152. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers

Williams reported to Rogers on his recent trip to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Nodis. Sent through S/S and initialed by Eliot. A stamped notation on a copy of this memorandum in White House files indicates the President saw it. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VIII, Nov–Dec 71)

153. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Summary of a contingency paper drafted in the Department of State that outlined options open to the United States in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. The summary was prepared for use by the Washington Special Actions Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 11/12/71. Secret; Exdis. The summary was attached to and summarized an undated paper that outlined contingency planning in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. Neither the contingency paper nor the analytical summary have drafting information, but the former was apparently drafted in the Department of State and the summary was prepared by the NSC staff. Samuel Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy probably drafted the summary, which they forwarded with the contingency paper to Kissinger on November 11 under a covering memorandum for use by the Washington Special Actions Group at their November 12 meeting. (Ibid)

154. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan

Nixon briefed Sultan Khan on his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, assured him of U.S. sympathy and support for Pakistan, and discussed U.S. efforts to try to prevent a war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Sultan Khan, Oval Office, Conversation No. 617–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

155. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Kissinger and Rogers expressed some differences over the U.S. response to the escalation of fighting in East Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 15–23 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. The announcements referred to in the conversation are apparently the projected announcements of Nixon’s scheduled meetings in December with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, French President Georges Pompidou, and British Prime Minister Edward Heath. The cable referenced in the conversation is apparently telegram 212549 to Islamabad, November 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK)

156. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Secretary of State Rogers

Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers discussed the implications of the crisis in South Asia and the approach to be taken in dealing with India and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers, Oval Office, Conversation No. 624–21. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

157. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the fighting in East Pakistan. Nixon said he “would like the Indians to be embarrassed.”

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 24–30 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript.

158. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Kissinger and Rogers discussed whether to place the blame for the conflict on India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking.

159. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Kissinger and Connally agreed that the fighting between India and Pakistan had developed as a result of collusion between India and the Soviet Union. They further agreed that it was necessary to oppose India in the conflict.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, December 1971. No classification marking.

160. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (Vorontsov)

Kissinger called Vorontsov to confirm that President Nixon felt that the crisis in South Asia had created a watershed in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking.

161. Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers

Nixon and Rogers discussed the crisis in South Asia and the bleak prospects facing the Pakistani Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–14. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

162. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the crisis in South Asia, focusing on the approach to take with the Soviet Union and China, and the best way to deal with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 630–20. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

163. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Stans, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the President’s Assistant and Press Secretary (Ziegler)

Following a report to Nixon by Stans on his trip to the Soviet Union, Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler discussed a background briefing Kissinger intended to give the press concerning the crisis in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler, Oval Office, Conversation No. 631–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

164. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza)

Kissinger suggested that Pakistan invoke its mutual security treaty with the United States.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 6–10 Dec 1971. No classification marking.

No mutual security treaty has ever been concluded between the United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by the Kennedy administration indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and extent of a U.S. commitment to take military action to assist Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger’s reference to a mutual security treaty during this conversation is an apparent reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. The agreement (10 UST 317) obligates the United States to take appropriate action “as may be mutually agreed upon” to defend Pakistan against aggression. The agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th Congress) The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by “any country controlled by international communism” so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States. The assurance offered to Pakistan in 1962, which was cited by Kissinger repeatedly during the crisis, was that the United States would come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on November 5, 1962. (For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIX, page 372, footnote 6) The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued on November 17, 1962, however, stated that the United States had assured Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take “immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart such aggression.” (Ibid., footnote 7)

165. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell

During the course of a discussion of the crisis in South Asia, Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell weighed the possibilities of increasing pressure on India. Nixon instructed Kissinger to contact China to urge the Chinese to initiate military moves toward the Indian border, and he authorized the movement of a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 307–27. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

166. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger weighed whether to cancel the Moscow summit if the Soviet Union did not restrain India. Nixon reiterated his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–64. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

167. Memorandum for the Record

General Colin Hamilton responded to an Indian allegation of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Miscellaneous–SOA 1971. Secret; Limdis. Prepared by Brigadier General Colin C. Hamilton, USAF.

168. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger again weighed the moves they could make to prevent India from dismembering West Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 633–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

169. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (Matskevich), and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires (Vorontsov)

Nixon reviewed progress toward détente and asked Maskevich to inform Chairman Brezhnev that such progress would be seriously jeopardized if the Soviet Union did not act to restrain India from attacking West Pakistan. If India were to attack West Pakistan, Nixon warned there would be a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Matskevich, and Vorontsov, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–12. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Butterfield also attended the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The comments by Matskevich were translated by an interpreter. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

170. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Intelligence assessment of the implications of an Indian victory over Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–083, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 12/9/71. Secret. Prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group.

171. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger concluded that, while East Pakistan could not be saved, they would have “accomplished a lot” if they managed to “save a strong West Pakistan.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–19. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

172. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the measures that could serve to preserve the territorial integrity of West Pakistan. Nixon ordered a program of economic support for West Pakistan and a public relations campaign to fix the blame for the crisis on India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

173. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Kissinger reported to Nixon on his meeting with Soviet Chargé Vorontsov.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

174. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (Cargo) to Secretary of State Rogers

Cargo assessed U.S. interests in the South Asian crisis and stressed the importance of brokering a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Looking beyond the conflict, Cargo suggested the U.S. objective should be to establish a normal and positive relationship with the new Government of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to Sisco.

175. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan (Bhutto), the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Bhutto asked to meet with Nixon, and he and Raza pressed Kissinger for a firm public statement warning India to cease intervention in Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 11–15 Dec 1971. No classification marking. Haig was also on the telephone. Kissinger and Haig were in Washington; Bhutto and Raza were in New York City.

176. Telegram 12414 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Ambassador Farland asked Pakistani President Yahya to clarify Pakistan’s position with respect to a cease-fire.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN.

177. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig)

In the course of discussing the public opinion aspects of the crisis, a UN resolution to condemn India as an aggressor, and a hotline message to Moscow, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig were confronted with the implications of having offered to protect China from the Soviet Union if China intervened in the conflict between India and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger and Haig, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–3. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

178. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger reacted to the news that India had offered an assurance that it would not attack West Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–6. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

179. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Nixon and Kissinger completed drafting the hotline message to the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

180. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs

The contingency paper, prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group, examined the refugee problem created by the conflict in East Pakistan from humanitarian, political, economic and managerial perspectives, but assumed the “overriding importance” of humanitarian considerations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on December 10 by Thomas P. Thornton (S/PC). Thornton also apparently drafted the attached study. Cleared in S/P by Deputy Director Joseph Neubert and Cargo; in NEA by Van Hollen, Quainton, and Constable; and in S/R, IO/UNP, INR/RNA, and AID/NESA.

181. Telegram 223704 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

Indian Ambassador Jha responded to a U.S. request to outline India’s war aims.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent immediate as Tosec 9 to the White House with a request to pass it to Secretary Rogers on Air Force One. Repeated to Dacca, Islamabad, London, Moscow, and USUN. Drafted by Quainton and approved by Irwin