320. Memorandum From Douglas M. Cochran of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)1 2
Subject:
- Pakistan: Growing Nervousness
It is certain that in the course of your forthcoming lunch with Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan you will be made well aware of growing GOP uncertainty regarding the state of its relations with the United States. Members of the Pakistan Embassy, including the Ambassador, have impressed upon officers of NEA/PAB their concern as to the extent and nature of our relationship. This week’s call on the Secretary by Minister Roy and the Ambassador reflected that concern as well.
There are three distinct areas in which the Pakistanis have been expecting more forthcoming positions on our part: PL–480 wheat, POWs and arms supply. Our less than maximum response to President Bhutto’s personal appeal for PL–480 wheat, our virtual silence on the POW issue, and our inaction since the election regarding arms supply all contribute to this atmosphere of worry. Anxiety on the latter issue clearly stimulated President Bhutto’s assertion to Lewis Simons of The Washington Post, reiterated to Consul Velletri in Peshawar, that Pakistan, while modest in its hopes for military supply from the United States, has yet to receive its “due”.
What is basically involved of course are Pakistan’s concerns about and attitudes toward India. And in that context one can understand, though not defend, Bhutto’s and Sultan Khan’s limited appreciation for the very large support we have provided on the economic side in the period since the war.
[Page 2]The more balanced tone of our recent exchanges with the Indians has simply added to Pakistani concern. In conversation with us on December 3, Ambassador Khan referred to the Secretary’s December 1 statement vis-à-vis India and pointedly asked “when are we going to get started?” Referring bluntly to arms, he noted that India can look to its “allies” for help but Pakistan, while it can obtain some assistance from China, seems unable to rely on the United States for even spares to keep its American-supplied tanks and aircraft in operation. We suspect that the Ambassador and Minister Roy went away from their meeting with the Secretary even more concerned that Pakistan was not getting its security concerns across to the USG.
Thus we can anticipate that, the probing by the Pakistanis regarding our intentions in regard to a lifting of the arms embargo will continue, culminating it seems to us in indications fairly soon that Bhutto will want to come here to talk about what he can expect from us in the security area. FYI: We expect to have available by next week a study by the intelligence community on the nature of Pakistan’s military procurement efforts since the war. We are requesting separately an assessment of the impact that our embargo on spares has had on Pakistan’s U.S. equipment inventory—the latter with reference to Ambassador Khan’s statement to the Secretary that this equipment is now largely immobile.
(NOTE: We suspect there is also, as far as Ambassador Sultan Khan is concerned, some sense of personal frustration in getting things accomplished. He has told both us and others—including Spencer Davis of the AP—that he feels he has failed in his mission here.)
- Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 52, PAK/Indian Negotiations July–Dec 1972. Confidential. Cleared by Meyer and sent through Laingen. The December 4 meeting between Rogers and Tridev Roy, head of Pakistan’s delegation to the UN General Assembly, was reported to Islamabad on December 5 in telegram 220229. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PAK)↩
- Cochran’s memorandum detailed what he described as Pakistan’s “growing nervousness” over the state of its relations with the United States.↩