Office of the Historian

265. Telegram 7113 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1 2

New Delhi, June 9, 1972, 1525Z

Subject:

  • Secretary Connolly’s Visit to India
1.
As Department aware, style and substance of Secretary Connolly’s visit will be crucial importance to its success, with style carrying greater importance with unusually-sensitive and xenophobic Indians than probably any other post he will vtsit. On substantive side, as our senior most US representative to visit India since souring our relations with Indo-Pak war and its after-math, GOI will be looking (and hoping) for some indication we are prepared to let bygones be bygones and work toward a new mutually satisfactory and fruitfull relationship. This is true even though they continually rake up old complaints in Parliament and in the press.
2.
I will have some specific suggestions for Secretary regarding his dialogue with key Indian leaders which I hope will help set positive tone of this visit. I suggest secret service be reminded that Secretary and party as welcome guests in India will be considered by GOI to be their primary responsibility as regards security and welfare. Obviously, Secret Service will feel only they can effectively assure Secretary’s safety, but I hope they will in turn consider Indian authorities their partners in this effort, and am confident they will receive the excellent and effective cooperation we have always had from Indian services in such instances.
3.
On substantive side, I would hope Secretary could include following elements in his presentation: [Page 2]
(A)
Reiterate assurance we are prepared to let bygones be bygones and believe it in our mutual self-interest to look to future and not past.
(B)
Assurance that future US role in area, contrary to what others say about us, is one designed to contribute to peace, stability and development of area as a whole, interests we believe are wholly compatible with those of GOI and other countries.
(C)
Improvement in our relations can only be based on recognition that each of us must take account of vital interests of the other e.g. Viet Nam and not act in such a way as to directly interfere with the vital interests of the other party.
(D)
For its part, in implementing foregoing, US has no intention in foreseeable future to provide lethal military equipment in any form to Pakistan (Comment: This is the single most irritating bone sticking in the Indian craw. Orally and in the press the impression is conveyed that the freeze on further military aid to Pakistan is only temporary and after election the flow will start to again build up Pakistan military machine. End comment.) We should point out we do not seek to build up Pakistan or any other country as a counterweight to India; we have long contributed to Indian economic development because we wanted to see a democratic India make a success of its development. Our assistance efforts in future will only be in response to clearly expressed requests of GOI.
(E)
As further earnest of our intentions, we are authorizing release of dols 87.6 million non-project assistance which had been temporarily suspended at outbreak of hositilities last December. (Comment: This so-called “breach of US committment” is second most serious irritant. Although pride may cause GOI officials not to bring up this subject and indeed to react to offer of reinstatement with reserve and possible rejection. End comment.)
4.
Needless to say it is extremely important to success of Secretary Connolly’s visit that we take favorable position on Indian debt relief at forthcoming Paris meeting.
5.
If it is intention to provide report to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on results of Moscow summit I would hope that new piece of information or insight could be included beyond that which has already been well-covered in public domain. Report similar to that contained in Secretary’s presentation to NAC (Bonn 7563) would be most helpful.
6.
By time of visit we should know outlines of results Indo-Pak summit. It would be useful to invite Indian leaders to give their appraisal of summit results. However, it will be important to remember extreme Indian sensitivity to anything smacking of meddling in what GOI insists is bilateral affair. Given present GOI suspicions, Indians will be on quivive for any statement that might imply US coercion or excessive US intervention.
7.
I trust Department will find foregoing thoughts helpful in preparing for Secretary’s visit, which I am confident can be important milestone in reversing current atmosphere of recriminations, and set stage for marked improvement in our bilateral relations.
9.
Department repeat as desired.
Keating
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.↩
  2. Ambassador Keating viewed the impending visit of outgoing Secretary of the Treasury Connally as an opportunity to take a step in the direction of repairing relations between the U.S. and India.↩