Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

374. Telegram 12575 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Islamabad, December 15, 1971, 1034Z

Subject:

• US Policy and Bangla Desh

1. Summary: Over longer term USG will wish establish normal friendly reltions with Bangla Desh. Once BD Govt meets customary criteria for recognition, question will be one of choosing most advantageous time for recognition, in light our relationships with Islamabad, New Delhi and people of Bangla Desh. Although Pakistan will probably try to discourage others recognizing Bangla Desh (and may be for brief period contemplate breaking with those who do). We doubt our relations will suffer unduly if US recognition come after some other major Western powers have broken ice. With regard India, we may wish examine possibility that assurance of reasonable prompt recognition would prove modest bargaining counter with GOI in seeking satisfactoy resolution of crisis. As to Bangla Desh itself, recognition without undue delay would be important element—along with general manner in which we deal intitially with BD reps—in laying groundwork for useful relationship with new govt at time of maximum receptivity.US participation in expected international post. Hostilities relief and rehabilitation effort shold also offer opportunity hear recent wounds in our relations. Embassy recommends meanwhile that we continue (and expand) unofficial contacts with BD reps, seeking to assure them US looks forward to cordial relationship with new state. End summary.

2. Embassy has been considering implications for US policy of Bangla Desh regime in East Pakistan situation emergence independent Bangla Desh regime in East Pakistan, situation which it appears we will be faced with shortly. Having decided to seek retain ConGen in Dacca after Bangla Desh takeover, presently, also useful for us to look further ahead to larger question of US position on recognition Bangla Desh.

3. Chances reasonably good that shortly after raising flag in Dacca BD authorities will be able claim—with substantial valdity—fulfillment of basic criteria for recognition i.e., effective control over territory (with Indian Army backstopping) support of local populace, and expressed willingness to meet international obligations. On other hand widespread communal violence or general breakdown law and order either or both a distinct possibility in aftermath current conflict—conceivably could cast doubt on regime’s qualifications for international recognition.

4. It has been essential element of our posture during past year of crisis hopefully to emerge with the useful and cooperative relationship with peoples of both wings of pakistan. As matter of policy USG will wish to have normal friendly relations with Bangla Desh new state will be eighth largest in world. In terms of population and will control area which if not of much direct strategic significance to us, is likely to prove key factor for better or worse in stability of subcontinent country will be small element in world trade but, its humanitarian aid needs in wake of present ordeal are sure to be immense. Beyond that, Bangla Desh may well become focus of considerable competitive political maneuvering among Soviets, Chinese, Indians, and others, from which we would not want US excluded entirely.

5. Assuming absence of unforeseen factors which would militate against normal relations with Bangla Desh immediate question with regarding recognition is one of timing and tactics. Finding point at which recognition will produce maximum advantage (or minimum disadvantage) to USG will probabaly involve unavoidable tradeoff in our relations with Pakistan and with India and with East Bengalis themselves.

6. While Pakistani attitude toward Bangla Desh regime will be conditioned by terms under which current hostilities terminated, GOP can be expected, at least initially to resent and attempt discourage other countries from recognition Bangla Desh. Over longer term Paks may either move toward accommodation or continue to maintain claim off East Pakistan irredenta, but attitude over next few months likely to be bttter. As same time, we doubt Paks could sustain policy of breaking with countries which recognize Bangla Desh because, if our readings correct, they would shortly find themselves breaking with most major aid donors.

7. US aid policy will be influenced by course of events now underway. USG may wish resume economic aid to residual Pakistan when present crisis resolved, keeping it in consortium context. Could help mitigate impact on GOP of US recognition Bangla Desh if it were timed to coincide with US offer to take part in reactivating consortium and getting aid flowing.

8. While we not in position to assess Indian attitudes appears from here that effect of US on our relations with India might range from mild plus (if we recognize promptly) to minus (if we among last to recognize). One point that may be worth considering, however, is a possiblity of our using recognition—as a positive bargaining counter in our relations with GOI. Would US undertaking to move expeditiously in recognizing BD be helpful in inducing Indians to accept cease-fire formula acceptable to Paks?

9. Third element of equation is effect of recognition on Bangla Desh itself. Not unduly delayed recognition should help improve our misunderstood position with the Bengalis, while any long delay would certainly be taken as added affront. In this instance, Bengalis might seek exert pressure through harrassment or even ejections of ConGen Dacca to express their ire.

10. Beyond this are other pertinent considerations. First few weeks and months of Bangla Desh Govt will be period of special receptivity and sensitivity setting viewpoints and attitudes likely to endure for considerable time not only matter of formal recognition but more especially manner in which we initially deal (with BD reps likely to have greater impact on our long term relations with Bangla Desh than on our already established relations with either India or Pakistan. We have an opportunity to start with relatively clean slate in our official contacts with BD despite tensions and misunderstanding built up during recent months. Bangla Desh, although a central issue in crisis of last nine months has itself been less involved in US diplomatic initiatives than its Indian sponsor and thus possibly less affected by irritations stemming from these initiatives than either, US or INDIA.

11. Immediate operational opportunity to establish sympathetic working relationship with Bangla Desh—aside from recognition as such—will doubtless arise in post conflict requirements to provide for minimal needs of people of East Bengal. This will apply to Bengalis themselves (such things as food, refugee assistance, and rehabilitation) put also to non Bengalis whose fate may be even more precarious. We assume an international relief effort will be mounted we also assume that USG will not wish to stand aloof from such effort. Our participation could do much to help heal psychological wounds of recent months in our relations with East Bengalis (as relief program reached high gear however need for recognition could become increasingly important on operational grounds.)

12. As we have already said (Islamabad 12312) Embassy believes important USG continue (and expand) current unofficial contacts with BD reps. We should seek to assure them that USG is in no way opposed to legitimate interests or people of East Bengal. We should also seek to make evident that we look forward to cordial, mutually beneficial relationship with new state. That posture balanced against desirability of our retaining beneficial relationship with residual Govt of Pakistan, should govern our decision on timing of recognition and establishment of formal relations with Bangla Desh.

Farland

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated priority to Dacca and New Delhi. Repeated to Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, Kabul, and USUN.
2. The Embassy recommended that the U.S. continue and expand contacts with representatives of Bangladesh and time recognition of the new government to follow actions by other major western powers.