Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

406. Telegram 770 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State¹ ²

Dacca, March 3, 1972, 0615Z

Subject:

• Bangladesh Government Tolerance on Recognition Question

1. [text not declassified] appears to confirm impression I have gained from various sources that we are approaching the limits of tolerance of GOBD in matter of continued operation of this post without US recognition of BD.

2. Dacca 722 and Dacca 689 give clear indications of nature of GOBD concern. I suspect without being able to prove that there had been an original intention on part of GOBD to require closure of this post in response to Samad’s presentaion on Feb 26 had been considered unsatisfactory. Assuming this I can only speculate whether there was a change in GOBD attitude between Feb 26 and 28 or whether response conveyed by me on latter date was judged satisfactory enough to allow Samad to make favorable decision. Latter seems more doubful proposition of two, since I doubt Samad would have had authority to make decision on spot without consulting Mujib.

3. Whatever may be the case in regard to foregoing I now believe that we are approaching the crunch. There are several dates which appear significant in this connection. Mujib will return Dacca from his Soviet trip on March 6. Indian troops are apparently scheduled for definitive departure from BD on March 12, which they will do with ceremonial functions to which foreign representitives will be invited. Given fact that President has now returned from China, any of these dates might be selected by GOBD as suitable for gesture demonstrating national self-respect by closing us down.

4. All other considerations aside, I assume if USG intends to recognize BD that there will be an interest in doing so at a time when that action will receive optimum favorable public attention. The best date for that purpose would appear to me to fall somewhere in the week of March 6th, preferable the 8th or 9th. If this is case we shold convey this to GOBD as soon as possible to avoid their acting earlier.

5. If on other hand USG does not rpt not intend recognize BD with next month, I believe we should be prepared for a demand that this office be closed. In that case I assume that we would seek protection of some other power here (Australians would appear on the job) and try to maintain as much of present physical equipment and custodial staff in place as possible as an American intrests section within the Australian diplomatic mission.

6. I raise the question whether our own self-respect does not require that we do what we intend to do without appearing to be forced into it by GOBD.

Spivack

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Saunders sent a copy of this telegram to Haig on March 3 with a covering memorandum in which he suggested that Haig approve an instruction to Spivack to return to Washington for consultation. “The main rationale for bringing him back here would be to gain the time necessary to allow us to recognize only toward the end of March. It seems unlikely that the Bengalis would throw us out if it appeared that we were on the verge of taking a final decision.” Haig returned the memorandum to Saunders with a handwritten note instructing that Spivack be recalled on March 17.
2. Consul General Spivack cabled that he felt that “we are approaching the limits of tolerance of GOBD in matter of continued operation of this post without US recognition of BD.” He suggested that a decision on recognition be conveyed to the Bangladesh Government by March 9th in order “to do what we intend to do without appearing to be forced into it by GOBD action.”