The major threat to U.S. interests in the period ahead will be a takeover
of the government in Addis Ababa by the radical members of the AFCC. If moderates on the Military
Committee, by contrast, are able to keep the upper hand, Ethiopia will
probably maintain reasonably friendly ties with the U.S. and seek
continued U.S. economic and military assistance.
Tab A
Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency
Washington, October 15, 1974
Introduction
Ethiopia’s creeping revolution—now some 8 months old—has not yet
unfolded to the point where we can speak with confidence about the
nature of the successor regime or the policies that will eventually
take shape. Thus far, a single leader has not taken stage center and
dominated the revolution; factions within the military are still
locked in struggle to capture command of the revolution that is
largely being played out away from public view.
What follows is thus necessarily an interim assessment on where the
country stands now and the direction it will take in the months to
come. We have divided the subject, somewhat arbitrarily, into three
parts: Part I discusses Ethiopia’s internal political situation and
where that appears to be headed. Part II tries briefly to place
Ethiopia in its East African context. Part III is concerned with
Ethiopia’s international role and its relations with the US and that
Soviet Union.
Conclusions
—Instability and governmental paralysis will continue for some time,
and the moderates will be subject to conflicting pressures from
extremists at both ends of the political spectrum. We believe that
the moderates will stay reasonably united, however, and retain
control of the Ethiopian revolution, at least in the short term.
They will attempt to carry out political and economic change a step
at a time guided by pragmatism rather than ideology.
[Page 4]
—radical military and civilian elements will continue to challenge
the moderates’ leadership. In order to avoid a complete break with
the radicals, the moderates may have to make concessions on some
issues, thereby pushing the revolution farther to the left.
—The coordinating committee will probably abandon any pretense of
maintaining the monarchy and declare a republic, headed by General
Aman.
—General Aman’s influence may increase, but he is not likely to be
able to establish a position independent of the coordinating
committee or to become Ethiopia’s strongman. In his exposed
position, he could also be blamed for any of the revolution’s
serious mistakes or failures, and be removed from office.
—One of the military’s less well known figures may yet emerge as the
revolution’s acknowledged leader. This process could take many
months, perhaps a year or more. One prospective candidate for such a
role is Tessema Abaderash, an air force colonel. He is an ally of
the moderates, part of Aman’s entourage, and deputy commissioner of
the drought relief commission. This latter position could provide
him with the means of extending his power and influence.
—Land reform will be the first major program carried out by the
military.
—Somalia will not try to seize the Ogaden unless there is an almost
complete breakdown in order inside Ethiopia.
—Ethiopia will give stronger emphasis to non-alignment while trying
to maintain good relations with Western countries, especially close
economic and military ties with the US. If the moderates become
seriously dissatisfied with US military aid, they might carry out a
more basic shift in foreign policy as a means of appeasing the
radicals and bidding for major Soviet support.
Internal Politics
With the deposition last month of Haile
Selassie the military emerged as the undisputed
center of supreme political authority in Ethiopia. The ruling armed
forces, however, are divided within their own ranks and are not yet
able to provide coherent leadership.
[Page 5]
The political change set in motion by the military revolt is
irreversible. The old order based on position, wealth, and family
connections has been destroyed. The monarchy has been retained for
the moment, but we believe the ruling Armed Forces Coordinating
Committee—whatever its original intention—will probably opt soon for
a republican form of government.
Beyond acquiring power and neutralizing the political establishment
under the former emperor the military has done little to reorder
Ethiopia’s social and economic fabric, despite its earlier promises.
For the most part, tha impact of the revolution so far has been
confined to the top layer of the upper classes and to the cities.
The bulk of the peasant population remains unaffected, although
there have been numerous isolated instances of peasants taking
matters into their own hands and attempting to seize lands from
their landlords. The provincial elite—- comprised of landlords,
merchants, and grain dealers—-remains entrenched in the countryside.
The military has been too preoccupied with power struggles within
its own ranks and with its conservative civilian opponents in the
capital to plan or inaugurate a coherent program of change.
The military has, however, created expectation of further significant
change, and has made numerous promises of specific new policies. At
this time, the basic goals of the Armed Forces Coordinating
Committee appear to be:
- —Complete destruction of the feudal social order and an
end to the local domination by the provincial elite. This is
to be accomplished mainly by land reform and by the
enactment of new laws altering the relationship between
tenant and landlord.
- —A reordering of economic priorities to give emphasis to
improving the lot of the less affluent. The committee wants
active government encouragement of economic development and
plans a larger direct economic role for the
government.
- —A commitment to the establishment of constitutional
government.
- —Maintenance of Ethiopia’s present boundaries, combined
with the introduction of a measure of political
decentralization for the country’s diverse ethnic and
regional groups. The new leaders clearly will not tolerate
separatism, however.
[Page 6]
Members of the coordinating committee, while endorsing these broad
goals, differ on the pace and method of change. A constant shifting
of alliances, both within and between the units represented on the
committee, complicates the task of defining the various factions. A
basic division, however, has emerged between a majority group with
essentially moderate objectives, which so far has commanded majority
support within the committee, and a more radically-inclined minority
group. Almost all the committee’s major decisions have reflected the
moderates’ viewpoint; the radicals had their way only on the
deposition of Haile Selassie in which they ware aided by an
accumulation of evidence of the ex-emperor’s corruption.
The moderates favor a continuation of military rule until the country
is better prepared for parliamentary democracy, a more
representative legislative assembly is elected, and land reform is
underway. At present, their reported goal is a return to civilian
government within two or three years, but they could well decide to
extend the period of military control. The moderates favor
far-reaching changes, but they want to move cautiously and to gain
broad civilian support without resorting to coercion.
The moderates, if they stay in charge, will probably stop short of
establishing a thoroughly socialist economy. They appear prepared to
allow private enterprise and foreign investment a significant role
and to refrain from large-scale nationalization of businesses,
except for those enterprises in which the royal family and other
aristocrats have major interests.
Although the moderates are united generally on matters of public
policy, there are tensions among them stemming from porsonal
rivalries, ethnic and regional differences, and military unit
loyalties. These animosities, even if they do not lead to an open
split, will continue to drain much of the committee’s energies and
reduce its ability to direct effectively the country’s affairs.
The radicals on the committee want an immediate return to civilian
rule and the reshaping of Ethiopian society along socialist lines,
together with abolition of the monarchy and harsh punishment of
Haile Selassie and the imprisoned aristocrats. Advocates of Maoism,
communism, “African Socialism,” or the “Tanzanian model” can be
found on the committee. At a minimum, the radicals—found mostly in
the air force—want
[Page 7]
their
civilian allies in the university and labor unions to have an
important role in the government. Although unable so far to dominate
the committee, the radicals are vocal and aggressive in pushing
their demands, and they could cause considerable trouble. Their
opinions therefore have to be taken into account.
Aman is the front man for the coordinating committee, which picked
him to be titular leader of the provisional military government
because he is personally magnetic and popular with the ranks. He has
drawn large and enthusiastic crowds during travels throughout
Ethiopia, but in private meetings with the cabinet and other
officials he shows deference toward the coordinating committee
representative who almost always accompanies him. There have been
reports of antagonism between Aman and members of the committee;
Aman no doubt chafes at times at taking orders from his juniors, but
right now he does not seem to be engaged in an outright contest for
power with the committee. In recent public statements Aman has
strongly criticized those who attempt to create disunity—the same
line taken by the committee.
If Aman did make a bid for power in the near future, he would
probably lose out to the committee. Aman seems more likely to try to
extend his influence by slow and careful moves than to mount an
overt challenge. He is of a different ethnic and regional origin
than most of the committee’s members. Although these considerations
are less important to the younger military than to other Ethiopians,
they are still potent enough to limit Aman’s chances of establishing
control of the committee.
The Separatist Threat
During the old regime, Haile
Selassie was fairly successful in submerging regional
and tribal differences, with the exception of the separatist
movement in Eritrea. General Aman and the Armed Forces Coordinating
Committee are acutely, sensitive to the possibility that these
differences could come to the fore in the present period of
instability. The military government is thus seeking to defuse such
trouble spots.
In the case of the most pressing of these problems, Eritrea, the
Ethiopian military and the separatist Eritrean
[Page 8]
Liberation Front seem headed toward
negotiations, with the Sudanese government perhaps undertaking a
role as intermediary.
Last month the military committee adopted a more accommodating
position toward Eritrea and named new provincial officials to
replace unpopular appointees of the old regime. The committee, of
course, is unwilling to grant the province independence, and also
seems unlikely to agree to a federation proposal made by some Front
members. Negotiations, once begun, will almost certainly be
prolonged. At present it seems likely that the ELF faction which is more prone to
accept compromise will eventually join with traditional, non-ELF provincial leaders and reach some
agreement with the government. The more radical ELF members will probably continue
terrorist activities, but they will be more susceptible to army
counterpressure.
There is a possibility that the separatist movement will develop. The
Tigre are second only to the Amhara tribe in Ethiopia’s traditional
hierarchy of ethnic groups. Ras Mengesha Seyoum, the Tigre leader,
and one of Ethiopias most powerful aristocrats, remains at large.
The committee only last week issued an order for his arrest,
accusing him of corruption and of trying to organize an
insurrection.
The committee delayed taking action against Mengasha because it
recognized that Mengesha had a better chance than the other noblemen
of organizing armed resistance. Mengesha has been one of the more
progressive members of the aristocracy, and as governor general of
Tigre had made a conscious effort to improve living conditions for
the local population. As a result, he was generally popular, and is
believed to retain many loyal followers. His present whereabouts is
unknown; there are some reports he has fled to Sudan. There are also
reports that several thousand armed men have joined him. Although
this number may be exaggerated, Mengesha could cause considerable
problems for the military if he decided to lead a revolt.
The Galla tribe is another potential source of dissidence. The Galia
are the largest single ethnic group in Ethiopia, but many of them
are dispersed throughout the country. Separatist sentiment is felt
most keenly among the large number of Galla concentrated in an area
south of Addis Ababa. This group carried out an insurgency against
the government from 1965–1970, and they might believe this is an
advantageous time to renew their activities.
[Page 9]
Any separatist moves by the Tigre or Calla would probably first take
the form of sporadic violence and isolated attacks on government
installations. The unity of the armed forces will be a major factor
in determining the success of such movements. If the military avoids
irreconcilable splits in its own ranks, it will probably be able to
prevent large-scale organized resistance. The inauguration of land
reform would also reduce the chances of peasants joining a
rebellion.
Concern about Somalia
The military government’s major regional worry is that neighboring
Somalia has a military edge and might try to grab the Ogaden region
inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The long-stnding feaar of Somali
irredentism was a major factor in Addis Ababa’s recent request that
the US increase military grants and credits to cover the purchase of
arms in lieu of cash sales previously authorized.
Mogadiscio will be on the watch for signs that the preparedness of
Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden had deteriorated to such an extent
that Somalia could seize a sizable portion of territory in a quick
action and hold it against an Ethiopian counter-attack and the
ensuing international diplomatic pressures. We do not believe,
however, that Somalia will move against the Ogaden area unless thore
is serious disorder in Ethiopia.
The Somalis have indicated they do not intend to take advantage of
Ethiopia’s preoccupation with internal affairs to interfere in the
Ogaden. Thus far, Somali President Siad had adhered to this pledge.
A breakdown in law and order in Ethiopia, however, would be likely
to tempt the Somalis at least to support gnerrilla activity across
the Ethiopian border. The Somalis realize that an outright attack by
their regular forces would probably unify the Ethiopians.
The coordinating committee may hope to reach an accomodation with
Somalia, but at best the Somalis are only likely to agree to a
mutual thinning out of military units in the area and stricter
observance of a neutral zone along the border. The Ethiopians would
probably view this as buying time. They might view their military
requirements in less alarmist terms, but their search for more arms
would continue.
[Page 10]
Foreign Relations
The Armed Forces Coordinating Cormittee has thus far been able to
give relatively little attention to foreign relations, being
preoccupied with ousting the old order and now engaged in infighting
for control of the revolution. We surmise, however, that the
military’s use of the slogan “Ethiopia First” has implications for
foreign policy as well as emphasizing the need for domestic
reforms.
Just as there is conflict between moderate and radical military
factions over the nature and pace of domestic reform, we think these
differences spill over into the foreign policy field. As long as
moderates are dominant on the coordinating committee, wa expect that
it—and the predominantly civilian cabinet fronting for it—are likely
to follow these guidelines:
- —Pursue better relations with svmpathetic regional states,
such as Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. We expect the
Ethiopians to look to the Saudis and Iranians for arms and
economic aid. The Ethiopians will be importuned by Libya to
establish closer ties.
- —Emphasize third-world solidarity more than did the old
regime loosen political ties with the US as the new
government tries to distance itself from the policies of
Haile Selassie.
- —Continue to look to the US as its major arms supplier,
more for technical than ideological reasons. Should the US
be deemed unresponsive to Ethiopia’s military needs, the new
Ethiopian rulers will look elsewhere.
We know that the Ethiopians have already made inquiries to the Soviet
Union about aid. Moscow has indicated a willingness to provide
Ethiopia with some military assistance, but Soviet officials have
been very cautious. They have requested that detailed studies of
Ethiopian needs be provided and said te Soviets woald provide aid at
levels “permitted bv Soviet resources.” Mosocw’s diffidence stems in
part from its reluctance to offend Somalia and thereby jeopardize
Soviet access to military facilities there.
The fact that the Soviets have not flatly turned down the Ethiopians
suggests that Moscow thinks it can have it both ways in East
Africa—as long as it does not give the Ethiopians too much.
[Page 11]
Addis Ababa is seeking more military aid because it believes Soviet
arms deliveries to Somalia have given Mogadiscio the military edge.
The Ethiopians are also trying to use their dialogue with Moscow to
gain leverage in dealings with the US for military aid.
Most members of the ruling Armed Forces Coordinating Committee
probably want to continue to rely mainly on the US for aid; they
probably see Soviet aid as supplemental. If the Ethiopians become
dissatisfied with US military aid, they could seek closer military
ties with communist countries. Some of the radicals within the
military committee are already pressing for a turn in that
direction.
Ethiopian military and civilian leaders are hopeful that Saudi Arabia
and Iran—in addition to the US—will provide cash for arms purchases.
King Faysal and the Shah, however, are reluctant to provide such aid
while Ethiopia’s domestic situation remains unstable. If the
military should decide to take harsh action against Haile Selassie,
they are likely to be even less responsive to Ethiopian
requests.
If the moderates on the military committee are able to keep the
upper-hand, Ethiopia will probably maintain reasonable friendly ties
with the US and seek continued or increased US economic and military
assistance. A takeover by the radicals would probably lead rapidly
to a substantial decline in US influence in Addis Ababa.
