Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

426. Telegram CONTO 262 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹ ²

Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0700Z

Subject:

• Secretary Connally Travel

Memorandum of conversation from meeting with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur in Dacca on July 3, 1972

1. At the outset the conversation which I held alone with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman extended President Nixon’s greetings and complimented Mujib on the fact that he had taken a war-torn country and restored civil order in a matter of a few months, which was a great tribute to the qualities of leadership which he had demonstrated to the Bangladesh people. I told him that the President had asked me to discuss with him President Nixon’s visit to Peking and Moscow and to the extent that he was interested, the international monetary and economic problems as we saw them. I also wanted his evaluation of the situation in South Asia to take back to President Nixon.

2. Almost from the outset, Sheikh Mujibur started with a long impassioned recount of what had happened to the Bengalis in the last 18 months. He apologized at least four times during this recount for getting into it—for talking about it. Quote I know I am telling you information you already know. Unquote And on another occasion: Quote I don’t want to bore you but I must recount some of these things for you. Unquote.

3. He talked about the Bangladesh people; their desires for independence and went into great detail in talking about the atrocities which he claimed had been perpetrated by the Pakistani Army on the people.

4. He said when he got out of jail and came home that he found sheer chaos. He wanted to thank President Nixon and the US for his life, saying: Quote I know that you interceded to save me and I am very grateful. Unquote. He said that there was no food—that 10 million of his people had fled as refugees to India, although he could not be precise about the 10 million. Perhaps he was off 10 percent, maybe only 9 million, but there were millions homeless and foodless. Three million of his people had been killed—many in a very brutal and barbarous fashion. He did not count all the bodies and could not be sure, perhaps only two million, but there was hardly a family in Bangladesh that did not lose a member of the family or was not personally aware of the war crimes committed against quote my people unquote. His own father, who was 80 years old, saw a member of his family and five servants shot down before his eyes. His brother’s house was burned (this was what I understood him to say). His sister was homeless and started walking to India to seek refuge from the cruelty.

5. He found many of the teachers, many of the professional people, many civil servants had been tortured and killed in the most cruel and inhumane fashion. In one of the hospitals in Dacca, there is a plaque with the names of 40 doctors in that hospital who were annihilated. He recounted that eye doctors were taken out and their eye balls pulled out of their sockets before they were killed. Heart doctors had their chests cut open and their hearts removed while they were still living. He recounted that his wife had gone to a prisoner camp where there were 7,000 girls imprisoned. She had talked to a 13-year old girl who was in a state of hysteria and told his wife that she had been taken to a Pakistani soldiers camp where she was forced to stay for three months and she was raped from 10 to 15 times a night every night during this period. That she was pregnant as were tens of thousands of Bengalese women. That there were over 200,000 women who desperately needed medical assistance and abortions because these young and old women were bearing children that they did not want. During this period of recounting these stories, he was obviously expressing a very deep and emotional feeling about the circumstances which he found.

6. He then recounted his own political experiences in his own life after recalling the trials of the Bengalis and their quest for freedom dating back to 1885 when they first led a revolt against the British. He talked about his own experiences of being jailed—that he had returned after the cease fire to a devastated land to try to pick up the pieces and lead his people into a period of peace and tranquility and progress. He obviously had very difficult problems of law and order. There were still guerrillas in the land. Hundreds of thousands of people had been armed. He had travelled the country appealing for the Bengalis to turn in their arms and over 200,000 rifles had been turned in and he used these weapons to arm the army and the police force in all the villages. He found that many of his policemen had been killed by the Pakistanis along with the civil servants, the professional people, the educators, the intellectuals. the atrocities were aimed at the police force also. He said quote I cannot say that all of the arms have been turned in—I think no. Unquote. But relative peace had been restored and administrative control obtained in most of the country. They were trying to get food to their people and he was very aware and grateful for the assistance from the United States—the relief and rehabilitation, the food and funds supplied. Their problem was one of getting it distributed because the ports were clogged, the trucks destroyed, the facilities gone. It had been terrible and difficult, the position in which they found themselves.

7. At this point I said to him that he was obviously very moved and felt very deeply about what had transpired. I asked if under these circumstances he could with equilibrium sit down and discuss in a very rational manner with President Bhutto the resolution of some of their problems in the event the circumstances presented themselves. He said he could but not until Bhutto first recognized Bangladesh. Quote we are free. We are no longer a part of Pakistan. This is a reality. He must recognize this. The world has recognized this and he must first do that unquote.

8. I told him that we did not want to intrude on the situation or inject ourselves into the discussion of the many problems that existed. But I nonetheless wondered whether matters could be structured in such a way that he and President Bhutto might be able to start discussions as soon as possible toward solving some of the issues. specifically, what were the primary issues?

9. To my surprise, he indicated that the return of the Bengalis in Pakistan was a matter of the utmost if not the paramount importance. He stated that Pakistan was holding some 20,000 Bengali soldiers and, in total, they were holding a half million Bengalis, many civil servants and many business people, he said they were being kept in camps without proper care and food and some of them were being tortured. I asked if these people had indicated that they wanted to come to Bangladesh. He replied that the businessmen had their businesses taken away from them, that they had no means of livelihood. The soldiers were imprisoned, the civil servants were out of jobs. They were Bengalis and of course they would come if they were permitted to do so.

10. I expressed the view that although we were not going to involve ourselves, it was our hope—and I would express the same hope to Mrs. Gandhi and President Bhutto—that none of them do anything which would make it more difficult for a rational discussion to be held and hopefully an acceptable solution reached to the very emotional and difficult problems which faced the sub-continent.

11. I then asked what he planned to do with respect to the prisoners of war. From the press accounts he was demanding that there be trials. He said: Quote we must try them. They must pay for these crimes. Not all 1500 but maybe 300, maybe 200, or maybe 100, but we must have some trials. They must be tried on this soil for the crimes committed on this soil. Unquote.

12. He said some trials were inevitable and it was inevitable that Pakistan recognize Bangladesh before any conference could take place. I asked if he had talked to President Bhutto. He replied he had talked to Bhutto twice while in prison. In December and January Bhutto had sent for him and attempted then to negotiate some of the problems which had arisen—such as for the prisoners of war. Mujib replied that he could not negotiate, that he held no position of power but rather that he was a prisoner of war. This was what he told Bhutto the first time he sent for Mujib; this was what he told Bhutto the second time he sent for Mujib. He told Bhutto he could not speak for quote my people unquote. He was in jail and a prisoner.

13. We were having a very open and frank discussion and at this point I told him that I well understood the depth of his feelings about all that had occurred. I knew that many of his people, including his Foreign Minister with whom I had talked, felt that the United States had sided with the Pakistanis in their struggle. Perhaps he felt the same way. He said he did, but what was past is past. I responded by saying that in all fairness I felt he should know that we in the United States did not feel we had sided with the Pakistanis against him. I said I understood his feeling but I hoped he would accept the truth and sincerity with which I spoke in that we did not feel that we had sided against him. We had tried to do everything in our power to bring about a peaceful resolution of a rapidly deteriorating political situation. We hoped we could avert a war. We felt that it would be the worst of all endings but we failed. Inevitably we were in the posture of being in the middle and, even though we tried to help reach an amicable solution, the Pakistanis also felt that we failed to support them. This was unfortunately the position of a mediator when his efforts fail and war erupts.

14. He responded by saying that it did no good to relive the past and what was over was over. Quote we are grateful for your help now. We need your help. Unquote. On my part, I went on to stress that we sought nothing from him except his friendship and that we wished him well. I told him we sought no sphere of influence with his nation or any other country in the sub-continent. We hoped no other major power would seek such influence. He responded by saying that whether or not anyone sought it they would not get it. He was grateful for our help and India’s help. India was the salvation of his independence but the Bengalis had fought for their independence and they were going to protect that independence. Their gratitude would not make them become subservient to India or anybody else. They had the air around them, the soil beneath them and the sea around them; the air, the soil and the sea were Bangladesh and they would fight to keep it so, but they wanted to be neutral and non-aligned. At this point I interrupted to say we applauded his ambitions for both neutrality and non-alignment. He said we don’t want to become involved as a strategic tool of major powers. Quote we have more than we can do in trying to establish our country. We cannot fight anybody. We are poor, we are weak. Unquote.

15. Mujib said one of the problems that brought on the trouble was that Pakistan devotes 6o percent of its budget to defense. This was an incredible waste. Bangladesh was a poor nation and surely could not survive with such an allotment. It was a quote criminal act unquote to use this money for military purposes when people were homeless and hungry. Bangladesh wanted to be left alone. When Sheikh Mujib was talking about the return of the Bengalis from Pakistan, he said, he had many people who had not been loyal to the independence movement, who wanted to go home and who owed their loyalty to Pakistan. They should be permitted to go.

16. I asked whether he was talking about the Biharis and he said quote some of them unquote. Some of them were not loyal to his country and he thought President Bhutto should take them. If they have not been disloyal to our fight for freedom and if they will pledge their loyalty to us we would be glad to have them stay here. we believe in democracy, we believe in socialism, secularism and nationalism.

17. I said I assume then that your country will have no prejudice on the basis of religion. He said none whatever. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, whatever—if they pledge allegiance to this country and if they are loyal, we will be glad we have them. Notwithstanding that some of them want to leave and do not want to be part of this country, we have given them food and we have treated them like they were all Bengalis.

18. Comment: Without attempting to quote him, his discussions reflected an acute awareness of his problems of administration. The thrust of much of what he said, including his adamant stand on having the Bengalis in Pakistan returned to Bangladesh, was interpreted by me to mean he was desperate for the 20,000 soldiers to come back to help him form the nucleus of his army and police force in the country. His desperate need for the knowledge and the abilities of the civil servants, the professional and business people. He did not express it in these strong terms, but the clear implication was that he needed the soldiers to build his army and the business and professional people to help him build an economy. It is my own evaluation, that this is the real motive for the return of the Bengalis, in addition, of course, to the emotional desires that are apparent. He clearly outlined the many problems that has in terms of trying to build a government structure at the national and local levels. He clearly recognizes the need for talent, skills and good management. End comment.

19. Mujib emphasized time and again that his country was bankrupt and in desperate straits because West Pakistan had always robbed East Pakistan of all foreign exchange. They took their foreign currency from the sale of jute and used it in West Pakistan. They took the tea from the tea gardens and what they didn’t use in West Pakistan they brokered and resold to the Middle East and kept the money.

20. In response to my question concerning the liquidation of assets and liabilities between Pakistan and Bangladesh, he said, whatever quote they unquote have in the treasury belongs to us. We control the government. We had an election in 1970 and won. We control the majority of the government. The assets of the government are ours and they would be ours if it were not for the military take over and reprisals and the refusal of the military to put into effect the results of the election process.

21. He specifically asked that the US sponsor Bangladesh’s entry into the United Nations. I responded that I did not see any reason we could not support his entry into the UN as we had done for other nations. This didn’t satisfy him and he came right back and asked for more than our support. He said he hoped the US would take the initiative and sponsor Bangladesh entry into the UN. He asserted that only the US could assure Bangladesh entry into the UN.

22. I responded that we cannot assure Bangladesh entry into the UN since a veto might be cast by another country. I told him that if he thought we could control the votes of those who have the power to veto then he had not been following the actions of the UN in recent months. He said, he knew the Chinese might cast a veto and that the US could not control China, but if the US took the initiative and if the Chinese did cast a veto, he would certainly understand that it was not our fault. If China did cast a veto, he said he would lodge a complaint with the UN that Pakistan should be removed from the UN. He would charge that the nation of Pakistan, which now holds membership in the UN, is basically Bangladesh. We, he said, are the majority of the people. We won the elections. But in any event the remaining people who call themselves Pakistan were not admitted to the UN. There has been a division of the nation since that time and they are not the same creatures who applied for membership. He said he did not want to raise this issue and did not want to hurt Pakistan. Qte I want to leave them alone; I want them to be happy. They have enough problems of their own. I want them to leave me alone unquote. He added that he only wanted them quote to face reality unquote.

Connally

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also numbered telegram 4084. Sent with instructions to pass to New Delhi, Dacca, Islamabad, the White House for Davis, the Treasury for Dixon, and the Department for S/S, A/OPR, and NEA.
2. Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported on his July 3 conversation with Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman.