Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976

148. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, September 19, 1973, 10–11:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

• The President
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
• Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan
• Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs
• Sultan Khan, Ambassador ofPakistan in Washington

Bhutto: Thank you very much for the banquet last night. You were very nice to my son. I slept well, but my son was so excited he could not sleep.

President: The only young politician I can think of who might have been launched earlier was Winston Churchill. [Note: The President at the White House dinner the previous night had called attention to the fact that it was Prime Minister Bhutto’s son’s 19th birthday. The President had introduced him and noted that some of his friends viewed him as a future Prime Minister of Pakistan.]

I want to tell you how much we all appreciate your eloquent toast. It was quite a contrast to Prime Minister Gandhi’s toast when she was here [November, 1971]. I had said all kinds of kind things about how she had come in her own right, not as her father’s daughter and not as a woman.

Boy, did we get a lecture! It was unbelievable.

Kissinger: It was the most ungracious toast I have heard since I have been here—or at any time.

Bhutto: She was trying to speak over the head of the President to the American people.

Kissinger: She even shocked the audience, which was basically pro-Indian.

Bhutto: India is in a mess. We are not happy about it. If it were not for the characteristic generosity of Washington, India would be in real trouble. She will soon be on her knees in Washington.

President: I think she is beginning to get the message that American generosity is being handed out with more discrimination now than it used to be.

Kissinger: They haven’t got anything yet. The rupee negotiation is symbolic. Our purpose is to avoid a confrontation with the pro-Indians. Our policy has been to give on principle and then protract the negotiations.

Bhutto: We do not want to complicate your relationship with India. We want you to have a good relationship with India.

President: We want to avoid encouraging India to think it has a free hand in any adventures in South Asia.

Now, I realize that one of the problems you wanted to talk about was debt rescheduling. I will talk to Secretary Shultz. I will be totally sympathetic. I think we can come very close to meeting your needs. I will bring Treasury along. If any arms need to be twisted, I will twist them.

Kissinger: We have been studying this problem seriously. We are now at the point where we need to decide among two or three technical options.

President: We will be very forthcoming.

Kissinger: If the Prime Minister would like, a member of his party could discuss these options with Mr. Saunders.

Ahmed: Yes, we will do that.

President: Shultz will not be rigid when I get done.

Bhutto: I want you to know our strategy toward coming events. The separation of Bangladesh was a traumatic experience for our people. It is still a highly emotional issue. I have brought public opinion close to recognition several times and then have backed off. What I am trying to do is to take the air out of the issue. I am following a process of attrition on recognition. After the POWs return, I will give the impression that. I am in no hurry to recognize. We can then think more dispassionately. It will also become clear at that time that there is no compulsion from external forces. So there will be a little gap in time between the return of the prisoners and recognition. The reason I am telling you this is that your embassy may misunderstand this. If you receive reports from the embassy that I have backed off, I want you to understand what I am doing.

President: It won’t be misunderstood here. You must move in your own way. There will be no pressures from the US. You have to bring your public along however you can.

Kissinger: I do not believe there will be any problem with our embassy. Our man there is quite sympathetic.

Bhutto: I agree. There is no problem with him. I just wanted you to understand in case various interpretations were put on the delay.

President: We will not pressure you. We want to be sympathetic. Bangladesh is a fact of life. But there is no rush about recognition. You have to bring your public along.

Bhutto: We will do it. It is just a matter of time.

Ahmed: The Prime Minister is doing a courageous job. The opposition is really quite substantial in some quarters.

President: Something like this has to be done very deliberately.

The second point I want to emphasize—it is a sensitive area—is that we talked to the Shah about the question of transferring military equipment. Ambassador Helms will be visiting Pakistan in November. This is not just a junket. As you know, he understands how these things can be done. He was head of the CIA. We want to be as helpful as possible through that channel within the limits of Congressional action. That is our policy.

I would not put it quite this way to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee people. But Ambassador Helms has the message.

Kissinger: We need to watch out for two things. We need to make sure that Congress does not cut off our ability to sell weapons to Iran, and we need to assure that Congress does not write further restrictions into the law against Pakistan. We have to navigate very carefully.

President: We are going to play this in a very low profile.

There is one very modest thing I want to tell you. I asked Henry whether there was anything we could do for you now, and he explained that your government has an interest in the helicopters that have been in Pakistan to help with the disaster relief effort. The helicopters are yours. We will play this very quietly. They will just stay on there. After all, I never know when it’s going to rain in Pakistan. The relief problem will go on.

Henry, can we provide spares?

Kissinger: Once they are there, yes.

President: The French are helping you with your arms?

Bhutto: We are paying through the nose.

President: The third point I want to make is also sensitive because a third country is involved. I will tell this to Gromyko when I see him without making an issue of it. The most significant thing I said to you in welcoming you yesterday was that the integrity of Pakistan is a “cornerstone” in US foreign policy.China will understand this; the Soviet Union will understand this; India will understand it. I will repeat this to Gromyko to make sure that the USSR gets the point.

We would like to know from you through your intelligence agency what is going on in Afghanistan—what the Soviets are doing there. If the Soviets continue massive aid to India, we will have to reopen the aid flow to Pakistan. But we do not want to mislead you on this point. Congress has imposed certain limitations, but who knows what the possibilities will be in the future.

Dr. Kissinger will reiterate in Peking that Pakistan remains a cornerstone of our policy. We will do all we can to implement support for the integrity of Pakistan.

I would like to think that after your visit here we would be in the position of a few years ago of supporting Pakistan diplomatically. But we need communication from your government in order to know as much as we can about what is working to your disadvantage.

You can talk to Ambassador Byroade. He is a tough, no-nonsense fellow. He is not pro-Indian. He knows the Middle East, and he is totally the President’s man. You will have an ambassador who knows what our policy is.

Ahmed: Can we talk to him about the Helms mission?

Kissinger: Yes. I will brief him.

President: He is a military man. He was a Brigadier General.

Ahmed: Yes. He was in Afghanistan some time ago. He is an excellent choice.

President: I have to give Dr. Kissinger credit for this. The state Department had its objections. They feel that Byroade likes to have a good time a little bit too much. But we think he is a good man. When a career officer likes to have a good time, the State Department says that he is strengthening his contacts. When someone else likes to have a good time, they are opposed. But he is a good man. Let him have a good time [smiling].

The port proposal that you made intrigued me. We cannot say anything definitive on this today. We have not checked with the Navy. Dr. Kissinger will look into this. So far, we have put everything in that area on Diego Garcia. It might be useful to have access to a port as well.

Kissinger: There are two aspects to the problem. First is the construction. This is primarily a problem for AID. Second is the question of use. This second question becomes an issue only when the port comes into being. Even then, there is the difference between formal and informal use.

Bhutto: I want to make it quite clear that, as long as I am Prime Minister, I can take difficult decisions like this to the people. I am morally certain that a US presence would be justified in terms of Pakistani interests. I don’t may that it will not be an issue in Pakistan, but I believe I can manage it.

President: It is an intriguing idea.

Kissinger: We do not have to face the issue now. We would not have to have a formal arrangement. We could use the port as we do Singapore.

Ahmed: It is an excellent location.

Bhutto: I am thinking about this port because I have to be concerned about what happens in Iran. We are commoners, not monarchs. In Iran, where are the institutions that will assure stability when the Shah goes from the scene? We in Pakistan wish him a long life, but we have to take into account what happens if he goes. That is why we think about a port in Baluchistan near the Persian Gulf. There are forces in Iran which could be loose, the situation changes. Perhaps we are a little more of the need to institutionalize our policies. A monarch’s mind is a little different; he does not have to submit his policies to the rough and tumble of politics.

President: I wonder what will happen in Saudi Arabia. The Communist countries have not really worked out this question of how to achieve a change in government. Look at Tito.

Kissinger: That could lead to civil war.

Bhutto: It is ironic because the same thing that happened in 1971 could happen in Yugoslavia, and yet Tito supported Bangladesh.

President: Did he take a position against Pakistan? I didn’t realize it.

Kissinger: He was viciously opposed to Pakistan on that issue. He was pandering to India. Now some outsider may support the Serbians against the Croatians, and the very issue could be posed that were posed at the time of the Bangladesh secession.

Bhutto: But that is far away. What matters to us are near Iran. We admire King Faisal very much. We have a relationship with him.

President: He has a great obsession with the Israeli problem. We like him, too. He is a very intelligent man. But perhaps less attention to his own problems than he should.

How are your relations with Indonesia?

Bhutto: Very good.

President: That is a tremendously important part of Asia—150 million people and 1,000 miles of islands.

Ahmed: It is potentially very rich. It has very substantial natural resources.

President: Yes, it has oil.

Bhutto: Our relationship with Indonesia is very good. There was a time when someone asked why the Indian Ocean should be called just the Indian Ocean. They suggested that it should be called the Pakistan-India-Indonesia Ocean. I told them that was too complicated—too long a name—but it illustrates the point that Indonesia is one of the major countries in the area.

The question of names is strange. We are frequently asked by our Arab friends why we call the Persian Gulf “Persian.” I always use that term because I have no interest in offending the Shah. I tell the Arabs to ask Alexander the Great why he named it that.

Returning to the question of our military supply relationship, I thank you for what you have told us about helping as much as you can. I feel embarrassed to complicate a problem for a friend. At the same time, there are ways that we can extend our collaboration. If Pakistan were not so badly menaced, I would not raise the question at all.

President: I appreciate your thoughtfulness in putting it that way. I wish more of our friends would do that. I wish it were possible for me to say more. But if I did, even the relationship we do have could be closed off.

Kissinger: There is one complexity about our using Iran as a channel. How can Pakistan get equipment that Indian intelligence does not learn about immediately?

The Indians will make a storm in a teacup whenever they learn about the slightest little bit of equipment coming into Pakistan. They feel that if they make a big enough storm they can prevent new equipment from being given to Pakistan. When I was asked recently about the question of military supply by the press, I told the press to go and look at Soviet aid to India. India spends some $2 billion on arms while its people are starving. Mrs. Gandhi wants to improve relations with China, so who is she arming against? If India were to reduce its military budget, we could do the same.

President: One of the rules of diplomacy is to do unto others as they do unto you. The last time I said that, Dr. Kissinger said, “Plus ten percent.”

Bhutto: These floods have really “knocked the mickey out of us.” We have explained our requirements. My concern is that if we are unable to meet some of them, the issues could become so difficult that the people would be out in the streets. We have never had a famine in this part of South Asia as they have had in Bengal and in India. Pakistan has always been the granary of South Asia. This is the first time we might face such a situation.

We asked for 1 million tons of wheat, but we understand your problems. If you could provide 500,000 tons or 600,000 tons, Pakistan will buy the rest. We also need 100,000 tons of edible oil.

Kissinger: We were aware of a request for only 40,000 tons of oil. We are prepared to go ahead with that very soon. We will look at your request for the extra 60,000 tons. On wheat we have found the 100,000 tons that we announced in response to the floods in Pakistan, but our situation is very tight. It is simply a question of availabilities. We will have to look at the problem again.

President: It is surprising for the US to be in this position. For years we have had surpluses that we could not give away. Now we have had a very unusual year. Also, I suppose a lot of people all over the world are eating just a little better. Production has to go up. And it can. My purpose in saying this is simply to say that I think the problem is a short term one in our view.

Ahmed: We have to get a million tons somewhere by December.

Kissinger: You need an answer by Christmas, then? Our next reports on the world supply situation will be available by then.

Khan: No, the wheat would have to leave port by about 15 October in order to reach Pakistan by early December.

Bhutto: The Soviet purchases have made things very difficult. Some of our fertilizers come from Tashkent. The US has helped a great deal in providing commodity aid for fertilizers. We would like to see more private investment in Pakistan. We have passed a law that we would not nationalize foreign investments.

President: We would like to see more investment in Pakistan. I believe that what affects our investors are the uncertainties of South Asia. People remember the war there and the difficulty of 1971. People ask themselves whether Pakistan will survive. There are many private investors I think who would be interested in going intoPakistan, but they do have this question of Pakistan’s survivability on their minds. What we can do is to help increase awareness that the government in Pakistan is a going concern and that it is not anti-private business. I think it is a good place to invest. If I had some money I would put it there.

Bhutto: We have done our bit on the narcotics side.

President: I know. We appreciate that very much. You have been extremely helpful, and we are grateful. I know this is a problem for you because it removes a cash crop from your farmers. We went through this a couple of years ago with the Turks.

Bhutto: One of the problems is that the poppies are grown in tribal areas which are hard to control.

Ahmed: It is also a political problem in these areas.

Kissinger: They are a rough bunch.

President: As a result of your visit, I believe we can say that US-Pakistani relationships are on a basis of firm friendship. We can speak with one voice from now on in the US government. Dr. Kissinger will be going to the state Department, and we will speak as a government with one voice. This has not always been the case in the past.

The commitments which we have made—modest as they are—are a beginning. It is important that we recognize the overriding fact that our interests are parallel. Our attitude towards the Soviets and towards the PRC are the same, as long as the PRC does not engage in adventurism. Pakistan can be helpful to these common interests. You can be helpful with the Gulf states—the newer states of the area. You can be helpful in the Arab world, especially in a place like Libya. And you have good relations with Indonesia.

We do not want to establish one bloc against another bloc. Our desire is to live and let live.

Henry, the Prime Minister made an interesting observation at dinner last night. He said that the Chinese still have a Bible. Like the early Christians or the early Muslims they still have the crusading spirit. He said that the Soviets do not have a Bible any more. In all of these movements the fire begins to die after a time.

One final point: We have a very delicate problem in dealing with American opinion. Many opinion-makers give the impression that the US should withdraw from Europe and get out of Asia. However, more people support a US presence in Europe than in Asia, although the problems there may be closer to being settled than they are in Asia. I believe strongly that a US presence in Asia is every bit as important as in Europe. There is going to be a real gut fight between those who want us to get out of Asia and to disarm totally and those who do not feel this way. There are those who feel that the US must continue to play a strong role in both Asia and Europe and that a strong US role is essential to the peace of the world. Now, I wouldn’t say that if we could go back to the situation that existed before World War I. But today it is certainly true, and we in this place will fight as hard as we can to preserve an American role. Our peaceniks are well intentioned, but I believe they are misguided. We are going to have quite a fight. We hope we will win it.

Bhutto: You cannot lose this fight. There is no difference between Europe and Asia. Today there is contiguity between the two and their problems are too integrated. It would be a disaster if the US were to end its presence in Asia—more so than if the Us were to withdraw from Europe. Europe has taken shape and is more likely to be able to hold its own. Asia has not. There is a need and a place for the US in Asia—from the world’s view, from the Pakistani view, and from the viewpoint of US interest.

Presence can take different forms. The French are no longer in Asia as a military power, but they have come back in a different form.

I do not even see a basis for debate on this issue. I do not even read the New York Times editorials.

In short, Asia is not less important than Europe, and it would be a total disaster for the world and for the US if the US presence in Asia were to diminish.

We also agree on Indonesia. We have a very close relationship with Indonesia. In the Emirates in the Gulf, we have a solid presence; we have our police and our military advisers there.

Ahmed: Yes, we have a growing presence there.

Bhutto: On India also, we have a community of outlook. The more US influence that exists there, the more it is to our benefit.

President: A US presence is better than a Soviet presence.

Kissinger: The release of the prisoners of war has been one of the preconditions for our improving relations with India.

Bhutto: I do not take the line of the earlier military governments. I do not say that outsiders must choose between Hindu and Muslim.

We have made every effort to improve our relations with the Chinese. Our limited experience since 1950 is that once the Chinese are taken into confidence, even if they do not happen to like what you tell them., they are able to accept it. The one overriding factor is that they be taken into confidence.

Ahmed: I was in Peking recently and spent four hours with Chou En-Lai He is worried also about Russian design in the Gulf. Russia can do without the Gulf, but the US cannot. Chou En-Lai is genuinely worried about that area.

Kissinger: I will go into detail about this subject when I am in Peking.

President: You can tell them our views on Pakistan again.

They have a strong interest in a strong US presence in Asia. Chou En-Lai takes a long view of the situation.

Bhutto: There is no conflict of interest between China and the US.

President: Getting the Vietnam war out of the way has made this much more apparent.

Well, we are very glad to have had you here. I will take you to your car.

[After the President and the Prime Minister left the Oval Office, the President took the Prime Minister into the Rose Garden for a short stroll for the benefit of photographers.]

Harold H. Saunders

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office File, Box 19, India/Pakistan (2). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. Bhutto met later that afternoon at Blair House with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Charge Sober regarding military issues with India and the Afghan coup. (ibid.)
2. Prime Minister Bhutto and President Nixon discussed South Asian affairs and the recent floods on the second day of Bhutto’s official visit.