Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

Kabul, September 15, 1972, 2237Z.

1.: Department appreciates urgency with which action must be taken if relief is to reach affected areas in time to prevent same type of suffering that occurred last year. We await your further reporting on action RGA taking and especially look forward to report on your conversation with King.
2.: Preliminary review here indicates that airlift of wheat would be technically feasible to Chakcharan, Qali-Nau and bamiyan, particularly if air drop employed as on several past occasions in pakistan. this would reduce landings on undesirable fields to those required to recover drop gear. on contingency basis we have asked DOD to investigate availability of USAF C–130’s for month of October. AID investigating availability of commercial C–130’S.
3.: Strongly recommend urgent exploration of availability of Pakistani and Iranian trucks on contract basis, [ref Kabul 5348, para 7]. advise.
4.: If airlift should be decided necessary, Shafiq’s [Page 2] determination to “ignore political problem” [Kabul 5354, para 13] can be drawn on to suggest to RGA that it also seek help from Iran and Pakistan where C–130 aircraft also available. GOP known to have ample experience moving bulk supplies into comparable locations—e.g., Gilgit and Skardu.
5.: For present you should avoid discussion any USG airlift possibility with RGA.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Flaten (NEA/PAB), cleared in draft with AID/ASIA/NE, AID/PRI/DRD, and DOD/ISA and by Laingen. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Moscow.↩
The Department concurred in the need for urgent action to try to prevent starvation in the western mountains of Afghanistan.↩

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972