

Ahmed The final wrap-up session was with Teng. The Chinese were a little more forthcoming on military assistance, although nothing sophisticated.

The Secretary. I’m glad to hear that. What are they giving you?

Ahmed: MIGs, anti-aircraft guns and tanks. First they said they could do nothing for two years because of the disruption caused by Lin Piao. We said two years was too long and then it was Mao who changed it and said we should get deliveries in 18 months. It was a welcome surprise for us, after Chou had asked us to wait. But they only give us conventional weapons.

The Secretary: Are the arrangements going forward with the Iranians on the tank modernization?

Sober: Talks were supposed to take place between the Pakistani Vice Chief of General Staff and the Iranians.

Ahmed: Yes, we understand it will take a year to make the kits. Then they can refit 20 a day. It will be two and one-half years before it’s done. It will help, but not much. In my message, there are two other points. The Prime Minister is visiting Moscow after President Nixon. The Prime Minister hope’s South Asia will come up during President Nixon’s trip as a main issue, not as a side issue. He requests that the President speak firmly to the Soviets.

The Secretary: In what sense?

Ahmed: That any Soviet threat via the Indians or Afghans would be viewed seriously by the United States.

The Secretary: We more or less did that in 1971. We’ll say something like that. I’ll check with the President, but you can be quite certain that we’ll say that.

Ahmed: You’ve been telling us that through diplomatic actions you can prevent a Soviet threat to us.

The Secretary: Soviet, not Indian.

Ahmed: In the debate in Parliament when I referred to the President’s statement during the Prime Minister’s visit that Pakistan’s independence and integrity is a cornerstone of American policy, the opposition leaders asked if these assurances are like the previous ones given during the Dulles era. There is a credibility problem. We can’t say we have a secret understanding that you will take care of the Soviet threat. The opposition says “Look what happened in ’65 and ’71.”

The Secretary: Basically you want military equipment.

Ahmed: About the nuclear test, an assurance is required within or outside the UN framework to calm the fears of other countries and to keep them from proliferating nuclear weapons.

The Secretary: What sort of assurances? Ahmed: We have been thinking of the precedent at the time of the Sino-Indian conflict. You offered India an air umbrella. If India should use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against a smaller neighbor, the U.S. would act to counter the threat, or any way you could put it. Others in the Security Council will not fall into line. Only the U.S. and UK are left.

The Secretary: I’m not so sure about the Chinese.

Ahmed: We’re sending our Foreign Secretary to Peking to find out about the Chinese attitude. We don’t know their thinking on the Indian capability. The French won’t fall in line. That leaves the U.S. and the UK. We don’t know about the British. They’re very sensitive about the Commonwealth.

The Secretary: And sensitive about India.

Ahmed: The Indians say it’s a peaceful explosion. Then they should be asked to accept international safe guards to assure that their developments remain peaceful.

The Secretary: It’s not a peaceful blast. No one has found a way to use a nuclear explosion peacefully. We haven’t said a great deal about the explosion. I’m strongly allergic to placing the full weight of American prestige against an accomplished fact. It would be extremely dangerous for them to use nuclear weapons against their neighbors. They’ll use it to threaten China.

Ahmed: But the threat is there against us.

The Secretary: We’ll make a statement supporting Pakistan’s independence and territorial integrity. The use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan would be a very grave matter.^* I will have to make some explorations with the Congress on military aid.

Ahmed: I hope your explorations will have a successful conclusion.

The Secretary: I had planned to go to India. Perhaps I will be able to go in August or September. If I do, I will certainly stop in Pakistan if I am invited.

Ahmed: We hope you will come.

The Secretary: When do you leave?

Ahmed: Tomorrow in the afternoon to New York and then a might plane to Paris.

The Secretary: I can’t get used to night flying. There’s no difference if you don’t work the next day. As the President told you, we’re extremely sympathetic. I don’t believe it’s a peaceful nuclear test. It’s a gross misapplication to try to use a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. We would take a most grave view of their use of nuclear weapons.^* We will make some statement. It’s not what you want. You really need those arms, military aid.

Ahmed: We’ve waited while you told us to hold on. Now the heat is on. We feel it.

The Secretary and Aziz Ahmed then continued their conversation alone for ten minutes.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, June 1974–8 August 1974. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable.
2. Pakistan Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Ahmed discussed U.S. military supply policy with Secretary of State Kissinger.
3. Mr. Riza, the Minister at the Pakistan Embassy, has informed the Department that the Pakistani memorandum of conversation records these statements as “the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.” He acknowledges that the Secretary did not use the word “threat” at these two points, but asserts that the context implied the word.
4. Mr. Riza, the Minister at the Pakistan Embassy, has informed the Department that the Pakistani memorandum of conversation records these statements as “the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.” He acknowledges that the Secretary did not use the word “threat” at these two points, but asserts that the context implied the word.