Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

368. Telegram 5636 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Kabul, September 27, 1972, 0330Z

Subject:

• Government-Afghan Styles or, Is Zahir Still PM?

1. His Majesty evening Sept 25 rejected PM Zahirs resignation (ref A) and ordered PM continue in power (texts-by septel).

2. We now have clearer picture of present siuation, although, timing of future moves siill unclear and possibly subject to further change. It is certain Zahir wants to resigns but timing his Sept 24 resignation still unclear although firm decision resign reached prior PM’s German trip. We also are certain King had firmly decided Sept 24 accept PM’s resignation and name Shafiq PM. Is also clear that Shafiq on morning Sept 25 moved in, took over decision making and convinced him that now was not propitious moment for change in govt. We assume his arguments based upon anticipated absence both him and Shafiq beginning Sept 26 and continuing problem of legislative versus executive. We understand HM agreed with Shafiq that Zahir should remain in office until King returns. Then second look would be taken with particular emphasis on how Parliament (which reconvenes October 14) is behaving. We further understand that new govt with Shafiq as PM will be formed at that time but, in reality Shafiq has assumed complete charge as of now. Zahir will run govt in Shafiq’s absence but Shafiq will have final authorty when he returns even though Zahir will be PM in name until HM returns and carries out present intentions.

3. Question most foreign observers and thinking Afghans are pondering is, why was it done this way and why was there this untypical admission of failure of PM’s resignation message? Why my first was that PM Zahir had chosed his words in order to force King accept his resignation. I now inclined conclude that wording was King’s was of shifting blame and that Zahir is to be made scapegoat for failure his govt and King work out effective modus operandi with Parliament, lack of which has stymied govt action in almost every field of endeavor. If Shafiq had not intervened as he did, HM would apparently have carried through his plan and named Shafiq PM Sept 25.

4. Still undecided are return dates to Kabul of HM and Shafiq. It appears Shafiq will proceed from Turkey to NY for UNGA. We believe his stay in US will last only few days. On assumption Zahir and Shafiq keep domestic political situation under control it now appears HM will complete his vacation in europe before returning.

5. While it does not seem possible that govt could discover new nadir of inactivity, I am forced to conclude that immediate period until Shafiq returns will undoubtedly see virtual cessation of all activity. Excluded from this appears to be Minister Seraj’s emergency relief program for central highlands which going forward full blast.

Neumann

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and USUN.
2. The Embassy reported that King Zahir had rejected the resignation of Prime Minister Zahir, but Foreign Minister Shafiq had emerged as the effective head of government and would very likely be appointed Prime Minister before the end of the year.