Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

232. Telegram 2922 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹ ²

New Delhi, March 8, 1972, 1624Z

Subj:

• US Figures Prominently Throughout Mrs. Gandhi’s Electoral Campaign

Ref:

• (A) New Delhi 2549
• (B) New Delhi 2703
• (C) Bombay 323
• (D) Calcutta 410

1. Summary: PriMin Indira Gandhi’s almost daily criticism of US during three-week campaign tour reveals continuing resentment of US support for Pakistan and cutoff of American aid to India. Testy determination make own decisions consistent with national interests, and uneasiness that China and US cooperating in Asia to India’s detriment. Anti-US tone only partially mitigated by occasional acknowledgent of desire improve Indo-US relations. While electoral politics are proximate cause, PriMin’s attacks on US as presumed friend of India’s enemies appears reflect her unesase in fluid South Asian situation, as well as deep suspicion US intentions in region. These attitudes remain formidable psychological obstacle to constructive Indo-US dialogue. Action requested: None. End summary.

2. During just concluding three-week nationwide campaign tour for state assembly elections, PriMin criticized US almost daily, often directly, sometimes with thinly veiled euphemisms. China was generally lumped with US in criticism of major powers alledgedly supporting Pakistan. PriMin stressed big power support for Pakistan demands vigilance. Election finds India at “crossroads” since country “antagonized very powerful forces outside which continue observe India closely.” India’s enhanced international prestige as result Bangladesh crisis “made some big powers feel uncomfortable...they want to create trouble for US.” Indians, must maintain unity of purpose so GOI can continue “independent stand” and maintain vigilance as it faces unpredictable external environment.

3. PriMin said Sino-US friendship welcome as step toward peace, only if not at cost of “enmity for India.” (PriMin commented sourly US “sitting on China’s lap...” and china “extracting...whatever it wants.”) Heightened tension in Asia would result from outmoded concepts of balance of power or spheres of influence. Shanghai communique reference to Kashmir ceasefire line intended as pressure on India and constitutes “downright interference” in India’s internal affairs. “India will not tolerate any interference there.” PriMin wondered sarcastically why powers unconcerned about Bengalis’ sufferings last year now solicitious about Kashmiris, “who happily busy in election campaign.”

4. According PriMin, “some nations still scheming against India and instigating Pakistan “to maintain confrontation. Objective is to keep India and Pakistan quarreling weaken both. Reportedly, powers prepared rearm Pakistan, though difficult understand what Pakistan would do with additonal arms. India wants peace with neighbors, but arms availability has usually led Pakistan to disastrous policy choices. New South Asia war possible because of what “certain countries saying and doing.... we nave to be prepared because we do not know what is going to happen.” US once alleged Pakistan being armed against communist nations, though India knows arms would be used against her. US did not stand by India in 1971 crisis, and now holds this country responsible for sufferings Pakistan inflicted on subcontinent.

5. PriMin found “some powers...failure to take note of march of history in subcontinent” through recognition Bangladesh, contributing to uncertainty about South Asia’s prospects for peace in months ahead.

6. PriMin twitted rival Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties for earlier pressing government “to toe American line in foreign affairs.” Subcontinent crisis revealed where America stands. In light Sino-US dialogue, PriMin ridiculed opposition parties’ prior assertions US involvement Vietnam would “save” India from China. Insisting not Soviet stooge, Mrs. Gandhi favorably contrasted Soviet support with US actions. Defended GOI decision upgrade Hanoi relations as reflection Indian sympathy for “courage” of Vietnamese against “onslaughts and massive attacks,” proving “not wealth or armed strength which makes nation great, but indomitable spirit and unity of people.”

7. PriMin denigrated economic aid and touted self-reliance. “Aid,” usually given in donor’s interest, misnomer since it actually long-term credit burdening recipient’s economy and lulling him into dependency. US attempted keep India dependent and to use aid to pressure GOI “to toe their line of thinking in conducting our internal and foreign policies.” GOI refused because it “inconsistent with our dignity and self-respect. We do not want anyone to tell us what decision we should take. We’re capable of making our own.” India must become wholly self-reliant to command world’s respect. At present stage, “friendly assisstnace” welcome if unaccompanied by strings or pressure: “I am definite and there [is] no compromise [on] this issue.”

8. Only partially offsetting anti-US remarks, PriMin asserted in passing desire improve Indo-US relations. Made clear, however, improvement depends on changed US attitude toward India.

9. Comment: Among reasons PriMin made US a whipping boy thoughout campaign is that in aftermath 1971 crisis, it good politics to hit out at “rich, powerful interest” supporting Pakistan and seemingly growing closer to other putative enemy China. Notable that Mrs. Gandhi reserved some of sharpest anti-US thrusts for constituencies where opposition parities which previously desired closer relations with US are relatively strong. Also, Mrs. Gandhi like most Indians harbors intense resentment over US actions considered prejudicial, and also considerable apprehension about India’s isolation in Asia, this resentment and apprehension helped propel GOI into friendship treaty with Soviets last August, and currently fueled by great powers’ South Asia policies and events in region, could motivate even closer Indo-Soviet relationship. Any case, PriMin’s statements remind of depth of suspicion and doubt about US motives in South Asia to be overcome in Indo-US dialogue. I send this regretfully but believe you should be informed of Prime Minister’s political tactics.

Keating

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, Dacca, Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, and CINCPAC.
2. The Embassy reported that criticism of the United States was a constant theme during a 3-week campaign tour of India by Prime Minister Gandhi. Her anti-U.S. tone was only partially mitigated by occasional acknowledgement of a desire to improve Indo-U.S. relations.