Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

279. Telegram 4077 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹ ²

Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2125Z

Subj:

• Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Private Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part III of VII: Improvement of Relations With India

1. I then said that we hoped that out of the unfortunate occurrences of the past few months we might again establish a relationship of warmth, friendship and cooperation which had existed between India and the United States since her independence. Mrs. Gandhi responded by saying that she would be “most happy” to have this happen and asked if I had any suggestions as to what should be done to bring it about. Since the US was so much more powerful than india it would seem to be in a better position to take the initiative.

2. I responded that I had no specific, affirmative suggestions to make, but that I was certain that no actions or words could be productive until the criticisms between us subsided. She responded by saying that the Foreign Minister had told her about my meeting with him and that she would like to comment on two things we had discussed:

3. First, about India’s position on Vietnam. There was nothing new in the Foreign Minister’s position. India had always been against our actions in Vietnam and everyone knew this. Secondly, she wanted to comment on my statements about armaments from Russia. She said that the military equipment India had recovered from the Soviet Union, had been bought and paid for. It was not aid. India attempted to buy military items from different countries, but others like France, require hard currency. It is much easier to trade with the Soviet Union because of this;

4. I responded, Madame Prime Minister, the world indeed does know of your position regarding our actions in Vietnam and this is all the more reason why our President and our leaders considered your Foreign Minister’s speech to your Parliament on May 10 as a “very unfriendly” act. We felt that we did not deserve the vituperative aspects of his remarks. We were equally disturbed, and even the President himself was displeased, with the speeches you made in Stockholm, Prague and Budapest.

5. At this point she noted that she had been criticized in Sweden because she had not supported the Swedish Prime Minister more vociferously. I responded by saying that surely no one could expect her to be as partisan as the Swedes in commenting on U.S. foreign policy. (She did not comment on the Prague or Budapest statements.) She said she was under great pressure from the Indian people and the Parliament on Vietnam. India never before used the word “condemn” but in this case she had to respond to the people’s wishes. She was only reflecting the attitude of the people. In any event, her speeches abroad had not always been unfriendly and at times she had gone out of her way to help the U.S. such as not recognizing East Germany.

6. He said, Madame Prime Minister, in your land, as well as in ours, it has been my experience that the people respond to a marked degree to the utterances of their leaders and they reflect the spoken views of their leaders. She said: “Oh, no. Our people here have a very great interest in international and world affairs and there is a great deal of interest in Parliament. There is a great deal of discussion of these matters all the time.”

7. I did not pursue this any further, but simply responded by saying that we would indeed hope that there could be an end to the vitriolic criticism that flows between us. She agreed that such exchange did not contribute to anything, but resulted in deterring constructive actions. I told her that a classic example was the story she had told me earlier about President Bhutto being restricted in what he can do because of the very sharp criticism in Pakistan directed against her personally. She said that “doesn’t hurt me.” I responded that I knew it did not hurt her, and probably helped her in India. But that it made it much more difficult for Bhutto to work out the problems within his own country. I pointed out that the U.S. is also not immune to such reactions when we get severe criticism which we think is unjustified. But in any event, we did not want to relive the past. I saw nothing to be gained by trying to relive history because frankly we saw things from different vantage points. For instance, India was upset last year because it thought the U.S. sided with Pakistan. In my judgment, however, a true historical perspective our our position was that we actually sided with India in 1965 when we stopped giving military equipment to Pakistan. As of that date, Pakistan’s military position began to deteriorate vis-à-vis India, notwithstanding their acquisition of goods from China. They were not in any sense about to match India’s acquisition of goods from the Soviet Union.

8. At this point, Mrs. Gandhi intervened to say that as long as we were being frank about the 1965 period she wanted to point out that despite our earlier fears about the spread of communism, nothing had happened anywhere. I told her flatly that this analysis was based on an assumption I could not make. Perhaps the U.S. did not roll back communism but there was no question that we did stop its spread in many areas. One could never, of course, prove this case. She responded that the retardation of communism was bound to come about in any event.

9. Mrs. Gandhi then went on to say she was not sure the figure on Soviet military assistance I had mentioned to the Foreign Minister was correct. I replied that I could not guarantee that it was correct but that we believed that it amounted to in the neighborhood of $700 million in the interwar period. That was approximately five times what we believed Pakistan got from China. We never anticipated or sought a military balance between Pakistan and India and we never thought there was such, but in any event when we failed to supply equipment to Pakistan in 1965 that was the end of whatever degree of balance there was.

10. Mrs. Gandhi then noted that she had seen reports in American newspapers about Pakistan getting military equipment and planes from neighboring countries such as Iran. I told her that I was not going to deny this since I could not say that Pakistan was not receiving some military equipment from other nations around the world. All I knew was that our policy was that we had not given Pakistan military assistance or even sold destructive equipment-except for some spare parts since 1965. And now we were selling Pakistan nothing and had no present intention of doing so. She said she also had information as a result of the Simla conference that since the war the Pakistanis had organized two new divisions. Consequently, one of the arguments against the release of the military POWs was that they would merely go back and be re-organized into the Pakistani Army for action against India.

11. When I asked if President Bhutto said this, she said no but that some of his people made these statements to some of her people. I said we were certainly not aware of any intention of President Bhutto to reorganize his army for aggressive purposes. He said he spent 60 percent of his budget for defense and that seemed to be an unreasonable amount considering economic conditions of his country, but it was his country.

12. I then noted that the U.S. had been alleged to have influence with Pakistan when we don’t. India, moreover, may well be in the same position we once were of trying to work out these difficult problems between Bangladesh and Pakistan as well as resolve its own. I told Mrs. Gandhi she might well find herself in the position we often do of being in the middle and being blamed by both sides. The Middle East was a classic example. We did not want territory or trade advantages and only desired peace. We were involved in the Middle East only because no one else could contribute to peace and stability, but we do not endear ourselves to either side because of it. So we are not volunteering for any such role in South Asia. I merely wanted to say that if there is a genuine and sincere desire for the U.S. to play a helpful part we would certainly not reject it out of hand. But we would consider whether we could indeed contribute anything to the peace and stability of this area.

13. I then said I would be glad to take back to the President and to his advisers, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger, her views and her statement of agreement that it is to our mutual interest to re-establish the relations we once had and that perhaps after this exchange a better environment would result which could make possible the reestablishment of such relations.

14. Mrs. Gandhi also made a point of telling me that gnamas [garble--India?] did not want South Asia to become a focal point for the strategic plans of major powers. She said that this was in response to my statement that we sought no advantage and we hoped no other major power did. She hoped that this would remain the case because if one great power comes in, the other will follow to everyone’s detriment.

Connally

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 256. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. Telegrams 4077 through 4080 from Iran, which reported on various aspects of Connally’s conversation with Gandhi, Documents 279–282, were misdated as July 8.
2. In the course of discussing the possibility of improved relations between the U.S. and India, former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the contentious issues of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan and Indian criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam.