379. Telegram 11 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State1 2
Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0650Z
Subj:
- Meeting With Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad
This message in three parts—part two
- 1.
- Turning to question of recognition, FonMin said he and his colleagues realized that this was matter which would require some time and that foreign governments would wish to ponder all aspects of situation; BDG was prepared for this and would soon make immediate recognition a condition for eventual good relations. However, he wondered if I could informally indicate to him considerations being taken into account by USG in matter of recognition. I said that I had no instructions of any kind on this subject and thus found difficulty in responding. When he pressed me further, saying that he was interested in a purely abstract discussion of question with no official implication, I agreed, on a purely personal basis and as a hypothetical case with no direct impliatton relating to specific case of Bangladesh, to discuss recognition as an aspect of relations between states. He agreed to accept this framework.
- 2.
- I said that recognition of a seceded or a separated territory posed more problems than an unconstitutional change of government such as a coup d’etate: in the latter case, the previous govt no longer existed, and new govt automatically occupied same space and territory; in case of secession or separation, previous govt still, existed so that third countries [Page 2] were faced with the problem of managing relation with previous govt as well as with newly-created govt occupying portion if space formerly (or in some cases still) claimed by original govt. In general, I went on, there was question of extent to which new govts were in full control of areas they claimed, whether they were in a position to govern those territories effectively, whether they were prepared to accept their proper international relations in accordance with generally accepted standards, and whether they were prepared to accept their proper international obligations. And over and above these considerations, I went on, still in purely hypothetical vein, all governments, particularly governments with widespread interests and commitments, had to view any important question such as recognition of a new state in light of their relations and obligations to many other countries. I pointed out that this was as true of the U.K., France, and USSR, as it was of USA.
- 3.
- Samad indicated his understanding and appreciation of points made in previous para and, with a smile, he said, “I suppose your relations with China will have something to do with it.” He replied that I supposed so also, and I stressed the importance which President Nixon attaches to his forthcoming visit to Peking as an effort to establish a constructive relationship with the world’s largest country, which had been in virtual diplomatic isolation for many years. Expressing purely personal speculation, clearly identified as such, I ventured the opinion the USG might not be able to give full consideration to matter of recognition of Bangladesh prior to conclusion of President’s visit to China. Samad pondered this for a moment and then indicated he regarded this as an important and valid consideration, acknowledging as he did so, disclaimers under which I had advanced this speculation. End part two of message.
Spivack
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi.↩
- Consul General Spivack reported that part two of his January 1 conversation with Foreign Minister Samad involved a discussion of the question of recognition. Samad asked about the factors being considered by the U.S. in weighing recognition of Bangladesh, and Spivack indicated that he was not authorized to discuss the question in other than broad, hypothetical terms.↩