Morocco
127. Intelligence Note RAAN-36 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
This 3 page report observed that the General Oufkir’s suicide removed an irreplaceable pillar of support to the Hassan regime as Oufkir’s total devotion to the monarch, coupled with his ruthlessness and organization, had enabled the monarchy to maintain control of the military in spite of attempts to overthrow the regime. As the loyalty of the military was critical to the survival of Hassan’s regime, the report noted that a purge of the Moroccan forces was likely and that the United States might possibly be assigned responsibility for supporting the opposition.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hoffman; cleared by Godfrey Summ (INR/Africa).
128. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)
Following the August 16 coup attempt in Morocco, Rush requested recommendations on how the United States could reduce its military dependence on the communications facilities there.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 75–0125, Box 15, Morocco 000.1, 1972. On September 22, Vice Director of the Joint Staff Martin Colladay responded to the request for alternatives to U.S. communications facilities in Morocco. He reported the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s conclusion that “No precipitate action be taken to reduce US personnel assigned to NAVTRACOM Morocco which supports the Kenitra Air Force Base” but that “current US Navy plans to reduce telecommunications operations at Sidi Yahia complex in late FY 1975 continue as planned.” The Joint Chiefs also recommended that “When a Fleet Satellite Communications System is operational in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Basin, approximately FY 1977, and lack of dependency on Moroccan-registered frequencies has clearly been established, the United States then inform the Government of Morocco of its intent to close C [text not declassified] facilities entirely.” (Ibid., OASD Files, (C) (A), FRC 77–0094, Box 65, Morocco 1972)
129. Memorandum From the Secretary of State (Rogers) to President Nixon
Rogers summarized Hassan’s position in the wake of the failed coup against him by the Moroccan Air Force and noted that another assassination attempt could create a dangerously unstable and unpredictable situation in Morocco. Rogers’ outlined U.S. actions following the assassination attempt and presented 3 options for the future.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MOR. Secret. For the draft NSSM as approved, see Document 133.
130. Telegram 4147 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State
In this 8 page telegram, Ambassador Stuart Rockwell reported on his September 7 meeting with King Hassan. Hassan analyzed the coup attempt and described his future plans for restoring order.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MOR. Secret. It was repeated to Paris, Madrid, Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, Casablanca, Tangier, USCINCEUR, and COMNAVTRACOM.
131. Special National Intelligence Estimate 61–1–72
This 7 page estimate examined the prospects for the Moroccan monarchy and concluded that Hassan’s position had been seriously weakened. Another attempt against him was liable to succeed.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Treasury who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.
132. National Security Study Memorandum 160
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger delivered President Nixon’s request for a study of U.S. policy toward Morocco, which would examine U.S. interests and options for protecting them.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM’s), Nos. 104–206. Secret.
133. Telegram Secto 80/3838 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State
The telegram transmitted a memorandum of a conversation between Rogers and Behima, in which they discussed a range of issues, notably the need to reconsider U.S. bases in Morocco in order to placate the Moroccan opposition.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 MOR-US. Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated to Rabat and Madrid.
134. Analytical Summary
This 8 page summary examined the paper on U.S. Policy Toward Morocco produced in response to National Security Study Memorandum 160.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-66, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 160. Secret. The full NSSM 160 study, dated October 25, is not printed. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 100, Senior Review Group Meeting, Morocco, NSSM 160) The Special NIE is printed as Document 132.
135. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting
The Senior Review Group concluded that it was strategically important for the United States to maintain friendly relations with Morocco; that King Hassan, still the focal point of authority, deserved support; and that the U.S. military should reduce its presence at Kenitra.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-66, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 160. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The CIA statement is ibid., NSC Files, Box 100, Senior Review Group Meeting, Morocco, NSSM 160.
136. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and William Quandt of the National Security Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders and Quandt reported that King Hassan hoped to send an emissary shortly to improve U.S.-Moroccan relations and indicated that Hassan continued to believe that the United States was involved in the coup attempts against him.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-237, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 200. Secret. Sent for action. Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. The minutes at Tab C are printed as Document 136. The NSDM at Tab C is printed as Document 138. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger approved all recommendations and indicated that he wanted Saunders to meet with Canton.
137. National Security Decision Memorandum 200
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded President Nixon’s approval of the conclusions reached at the Senior Review Group meeting on Policy Toward Morocco.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-237, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 200. Secret.