In view of the recent changes in the situation with regard to the FTAI
(e.g. election of new government, advance of referendum to January,
1977) the ad hoc interdepartmental Group is submitting herewith an
updating of the situation. We will shortly be sending our formal agency
comments on the study on the future of the FTAI prepared in response to
NSSM 239.
Attachment
Report Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group
Washington,
undated
AN UPDATING OF THE SITUATION IN
THE HORN OF AFRICA
[Page 2]
Since the writing of the study on the independence of the FTAI, there
have been a number of significant developments.
FTAI: In June the representatives of the three principal political
groups within the FTAI met in Paris with French Government officials
in order to agree to steps leading to independence. The
representatives of the National Independence Union, the African
People’s Independence League (APIL), and the FTAI parliamentary
opposition all pledged support for a government of national unity,
and have signed [text not declassified] (The
French admit some doubt concerning the value of these pledges.) The
GOF agreed to modify the
nationality code of the Territory which has heretofore restricted
the franchise so as to assure an Afar majority. Earlier, as evidence
of its willingness to play an evenhanded role between the Afars and
the Issas, French authorities in the FTAI resumed the responsibility
for public security which had been delegated to Territorial Prime
Minister Ali Aref’s
government.
[Page 3]
Following the Paris agreements, rioting broke out in Djibouti on July
9 between Afars and Issas and at least 15 people were killed.
Ali Aref’s supporters may
have begun the disturbance in order to postpone his political
demise, for by then it was clear that he was unable to attract
sufficient support to form a broadly based government. He accused
the French of yielding to Somali pressure, and he.refused to
associate himself with the Paris agreements. Submitting to French
pressure, he finally resigned on July 17 and was replaced on July 29
by Abdallah Kamil, Secretary General of the preceding
government.
France: A high Quai source has informed us
that French determination to attempt to maintain a military presence
in Djibouti has significantly declined, although French
representatives have said that they are prepared to offer
cooperation in military matters to the new state after independence.
No African country has been willing to support a French troop
presence openly. Nor has the GOF yet
been able to obtain the sought for guarantees of the Territory’s
independence from any organization or state (aside from Ethiopia).
In the
[Page 4]
face of these
discouraging developments, the GOF
is determined to maintain the schedule for Djibouti independence.
The referendum is now planned for January 1977, a constituent
assembly is to be elected in March, and independence to be granted
in May or June. According to one high Quai source, the GOF sees little hope for a truly
independent state and expects a Somali move to take over the
Territory shortly after independence, a move which the Ethiopians
will be in no position to prevent. The State Secretary for Overseas
Departments and Territories takes a more optimistic view of the
future of Djibouti as an independent state and hoped the US would
support French efforts.
Somalia: Somali-supported political
activity was instrumental in undercutting Ali Aref. Following the
Paris negotiations, Hassan Gouled, leader of the APIL, visited
Mogadiscio and there pledged to include the GSDR-controlled Front for the Liberation of the Somali
Coast in future talks leading to FTAI independence. However, he
apparently did not prove as pliable a tool of Somali ambitions as
Siad had hoped. Meanwhile Somalia continues its pressure on Ethiopia
by supporting
[Page 5]
incursions
of irregular combatants into the Ethiopian border areas. Our Embassy
in Mogadiscio sees little chance of an overt Somali military move
against an independent FTAI but believes that Somali-sponsored and
directed subversion against FTAI will continue. (See top of page 5
of NSSM 239).
Ethiopia: The Government of Ethiopia has
reluctantly accepted the withdrawal of Ali Aref from the center of the political scene.
During Hassan Gouled’s visit to Addis in June, the EPMG agreed that all “habitual
residents” of the FTAI should participate in the political process.
This was a significant concession to the Somali ethnic elements in
the Territory. However, the EPMG
remains gravely concerned over lower level pan-Somali influences in
the APIL. In one attempt to assure the stability of the Territory
the EPMG has requested that the
Soviet Union exercise a moderating influence on the GSDR. We have been told that in
mid-1975 the EPMG turned to the
USSR for military assistance,
but was refused. In July of this year an Ethiopian delegation
visited Moscow and our Embassy there speculates that this time the
Ethiopians may have gained the promise of some military assistance.
[Page 6]
Chairman Teferi Bante, however, has said that
the EPMG considers Soviet
assurances to be less than satisfactory, and has suggested to us
that US-Soviet collaboration could help to preserve the peace. He
also told us that the scale and pace of the Somali infiltrations
into Ethiopia have increased. U.S. Embassy Addis agrees with Embassy
Mogadiscio’s thesis that Somali subversive efforts in the FTAI or
unplanned border clashes between Ethiopia and Somali forces carry a
greater risk in triggering full-scale hostilities over Djibouti than
the more unlikely contingency of a Somali attack on the
Territory.
The OAU:
Much of the Somali-Ethiopian maneuvering has taken place within the
context of the OAU. At the most
recent meetings in Mauritius, the Ethiopian draft resolution on the
FTAI was accepted substantially as written. The final OAU resolution reportedly reaffirmed
respect for FTAI territorial integrity, proposed OAU observers at the Djibouti
independence referendum, and called for a round table conference of
all political groups and recognized liberation movements under
OAU auspices to draw up a common
political
[Page 7]
platform.
(This meeting was scheduled to take place in Accra in August, but
has now been indefinitely postponed at the request of the APIL.)
In a press conference in Mauritius, the Somali Head of Delegation
again refused to renounce explicitly the historic Somali claims to
Djibouti (a move that would be impossible for a Somali Government to
make and still retain any popular support), saying that Somali
urging of unconditional independence for the Territory superceded
any such claims, and he rejected the Ethiopian proposal that the two
neighboring states guarantee the independence and territorial
integrity of Djibouti, but he did state that Somalia would accept
OAU or UN guarantees.
The USSR:
Gromyko assured the French Foreign Minister in April that the
Soviets favor a settlement in Djibouti on the basis of “the opinion
expressed by the local populace” and have so informed the Somali
Government. The Ethiopians report that they too have received
assurances from the Soviets; the Soviets, on the other hand, told
the French that they had urged both sides to adopt reasonable
positions. The Soviet-Ethiopian communique of July 14 indicated that
Soviet economic experts and teachers might
[Page 8]
be sent to Ethiopia, and there is an oblique
hint that some military cooperation may be in the offing.
We have no specific confirmation of the assurances given Ethiopia or
the restraining signals that the USSR may have passed on to Somalia and Ethiopia. As our
Embassy in Moscow has noted, it is in the Soviet interest to portray
itself to Addis as a restraining influence on Siad, while the line of least
resistance would in fact be a reproving acquiescence in Somali
subversion.
The Arab States: The Saudis and the
Egyptians have both expressed concern about the future of Djibouti.
The Egyptians have requested permission to open a Consulate General
in Djibouti, and Ambassador Porter has suggested to the Saudis that an official
presence in the FTAI might be a useful contribution to stability.
The French have not yet made a decision concerning the Egyptian
request.
