Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

246. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹ ²

Washington, April 6, 1972

No. SS/11/1/72

My dear Mr. Sisco

Pakistan desires to hold early talks with India so that the outstanding problems between the two countries could be resolved through negotiations.

2. The President of Pakistan took the initiative in offering to go to New Delhi and discuss with the Indian Prime Minister all the problems between the two countries. He reiterated this offer in a number of public statements at home and abroad and declared his willingness to enter into bilateral talks with India without pre-conditions. In a broadcast on March 3, 1972, he expressed the hope that he would soon be able to embark upon negotiations with India. The President’s views were communicated to the Indian Government through direct and indirect channels including the Swiss Government which acts as the protecting power on behalf of both countries in each other’s capitals.

3. The Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, also declared in Delhi on March 14 that India was “prepared to have bilateral talks with Pakistan at any time and at any place “without pre-conditions.” The Indian officials were also taking similar lines in discussions with foreign governments. Unfortunately, however, the Indian approach as usual is double faced. While expressing willingness to enter into bilateral negotiations with Pakistan “without pre-conditions”, the Indian leaders are at the same time making demands which tantamount to imposition of pre-conditions. For example, the Indian leaders continue to demand in their public statements the recognition of “Bangladesh” by Pakistan prior to negotiations between the two countries. They have also asked for readjustment of Western borders and re-alignment of ceasefire line [in] Jammu and Kashmir as essential components of an overall settlement which is the objective of bilateral negotiations.

4. The Indian Government also recently suggested that before the negotiations could take place between the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, the officials of the two governments should meet and prepare the ground for a summit meeting. We did not reject the Indian proposal but pointed out that past experience of negotiations between the two countries would show that officials would not be able to take any substantive decisions on their own. We, therefore, re-affirmed the desirability of holding a meeting between the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India. The Government of Pakistan feels that such a meeting would result in reducing tensions and subduing bitterness between the two countries. It would also enable the two leaders to agree to a broad framework in which their respective officials could concurrently and subsequently work out details of a settlement of specific issues.

5. As on March 25, India had not clarified its final position as to how bilateral negotiations should begin. It was apparent that India was adopting dilatory tactics to avoid an early settlement of problems created by the recent war. The Indian Government’s attitude on the withdrawal of troops and the return of POWs is in total defiance of the Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, tends to confirm the view that India’s offer of negotiations is neither sincere nor unconditional.

6. We are grateful for the help and assistance given by the Government of the United States to the Government of Pakistan in the past. Being aware of the earnest desire of the US Government to see a peaceful and honourable resolution of the problems in South Asia, I would request you to kindly impress upon the Government of India the need for an early settlement of the problems so that a durable peace can be established in the sub-continent.

With kindest regards,
and Sincerely

A.M. Raza

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. No classification marking.
2. Raza detailed the efforts his Government was making to initiate negotiations with India and alleged that India had established preconditions for negotiations designed to delay an agreement to settle the crisis. Pakistan called on the U.S. to impress on India the need for an early settlement of the problems of the subcontinent.