251. Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon1 2

No. SS/11/1/72

Dear Mr. Secratory

I have the honour to forward herewith the letter dated April 18, 1972 from the President of Pakistan to His Excellency Mr. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America

With kind regards,

Yours Sincerely,

(M. Akram Zaki)
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Enclosure

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Subject:

  • Letter to President from President Bhutto

The Pakistan Embassy delivered to the Department on April 25 the attached letter to the President from President Bhutto. It acknowledges the President’s letter to Moscow and, noting the President’s forthcoming visit to Moscow, asks his assistance in promoting a rapprochment between all parties concerned in the recent South Asian crisis.

The Department will shortly forward a suggested reply to President Bhutto.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
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Attachment

Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter of March 22, which was delivered to me by your Charge d’Affaires in Islamabad.

I am grateful to you for your concern for the well-being and security of the people of Pakistan and for the help you have offered my country in rebuilding our war-shattered economy. The assurance of your support at this critical juncture is most heartening.

I also thank you for your impressions of your historic visit to China, and for the outline of your talks and their significance. Your visit has not only paved the way to a healthier relationship with China but has considerably improved the prospect for world peace.

May I once again take this opportunity to discuss the situation in our sub-continent. I regret that I should have to deal with it at some length, but since you are shortly to visit Moscow I feel you may find this information of use in your discussions there.

On the 16th of March I went to Moscow principally to make a first-hand assessment of the intentions of the Soviet leadership towards the sub-continent. I also wanted to assure the Soviet leaders of our desire to live in peace and to seek an honourable settlement of our problems with India.

My impression is that in the short term the Soviet Union probably wants to see an early return to peace and the “normalization” of the situation in the sub-continent. The Soviet leaders showed considerable anxiety that we recognise ‘Bangla Desh’ and that I meet Mrs. Gandhi in order to negotiate a settlement of the problems that bedevil our relationship. But their desire for peace may be no more than a move in their efforts to consolidate their position in India and ‘Bangla Desh’.

On the issue of prisoners of war, Mr. Kosygin read out from a letter of Mrs. Indira Gandhi her comment that she could not return our prisoners of war [Page 4] to augment Pakistan’s war potential until she was satisfied as to Pakistan’s peaceful intentions. I told both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev that I was resolved to work for peace between India and Pakistan and that if I intended otherwise there was no dearth of manpower available to join the armed forces in Pakistan.

I also gathered from the talks with Soviet leaders that the prisoners of war would not be returned until ‘Bangla Desh’ had been recognised. I told them quite candidly that ‘Bangla Desh’ had come into existence as a result of direct intervention by Indian armed forces and that it would be unrealistic to expect the people of Pakistan readily to accept the dismemberment of their country in this fashion. The question of recognition arouses deep emotions among our people. It was therefore essential for me to lay the ground-work for such an eventuality. I expressed my willingness at this stage to signify an “intent to recognise” ‘Bangla Dash’ and would like to meet Shaikh Mujibur Rahman to discuss with him this and other matters of mutual concern.

I told the Soviet leaders that they could greatly assist in preparing the climate for normalization of conditions and return to peace in the subcontinent by persuading India to release the prisoners of war immediately. I informed that it was wholly inappropriate for India to link the question of the release of prisoners of war with other political issues. They could not be used as hostages in brazen contravention of international conventions to which India was signatory.

The Indians are threatening the preservation of the tenuous peace that has been achieved; they have in the last month moved five additional Divisions to the west Pakistan border, and the Indian Chief of Staff has recently visited Moscow to replenish military equipment. Then too the Soviet Union and India have stepped up their subversive activities in both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

We have nevertheless responded positively to Mrs. Gandhi’s proposal that the emissaries of both countries should meet to prepare the way for a meeting between the two of us. I have left her to decide the time and place for the emissaries to meet.

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At the moment it appears that the prospects of any worthwhile negotiations with Shaikh Mujibur Rahman have diminished. The persecution and killing of the helpless Biharis continues—for no other reason than that they are federalists. Many thousands of Bengalis who are opposed to the secession of East Pakistan have been dubbed “collaborators”, consigned to concentration camps.

Moreover, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman seems determined, with the cooperation and collaboration of India, to try some 1500 prisoners of war for alleged “war crimes”. This is a most disturbing development. If the Bangladesh authorities went forward with these trials they would indeed have very serious repercussions in Pakistan. There are over 400,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan. We have so far succeeded in ensuring that they are not maltreated in any way. But if the projected trials took place, they would generate such bitterness and resentment among our people that irreparable damage might be done to the prospects of establishing normal relations with India and “Bangla Desh”.

Mr. President, the United States may be in a position to use its influence to prevent the Indian and “Bangla Desh” authorities from going forward with the proposed trials. I shall be grateful for any assistance you can give us in this respect and for the influence you can use to promote a rapprochment between all the parties concerned so that a durable peace can be established in the sub-continent.

With warm personal regards,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Secret. The letter was delivered to the Department of State on April 25, under cover of a transmittal letter from Charge M. Akram Zaki. The letter was forwarded to the White House on the same day. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 25; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK-US) The text of the letter was transmitted to Islamabad on April 26 in telegram 72027. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Nixon)
  2. Bhutto wrote to request that the U.S. intervene on behalf of the Pakistani prisoners of war being held he alleged as bargaining chips by India and under threat of prosecution by Bangladesh for war crimes.